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Abstract 
Although the Philippines’ populist strongman Rodrigo Duterte is often called the Trump of the 
East his unexpected victory in the 2016 Philippine presidential election has created such a 
bloody legacy that Duterte’s impact may even outlast his namesake’s.  Duterte’s rise to power 
occurred in the country with the world’s heaviest Facebook users and relied on this social media 
platform to a far greater extent than any candidate had during the 2010 Philippine presidential 
contest.  This development determined that Facebook would be the main subject of this 
analysis.  This research analyses what happened during the 2016 Philippine presidential 
election campaign by examining the role Facebook played in Duterte’s success from when his 
candidacy was formally approved on December 17, 2015, through to the presidential election 
on May 9, 2016.  It subjects two key Facebook accounts, Duterte’s official page and a 
representative example of one of the hundreds created to support him, to content and discursive 
analysis.  It places Team Duterte’s use of Facebook within the overall context of the campaign 
and shows how Duterte’s complex and contradictory identity as a candidate was constructed 
for two very different Facebook audiences.  This research also considers how Duterte’s rise 
was linked to the assistance he received – either intentionally or otherwise – from other 
members of the Philippine political and media elite.   
In contrast to his official position as a vulgar yet ultimately non-threatening change 
agent Duterte’s diehard Facebook activists and their networks of fake Facebook accounts 
revelled in distributing blatant utopian messaging.  This contributed to Duterte’s dominance of 
the political discourse of the campaign and exploited the Philippines’ messiah complex.  It 
helped Duterte present himself as a Christ-like saviour; the country’s last hope, the Philippines’ 
last card.  As a result, this research also examines the parasocial relationship between Duterte 
and his supporters.  This is because their belief that they knew who Duterte was and that he 
could be trusted with imposing a new dictatorship has allowed Duterte to unleash what he 
considers to be the final solution to all the Philippines’ problems – the violence which he 
previously used as a local warlord to pacify the most chaotic and ungovernable city in Asia. 
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We should remember how Hitler came to power – Benigno Aquino III  
Chapter 1. Introduction 
This research examines the role Facebook played in Rodrigo ‘Rody’ ‘Digong’ Duterte’s 
success in the Philippines’ 2016 presidential election campaign and his acquisition of 
power in what used to be one of the freest countries in Asia.  Duterte and 2016 in general 
(Taylor, 2016) are not a minor bump in a road leading towards the inevitable triumph of 
liberal democracy and free markets (Fukuyama, 1992).  Instead, they may herald a new 
post-truth moment (Oxford Dictionaries, 2016) in which distortions and outright 
fabrications can help propel authoritarian candidates into office. Although Duterte’s 
model is a specific Philippine one which could prove impossible to export it is 
also a timely reminder of what violent dictatorship actually looks like in the 21st 
Century.  The revolution he has imposed on a nation which was only just 
overcoming the costs of its last flirtation with one-man-rule demonstrates how easy 
it is to distract and lie during the Information Age.  The ways Duterte’s campaign 
leveraged Facebook during the presidential election seem relatively innocuous 
compared to what has come afterwards.  Yet it is important to remember that the mass 
killings which Duterte has introduced would not have been possible without it.  
Although other factors such as his effective television performances and well-attended 
rallies also played an integral part in his campaign success, Facebook became a key 
battleground in which his rivals failed to adequately compete despite their previous 
dominance of this medium (Occenola, 2016a).  
This research consists of content and discursive analyses of the activity of Duterte’s 
personal Facebook account during the official campaign period as well as that of a 
representative example of one of the hundreds of pro-Duterte Facebook pages created to 
support him.  The claims that this Facebook data made on Duterte’s behalf are also 
subjected to constant comparative analysis using Philippine and international media 
sources to check the Facebook data’s veracity and how the Duterte campaign was covered.  
This is because Duterte’s candidacy was able to exploit the culture of complacency which 
permeated the Philippines’ traditional political and media elite.  The unexpected 
victory of the most divisive figure in Southeast Asia since the end of the Cold War 
came about after a prosperous six-year period of high economic growth rates and 
technocratic government.  However, successive administrations had struggled to erode 
the poverty and corruption which made successful regional warlords such as Rodrigo 
Duterte appear as if they were a necessary part of the Philippine political landscape.  
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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At the beginning of the campaign it seemed unlikely that an uncouth provincial 
politician could really represent a revolutionary populist alternative.  As a result, his 
opponents refused to act in a forceful and co-ordinated fashion while Duterte was still 
vulnerable.   
Duterte’s deliberate obfuscation and blurring of East-West boundaries helped him 
to present his brutal mayoralty of the Philippines’ largest southern city as a development 
model for the rest of the country.  This distinctiveness also characterised Duterte’s use of 
Facebook during the campaign period because – unlike the three other major contenders 
whom he faced – he was the only one in a position to unleash nationwide the systematic 
violence he had previously employed at a local level.  His ability to conceal the true 
magnitude of his social cleansing ambitions while posturing as a non-threatening change 
agent meant that many Filipinos convinced themselves that he did not represent a real 
danger to their fragile democracy.  Yet their fickle flirtation with revolutionary 
populism has propelled a new dictator into power – one whose rule has quickly resulted 
in the largest single massacre of civilians in Southeast Asia since 1979. 
Chapter 1 of this research introduces the Philippine political environment and 
explains how Duterte fits into it.  It also describes the circumstances that affected Duterte’s 
presidential candidacy before stating this research’s key questions and definitions. 
Chapter 2 summarises and critiques the literature analysing Duterte’s performance 
during and after the 2016 election as well as the media and political ecologies which 
contributed to his success.  Chapter 3 details the methodology and methods used to 
examine Team Duterte’s use of Facebook during the 2016 Philippine presidential 
election and the theoretical framework which may offer an explanation for his 
appeal.  This research’s Findings are presented in Chapter 4 while Chapter 5 analyses the 
discursive data collected. Chapter 6 discusses the context of the election and how this 
research’s data fits within it while Chapter 7 provides some conclusions and suggests 
what a post-Duterte Philippines could require.       
Duterte’s rise to power cannot be understood without placing it within the historical 
context in which it occurred.  Many Filipinos see politics as an ongoing war for 
independence.  Even after the collapse of the Spanish Empire in Southeast Asia and the 
Pacific at the end of the 19th Century they remain committed to eliminating their 
Westernised Filipino overlords who benefitted most from European contact (Kerkvliet, 
1977; Paul, Clarke, Grill & Dunigan, 2013).  This Marxist determinism continues to 
divide Philippine society and has shaped Rodrigo Duterte’s political views as well. 
Yet his pacification of the most violent corner of the Philippines also drew heavily on
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the culture of the country’s security forces, the army and police units – and their 
civilian auxiliaries or militias – employed by the dictator Ferdinand Marcos and his 
democratic successors to prevent the Communist Party of the Philippines from 
dominating large swathes of the countryside (Weiss, 2017).  One of the few things the 
Philippine political Left and Right have always agree upon is the necessity of 
violence in order to achieve their aims.   This was a realisation that Duterte was to 
arrive at as well after he became responsible for achieving order and economic 
growth in one of the least stable places on earth.     
1.1     Background 
Although the Philippines consists of more than 7000 islands most of its 102 million 
people live on only 11 of them (BBC News, 2017).  Just over half of the country’s 
population is concentrated on the main northern island of Luzon and nearly 35 million of 
these individuals live in or near the capital in what is known as Greater Manila (Lozada, 
2014).  The second largest island in the country is Mindanao in the south (Central 
Intelligence Agency, n.d.).  However, it is home to only about 20 million people and is 
also where most of the overwhelmingly Catholic country’s Muslim minority live (CIA, 
n.d; Philippine Statistics Authority, 2016a).
The Philippines was part of the Spanish Empire for more than three-and-a-half 
centuries before becoming an American colony from 1898-1946 (Anderson, 1988; 
McBeth, 2011).  Thanks to American largesse it recovered quickly from the devastation 
caused by the Second World War and by the early 1950s had the highest standard of living 
in Asia behind Japan (Hedman & Sidel, 2005; Hutchcroft, 1998; Teehankee, 2006).  
However, the country’s remarkable post-war reconstruction boom was unable to eliminate 
rural poverty fast enough to prevent the large-scale Communist insurgency which occurred 
between 1950-1956 (Boot, 2013).  The Philippines then  seemed to stall economically 
under the dictatorship of President Ferdinand Marcos from 1965-1985 – a period during 
which other countries in Southeast Asia experienced rapid industrialisation and 
income growth (Hedman & Sidel, 2005; The World Bank, 2017).  This, in turn, may have 
contributed to the launching of the country’s second Communist insurgency in 1968 
which along with Muslim separatist movements in Mindanao continue to destabilise 
the Philippines today (Communist Party of the Philippines – New People's Army, n.d.; 
Rabasa et al., 2011). 
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   Map 1: Provincial boundaries within the Philippines' geographical and political regions  
(worldofmaps.net) 
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1.2     The Post-Marcos Years and Rodrigo Duterte 
After working in Mindanao as a 
Davao City public prosecutor 
since 1977 Rodrigo Duterte was 
appointed the city’s Vice Mayor 
by President Corazon ‘Cory’ 
Aquino in 1986.  The former 
housewife and widow of one of 
President Marcos’ main political 
victims, Benigno Aquino Jr., had been the symbolic head of the People Power Revolution 
which had forced Marcos to flee the country earlier in the same year (Anderson, 1988; 
Orejas, 2016).  After briefly considering his anti-Marcos activist mother Soledad Duterte 
for the post it has been suggested that Corazon Aquino chose Rodrigo Duterte at his 
family’s behest and because of the sympathy he showed towards the Communist guerrillas 
he had convicted (Human Rights Watch, 2009; Paddock, 2017; Zabriskie, 2002).  It was 
hoped he would be acceptable to both sides of the key divide in the country at the time, 
between the Maoist New People’s Army (NPA) and the security apparatus which Marcos 
had created to crush them (HRW, 2009).  Paradoxically, Duterte claims membership of 
both the NPA (De Luna, 2016; Sabillo, 2016) and the Kabataang Makabayan, the Youth 
Wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (although he has never been a full member 
of the Party) as well as the Guardians 
Brotherhood military death squad cum fraternity 
(ABC News, 2016a).  These multiple allegiances 
seemed to have allowed him to straddle the main 
fracture in Filipino society even as the NPA 
insurgency initiated by his former politics 
professor Jose Maria Sison (Communist Party of 
the Philippines – New People’s Army, n.d.; 
Sabillo, 2016b) appeared poised to exploit and 
ultimately fill the vacuum created by Marcos’ 
overthrow (Anderson; Quimpo & Quimpo, 
2006).  
Duterte managed to craft a unique if 
obscure political position for himself and this led 
Map 2: Location of Davao City (Whaley, 
2016) 
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to his election as Mayor of Davao City in 1988 (Coronel, 2016).  Back then, the city was 
known as the Philippines’ murder capital and was home to just under a million people 
(Philippine Statistics Authority, 2013a).  As a result of the scale of the multiple 
insurgencies still affecting Mindanao as well as the enduring weakness of the Philippine 
security forces the Davao region – with which the Duterte family had already had a long 
political association – could not escape the violence engulfing the Southern Philippines 
(Paddock, 2017; Zabriskie, 2002).  This was due to the success of the NPA’s assassins, 
their Special Partisan or Sparrow Units (HRW, 2009), on top of the parallel separatist 
insurgencies waged by the Moro National Liberation Front and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (Moro Islamic Liberation Front, n.d.).  When also combined with its 
general banditry and rampant criminality this Muslim minority region was 
totally ungovernable and spiralling out of control (HRW, 2009; Zabriskie, 2002).  
In many ways, it was distinctly different and not really representative of the rest of the 
country – especially in the eyes of Filipinos with their power bases on the main 
island of Luzon (Teehankee & Thompson, 2016).
Yet within 10 years Davao City went from being an area from which people fled, 
to one they fled to (Zabriskie, 2002); from being labelled the most violent place in Asia 
(Coronel, 2016), to one of the region’s most livable cities (The Asiaweek Quality of Life 
Index, 1999).  Some of this transformation was possibly due to external factors – such as 
the identity crisis experienced by the Filipino Left at the end of the Cold War as well as 
the increasing senselessness of much of the political, ethnic and religious violence while 
peace negotiations were occurring with successive 
governments in Manila (HRW, 2007; Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front, n.d).  However, it still seems as if 
the violent chaos plaguing Davao City reached its 
pinnacle just as Duterte occupied the mayor’s office 
for the first time in the late 1980s – and that it might 
have taken his personal and 
controversial intervention to bring it under control. 
It is alleged that Duterte organised former NPA 
and Moro insurgents, some of the local police – as 
well as sundry hitmen-for-hire – into his 
 own private army, the Davao Death Squad     An undated photo of Mayor Duterte
(HRW, 2009; Makabenta, 2016; Zabriskie, 2002).   (Paddock, 2017)
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By 1998, this force may have helped make Davao City safe again but at the cost of at 
least 1000 lives (Rauhala, 2016b).  Initially, those killed were accused of being 
Communist guerrillas or their supporters.  However, it has been claimed that the 
Mayor’s assassins also targeted alleged drug dealers, petty thieves and even the 
city’s street children (HRW, 2009; Valente, 2017).  Davao City was then able to 
attract new investment and over time it became an oasis of security and prosperity 
amidst the tumult of Mindanao – and like no other urban area in the Philippines (Al 
Jazeera English, 2016; InterAksyon News, 2015; Lema, 2016; Whaley, 2016).  This 
enabled Duterte to become a southern Philippine celebrity, a local politician who in 
stark contrast to many others just seemed able to get things done (Makabenta, 
2016; Zabriskie, 2002).  Yet even as late as 2009 he was still relatively 
unknown outside of Mindanao and had not achieved nationwide name 
recognition or anything approaching a national following (Jenkins, 2016).        
1.3     Before the campaign 
The Philippine economy began a period of rapid expansion at the start of the 21st Century 
(The World Bank, 2017) but due to the corruption and dysfunctionality that existed under 
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (Bernas, 2007; Gopalakrishnan, 2007) it was not until 
the election of Benigno Aquino III in 2010 that the country finally began to shake its Sick 
Man of Asia image (Deutsche Welle, 2015; Fensom, 2016; Pinches, 2005).  As a result of 
the Philippines’ strict presidential term limits, designed to prevent a return to Marcos-like 
dictatorship, the Liberal Party of Benigno Aquino III was faced with having to choose a 
successor to contest the 2016 election (Sabillo, 2015b) and eventually settled on Senator 
Manuel Roxas II (Maceda, 2015).  However, by March 2015 it was Vice President Jejomar 
Binay and Senator Grace Poe who led the early polls (Sabillo, 2015a).  This was also the 
first time that a nationwide Pulse Asia survey had asked its participants if they would be 
willing to vote for the Mayor of Davao City, Rodrigo Duterte.  Only 14 percent of them 
were (Sabillo, 2015a). 
Two months later, the Philippine Daily Inquirer newspaper began reporting that 
numerous pro-Duterte accounts were appearing on Facebook even though at this stage 
Duterte had still not publicly declared he would be a candidate in 2016’s presidential race 
(Zamora, 2015).  After confirming he would run on November 21, 2015 (Ranada, 2015; 
Valente & Antiporda, 2015), Philippine national polls showed a number of conflicting 
results (“Binay, Poe tied in new SWS presidential poll,” 2015; Carvajal, 2015).  When the 
margin of error for these are taken into account they indicated that Duterte had closed the 
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gap between himself and his rivals – all three of whom were associated with the presidency 
of Benigno Aquino III.  Roxas, Binay, and Poe combined were attracting the support of 
nearly two-thirds of all respondents.  However, on average individually, they were within 
a few percentile points of each other and from Duterte – who was now polling at around 
22 percent (“Binay, Poe tied in new SWS presidential poll,” 2015).  Although much 
was made at the time about his popularity amongst upper and middle-class voters the 
support he was attracting from less affluent individuals was far more significant 
(Carvajal, 2015).  Despite the major progress in poverty reduction which had 
occurred since 2010 a quarter of the Philippine population was still either 
unemployed or underemployed in 2015, while many other adults could only support 
themselves through informal work in sectors which the state had difficulty 
monitoring at all (National Economic and Development Authority, 2016).      
It seems clear that by the beginning of 2015 Duterte harboured serious presidential 
ambitions.  Although he joked that he would shoot those encouraging him to run he spent 
the weeks preceding the March 2015 Pulse Asia survey conducting a national “listening 
tour” (“Rody Duterte embarks on nationwide ‘listening tour,’” 2015).  Duterte seemed to 
hesitate until he and his advisors could be reasonably certain that his candidacy would not 
end in humiliating failure (Adel, 2015).  It’s also likely that their increased confidence 
was at least partially because of the success of the Duterte campaign’s Facebook efforts 
since May 2015.  However, six months out from the May 9, 2016 presidential election 
Duterte still looked like an unlikely contender.  Although he was the candidate who 
claimed the country was on the brink of collapse and that he was the only one who 
could save it (Cardinoza, Lacorte & Sotelo, 2015), Duterte kept struggling to 
attract significant levels of support outside of Mindanao (Adel, 2015).  As a result, 
the key to Duterte’s victory in the face of the Philippines’ growing prosperity under 
the Liberal Party’s leadership was how individuals in the densely-populated 
provinces of the Northern and Central Philippines were also persuaded to vote for him 
(Pacia, 2016).  Unlike in the United States, Philippine presidents are directly elected by 
popular vote and on election day Duterte secured about 39 percent of all the ballots 
cast (Cerda, 2016a; Salaverria, 2016).  Even though some of his supporters did come 
from the most affluent areas of Greater Manila (Cruz, 2016) the vast majority did not – 
and outside of his ‘Solid South’ bastion of Mindanao (Pacia, 2016) it was the 
choices of low-income voters from rural and small-town backgrounds throughout 
the rest of the country which ultimately propelled him into the Malacañang 
presidential palace (Albert, Gaspar & Raymundo, 2015; Tiongson-Mayrina &  
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Barrientos-Vallarta, 2016).  This electoral  group had become increasingly dependent 
on Facebook for their political news (Williams, 2017) and were also the 
most likely to view celebrity politicians positively (De Guzman Centeno, 2010). 
However, other more traditional political factors cannot be ignored either.  This is 
because even after 10 months of shadow campaigning (“Rody Duterte embarks on 
nationwide ‘listening tour,’” 2015) Mayor Duterte only confirmed his intention to run for 
president during an ambush phone interview while he attended a friend’s birthday party 
on November 21, 2015 (Calleja, 2015; Ranada, 2015).  Despite all the controversy that 
ensued over the following days because of Duterte’s vulgar comments about the additional 
traffic congestion caused by Pope Francis’ visit to Manila in January 2015 (BBC, 2015; 
Gonzales, 2015), it was not until December 17 that the Commission on Elections 
(COMELEC) formally accepted his candidacy (Aning & Carvajal, 2015; Dioquino, 2015a; 
Marañon, 2015).  Filing the paperwork required to become a presidential candidate in the 
Philippines can be an arduous process – as Duterte’s rival Senator Grace Poe also 
discovered – and even when successful, candidates can still be subjected to legal 
challenges or a form of lawfare long after they have been approved by COMELEC 
(Banyan, 2015; Valente & Antiporda, 2015).  Duterte’s problems were compounded by 
his campaign strategy of delaying any public announcement clarifying his 
presidential ambitions until his team were certain that he was capable of attracting 
widespread support (Adel, 2015).  This saw him use an early proxy filing by former 
Greater Manila local government official Martin Diño so COMELEC’s registration 
deadline could be met. Duterte then proceeded to get on the ballot as a substitute 
candidate after Diño had withdrawn as planned (Valente & Antiporda, 2015).  
Senator Poe’s unusual difficulties in establishing whether she met the citizenship and 
residency requirements of the presidency also meant there was a high degree of 
uncertainty around her bid (Banyan, 2015).  This may have been an attempt to 
get her to withdraw so that the official Liberal Party candidate Manuel Roxas II 
would face fewer rivals and therefore have a clearer path to the presidency.     
Duterte only declared he was definitely running a few hours after it became obvious 
that Poe was going to be able to do so as well (Geronimo, 2015).  This was because once 
Poe’s Filipino citizenship by adoption had been confirmed by the Senate 
Electoral Tribunal her candidacy was poised to split the governing Liberal Party vote 
amongst three separate candidates, potentially paving the way for an unlikely Duterte 
victory.  
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1.4      Research question 
What role did Facebook play in Rodrigo Duterte’s 2016 presidential election victory 
and his acquisition of power in the Philippines?  
The purpose of this research is to explore how voters came to support the first provincial 
level politician to be elected president of the Philippines.  Duterte’s campaign used 
Facebook to communicate with different audiences in different ways, at different times of 
the data collection period.  This was done to reassure potential voters from the upper and 
middle-classes.  These voters were alienated by the more extreme and revolutionary 
aspects of Duterteism and needed to believe that a Duterte presidency did not pose a threat 
to their affluence or physical security.  It also allowed the Mayor’s campaign to remain 
simultaneously connected to his diehard supporters who had openly embraced his calls for 
mass killings.  These confusing and contradictory messages were often amplified by 
political and media entities who struggled to accept that Duterte’s statements about 
breaking his critics and hunting down and shooting people he hated were more than just 
macho ‘tough guy’ rhetoric.  This straddling of the East-West divide in the Philippines – 
between its rural feudal violence and Western democratic norms – made the scale of 
Duterte’s national ambitions difficult to pin down even by those who already knew who 
and what he was.       
1.5     Sub-questions 
1/ How was Duterte’s image as a candidate constructed through his official Rody Duterte 
Facebook profile and DU30 for 2016, a representative Facebook account of the 
hundreds managed by his campaign team?  
2/ How did influential figures within the Philippine political and media elite abet Duterte’s 
rise?  
1.6     Operational definitions 
Fickleness is used to describe the fluidity and unpredictability of Philippine politics. 
Although it can imply disloyalty and devious self-interest, it is also employed to show how 
Filipino governments can be suddenly outmanoeuvred and abandoned by their former 
political allies and voters on the slightest pretext (Quimpo, 2005).  It can also be a way for 
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Filipino voters and elected officials to survive shifts in political power and patronage 
which would otherwise threaten their well-being or survival.            
Political populism relies on the perception that some political figures are just more 
responsive to the plight of the common people than others (Acemoglu, Egorov & Sonin, 
2013) – even when it often involves simplistic sloganeering and ignoring expert advice 
(Nichols, 2017).     
New populism is the label attached to contemporary political figures, not just in the Asia-
Pacific region, who seem to defy the traditional ideological orthodoxy of left-wing and 
right-wing political parties. These movements often leverage new communication 
technologies such as Facebook to draw attention to alleged crises in their societies (Moffitt, 
2016). 
Parasociality is a media effect which results in audiences believing that over time they 
have developed an intimate bond with a media personality (Rubin & McHugh, 1987).   
Trivial news will be considered for the purpose of this project as anything which seems 
unimportant in comparison with the past media coverage of Filipino political campaigns. 
Historically, this coverage used to be more about the Philippines’ difficult and complex 
security and economic problems – and how the candidates proposed to solve them – rather 
than the personal lives and personalities of the candidates themselves (Woodier, 2008).      
There is a tendency within Western academia to be preoccupied with populist movements 
– such as Marie Le Pen’s Front National or Germany’s Pegida – that fail to achieve power
at the national level.  The fascination with figures like Donald Trump also means that even
when there seems to be a genuinely disruptive development at the very centre of the Free
World it can still overshadow more disturbing transformations on its peripheries.  In
Europe, Viktor Orbán’s Hungary and Jarosław Kaczyński’s Poland (Cienski, 2016; Faiola,
2016; Krastev, 2016) remain underexamined despite being case studies in creeping
authoritarianism.  However, in Asia it is the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte who has
provided the most stunning example of revolutionary populism.  The horrific loss of life
under his rule has been widely ignored despite its blatant theatricality.  This research is an
attempt to move beyond the assumptions and stereotypes which a figure such as Duterte
routinely inspire.  Without personal knowledge of the current President of the Philippines
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it can be dangerous to claim that it is possible to ‘know’ him in any mediated way.  
However, the data collected by this researcher is a limited window into Duterte’s victory 
which has not been previously exploited.  It is an attempt to capture and preserve a small 
but significant part of Dutertismo’s cyber footprints before they are erased and contribute 
to the composite that Duterte represents.  Although he is an anti-elitist member of the 
Philippine dynastic elite the key to understanding Duterte’s political success is 
comprehending what he was forced to become while corralling Davao City.  The methods 
he first employed there have been reproduced throughout the rest of the country since his 
presidential victory.  They also make the posturing and pretensions of his global populist 
‘peers’ seem quaint in comparison.  This is because Duterte is a Philippine phenomenon 
who represents the conditions and challenges of that country, not the non-
violent discourses of those unaccustomed to death squads and criminal impunity.   
Chapter 2.  Literature review 
This literature review will examine the limited number of academic sources which have 
already analysed Duterte’s 2016 electoral victory and its implications as well as address 
the media and political environments in the Philippines which facilitated his victory.  It 
will mainly describe and critique the iconic literature which focuses on developments in 
these areas since the fall of President Marcos in 1986, before also analysing the sources 
which have begun to assess Duterte’s presidential campaign and his presidency. 
In 2015, prior to the election of President Duterte, the official position of the 
Philippines’ government under his predecessor Benigno Aquino III was that the country’s 
media had traditionally been the freest in Asia (Tuazon, 2015).  Although it glossed over 
the willingness of many of the largest privately-owned media outlets in the country to co-
operate with the Marcos presidency after censorship was imposed under martial law in 
1972, the forerunner of the English language daily the Philippine Daily Inquirer 
was singled out for praise for its refusal to comply with these restrictions (Tuazon, 2015).   
However, although ostensibly uncontroversial, describing the Philippines’ media 
environment as free comes with a number of caveats – some of which were also 
acknowledged by the government in 2015 (Tuazon, 2015).  After President Marcos was 
forced into exile in 1986 Woodier’s (2008) description of the country’s media outlets since 
then as generally freewheeling and chaotic, as well as hyper-competitive, can be broadly 
substantiated.  According to Freedom House (2015) there were around 700  
newspapers and 600 radio stations in the Philippines by 2015.  Yet even while 
acknowledging the award-winning quality of some outlets Woodier’s main criticism in 
2008 was how the Philippine media sector as a whole was embracing a growing shift 
towards trivial celebrity news and gossip.  This search for additional audiences and 
therefore, profitability, was leading to what he felt would be a future crisis for 
Filipino democracy due to the lack of a suitably informed citizenry (Woodier, 2008).  
This was not a concern that Benigno Aquino III’s government shared in the year before 
Duterte’s election, even when they also decried the national obsession with beauty 
queens and scantily-clad starlets (Tuazon, 2015).  Whether this development was 
driven by corporate financial concerns, or whether it merely reflected audience 
preferences, other data seems to represent a far more troubling structural 
challenge for the Philippines’ media and for the country’s politicians.   
    Although Woodier’s (2008) review of the Filipino media 
environment is comprehensive it lacks specificity regarding individual media 
channels.  For instance, government data suggests (Philippine Statistics Authority, 
2010) there may be reasons why some forms of media have proliferated to such a great 
extent since 1986 (Freedom House, 2015) – especially print media catering to 
individuals who are not able to read English and broadcast media servicing Filipinos 
who are unable to read at all.  Historically, overall mass media penetration outside 
Greater Manila has been very low (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2001).  The only 
medium which has always flourished in the rural Philippines is radio and even then, 
only after 1960 (Lent, 1968).  This expansion coincided with the electrification 
of the countryside as well as increasing literacy levels.  However, 
as Lent’s (1968) seminal work demonstrates the transistor technology and 
rural electricity grid required to facilitate this communications revolution were 
still not enough to affect the quality of the broadcasts these voters received.  
This was because advertisers were attracted to the most popular programming, 
which because of the low socio-economic status of the listeners, invariably 
comprised escapist soap operas and vulgar comedies (Lent, 1968).  This 
predilection still remains a part of regional newspapers and TV services half a 
century later.  As Woodier explains, albeit without fully delving into the history 
of the individual media, these publications and broadcasters instinctively 
understand what their undereducated audiences are most interested in.  However, 
even when the government of the Philippines was capable of acknowledging that at 
least 10 percent of the country’s voters in 2010 were essentially illiterate – 
and many others had only completed primary school – Freedom House’s 2015 
report also showed there was an  inability to recognise some of the other forces 
which also define the Philippines’ media environment. 
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The Philippines is supposedly the second most dangerous country in the world for 
journalists, just behind Iraq (Freedom House, 2015).  However, this claim, 
although statistically accurate, suffers from a lack of political context.  For instance, it is 
important to consider what areas of the Philippines are the most dangerous for 
journalists to work in and why.  The Committee to Project Journalists (2017) 
provides more information on each of the 67 Filipino journalists killed during 
Freedom House’s reporting period of 1992-2014.   Yet once again, there is no real 
political analysis only the names and photos of the dead.  These statistics are also 
artificially inflated by a single incident in 2009 on Mindanao which took the lives of 
32 journalists and media workers (Committee to Project Journalists, 2017; 
Freedom House, 2015).   
According to Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) exhaustive 
investigative report, none of the media representatives executed by the side 
of the road on November 23, 2009 in Maguindanao Province were deliberately 
killed because of specific aspects of their coverage.  Instead, these media 
workers died because they were travelling with the wife of a local politician 
who had challenged the dominant clan in the region, the Ampatuans (HRW, 
2010). Although this type of feudalistic violence has at times also 
afflicted other Southeast Asian countries as well (Sidel, 2005), 
HRW believes this massacre symbolises many of the political 
problems in the Philippines – and the complex ties which link provincial 
politicians to those at the national level (HRW, 2010).      
Since the transplantation of democracy into the Philippines during the American 
colonial period various theoretical models have been proposed to explain why 
the country seems to frequently fall short of its economic potential 
(Magcamit, 2016).  Benedict Anderson (1988) tried to show how the 
shortcomings of Filipino politics after 1986 were merely a continuation of 
the historic and exploitative rule of the country’s caciques or native chiefs.  
According to Anderson, this Spanish-Chinese-Filipino land-owning class had 
not only expanded its traditional influence since independence from the 
United States in 1946 but had continued to pursue its own interests at the 
expense of other Filipinos – even as it expediently embraced and led the 
reform movement which attempted to govern following Marcos’ fall (Anderson, 
1988).  As Paul Hutchcroft (1998) also concluded a decade later, no 
meaningful change in the Philippines would ever be possible when all the 
instruments of the state were merely used as tools by the elite in order to enrich 
itself even further, a process which he called “Booty Capitalism.”  He described this 
as a system in which a small number of predatory families are able to successfully 
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exploit the nation’s wealth for their own benefit, while somehow at the same time, 
also prevent the Philippines from developing additional resources for them to 
steal (Hutchcroft, 1998).   
In this version of Filipino politics, voters, just like their ostensible representatives, 
are complicit in perpetuating a clientelist, or patronage-based, pseudo-democracy 
(Anderson, 1988; Hutchcroft, 1998; Quimpo, 2005; Teehankee, 2006).  This model seeks 
to describe how politicians have historically dispensed favours and financial rewards in 
return for electoral support (Hedman & Sidel, 20005; Hutchcroft, 1998) while 
continuing to embezzle state funds on a truly extravagant scale (Carvajal, 2013).  It 
attempts to explain the fickleness of elites who appear to possess no ideology and 
who along with their supporters (Gotinga, 2016; Pulse Asia Research, 2016) 
constantly shift their party affiliation in order to remain close to whatever 
cabal happens to be in power – and therefore, close to the government’s coffers 
(Quimpo, 2005).  
John Sidel (1999, 2005) problematises this framework by introducing the concept 
of bossism to describe how coercive violence is also part of clientelism in the Philippines. 
This strongman mentality and its necessary web of patronage existed long before 
European contact with the archipelago (Sidel, 1999, 2005).  In Sidel’s view, it is one 
which rests on the public not only benefitting – even in only a limited way – from 
these unequal relationships but also being aware of the price of not complying with the 
dominant boss’ wishes (Sidel, 2005).  An excellent example of this is the 
Maguindanao Massacre mentioned earlier and how the challenge to the Ampatuan clan’s 
rule of part of Mindanao by a formerly subordinate politician in 2009 resulted in the 
death of that politician’s wife and all the journalists travelling with her – a mix that in the 
macho Philippines might have guaranteed them a degree of protection when so many of 
the area’s security forces and gunmen were under the Ampatuan’s direct control (HRW, 
2010).  However, it conveyed succinctly to voters in the area the real price of flirting 
with an alternative regional power structure and also ensured that any local 
journalist that had not already been killed understood the dangers of trying to 
expose the Ampatuans’ excesses.  The clan was also instrumental in delivering 
large numbers of votes for any presidential candidate willing to court them 
(HRW, 2010).  However, no single model, even Sidel’s, is adequate enough 
to capture the totality of the political and media environments in the 
Philippines (Quimpo, 2005). 
The most compelling critique of all these competing explanations for the 
Philippines’ dysfunctionality is provided by Nathan Quimpo (2005).  He refuses to accept 
that only top-down politics is possible and instead demonstrates how bottom-up political 
change has occurred throughout the country’s recent history as well.  Many Filipinos, 
including those who have supported the New People’s Army insurgency, refuse to accept 
oligarchical domination (Quimpo, 2005; Rabasa et al., 2011).  As a result, Quimpo feels 
that the term contested democracy best describes the Philippines’ predicament.  Change, 
whether non-violent or otherwise, is always possible within his model and even local 
strongmen, Sidel’s (1999, 2005) rural bosses, can also provide economic development as 
well as a form of political stability.  This is something very much akin to what Rodrigo 
Duterte was able to achieve in Davao City while mayor (Zabriskie, 2002), albeit while also 
discouraging critical coverage of his decisions by local journalists.  One of 
whom, controversial radio commentator, militia leader and former Duterte ally 
Juan ‘Jun’ Pala, Human Rights Watch alleges was killed on Duterte’s orders in 2003 
(HRW, 2009; May, 1992).         
Filipino reporters based in the capital do not face the same physical hazards as their 
counterparts who work throughout the country’s provinces as only two out of the 78 
journalists killed in the Philippines from 1972-2017 were based in or close to 
Greater Manila (Committee for the Protection of Journalists, 2017).  Nonetheless, as Eden 
Flores (2016) showed, national media outlets can still be subjected to external pressures. 
After employing the critical discourse analysis approaches of Teun Van Dijk, Flores 
concluded that some of the Philippines’ most popular print media outlets such as the 
Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Manila Times simply reflected the wider socio-political 
environment that they were part of (Flores, 2016).  He detected no outright 
manipulation in any of the coverage he analysed.  However, it is the nature of this 
media and political environment which deserves further analysis when it goes 
unremarked by both the media outlets he analysed and Flores himself.  This is 
an environment in which officials exposing wrongdoing are routinely kidnapped 
and killed, elections are rigged and the media is forced to rely on evidence 
provided to them by former presidents forcibly removed from office for corruption 
(Flores, 2016).  This process of scandal normalisation may also help explain why 
readership of the main newspapers in the Philippines is in decline (Greenslade, 2006) 
and why some audiences prefer to focus on the complicated love lives of celebrities (De 
Guzman Centeno, 2010) rather than the even more confusing accusatory and 
counter-accusatory staples of Filipino political theatre (Flores, 2016).        
In such a media and political environment it is easy to understand why so many 
Filipinos eventually became heavy Facebook users.  Comprehending the specific details 
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and context of individual political developments requires a high level of existing 
political knowledge.  However, it is estimated that even in highly literate Western 
societies only about two percent of the overall population have historically possessed 
such frameworks (Zaller, 1992).  This new platform could cater to the 
underdeveloped tastes of poorly educated Filipinos in ways that traditional media 
such as newspapers and radio never could, no matter how hard they tried, by placing 
the Facebook account holder’s perceived interests and preferences – based on their history 
of Facebook usage – at the centre of their personal information flows (Carr, 2011). 
Information, regardless of how trivial, affecting a Facebook user’s networks of 
friends, family, pseudo-associates and celebrity idols would begin to supplant information 
from more established print and broadcast media outlets (Carr, 2011; Pariser, 2011).  By 
2015, these “information bubbles” were also prone to manipulation by the millions of 
automated Facebook accounts controlled by the Duterte campaign (Williams, 2017).  This 
gaming of Facebook’s algorithms, the computerised system which determined what 
information was most likely to appear in a user’s Facebook news feed, ensured that 
even though some of Duterte’s political rivals had more Facebook followers than 
he did, Facebook discussions about Duterte still exceeded that of all other presidential 
candidates by a substantial margin (Occenola, 2016a). 
Initially, Facebook’s Filipino members relied on fixed-line internet connections to 
access it and were by 2010 one of Facebook’s 10 most important markets (Kirkpatrick, 
2011).  Yet this fixed-line based connectivity was beyond the means of most rural 
Filipinos.  The Asia Foundation (Tapnio & Rood, 2011) has tracked telecommunications 
progress in the country from its extremely humble beginnings.  Within a single decade, 
between 1991-2001, the Philippines went from having very few fixed-line phone 
connections outside Manila and the country’s other urban centres to being the mobile 
phone capital of the world.  Although Paragas (2010) also documents this almost 
universal mobile connectivity, the widespread adoption of low-cost smartphones in the 
Philippines has only been possible because of the free Facebook access provided by the 
country’s cellular phone networks (Globe Telecom, n.d.; Smart Communications, n.d.).  
As a result, it is estimated that individuals in the Philippines spend more time on Facebook 
than anyone else.  Yet fact-checking what they read for free on Facebook with information 
available through other online sources like the country’s main newspapers remains 
problematic.  This is because even many relatively well-educated Filipinos are still unable 
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to afford the mobile data rates their cellular providers charge and that their free Facebook 
access is meant to encourage them to use (“Fake news in the Philippines,” 2017).    
More than half of the 40 million Filipinos (Jiao, 2016) who own smartphones used 
Facebook to participate in conversations about the elections during the 2016 campaign – 
but this statistic does not convey anything about the substance of that discourse (Dela Paz, 
2016).  Well before the end of the campaign, The Philippine Centre for Investigative 
Journalism (Mangahas, 2016) provided political advertising figures which showed how 
crucial Facebook had become by necessity to Duterte’s candidacy.  This was because 
Duterte was only purchasing roughly five per cent of the amount of broadcast and print 
media ads that his main rivals were.  This was during a campaign in which by the start of 
2016 a total of US$134 million had already been spent by all candidates on political 
advertising (Mangahas, 2016).  However, it was not until more than three months after 
the election that TV broadcaster ABS-CBN News began to investigate exactly how 
important Facebook had been to President Duterte’s victory. .   In a televised 
forum organised by the network the director of Duterte’s social media efforts during 
the election, Jose Gabriel ‘Pompee’ La Viña, claimed that their campaign relied on 12 
million Facebook volunteers to promote Duterte’s character and his focus on combatting 
illegal drugs (ABS-CBN, 2016g). It then took until January 2017 for this assertion to 
be robustly challenged by the New Republic’s Sean Williams (2017).  Williams 
contends that although the Duterte campaign did have a significant number of 
unpaid online volunteers thousands of paid celebrity influencers and millions of 
fake Facebook accounts also played a role in spreading the political messages devised 
by La Viña and his staff (Williams, 2017). 
In the immediate aftermath of Duterte’s win a handful of Western and 
Filipino academics rushed to publish insights into the reasons for his upset victory 
(Casiple, 2016; McCargo, 2016; Teehankee & Thompson, 2016).  These snapshots 
were some of the first academic texts to probe the election outcome, even 
though methodologically, most rely more on the experience and instincts of the 
authors than comprehensive and rigorous analysis.  McCargo (2016) summarises 
Duterte’s appeal as that of a local provincial boss, someone who has 
campaigned solely on his sexual conquests and determination to use extra-
judicial killings to solve all the country’s problems, from petty theft to 
illegal narcotics distribution and corruption.  Yet McCargo seems confused by 
how widespread Duterte’s popularity is, even among those  who teach at the 
University of the Philippines (McCargo, 2016).  Teehankee and Thompson (2016) 
also single out the Duterte campaign’s lack of specific policies, 
although they acknowledge that one of Duterte’s key promises was to invest heavily   
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in improving the country’s infrastructure.  They see Duterte’s victory as essentially 
co-opting voters who had supported the economic policies of the previous 
president, Benigno Aquino III, but who are also comfortable with the measures outside 
the law the Duterte campaign implied would be necessary to protect the gains 
made under the preceding government (Teehankee & Thompson, 2016).  
However, Casiple (2016) provides a slightly different take.  He agrees with 
Teehankee and Thompson that a large number of middle-class voters were 
prepared to support Duterte in the belief that the new president would be able to 
continue the Philippines’ breakneck economic growth rates while also clamping 
down on crime.  Yet Casiple also feels that what really happened in May 2016 
was a protest vote against the country’s political elite and despite the progress 
made in 2010-2016, an indictment on how little the lives of many Filipinos 
had improved since President Marcos was deposed 30 years before 
(Casiple, 2016).  However, this conveniently ignores the material 
improvements which have occurred in many Filipinos’ lives since 1986.  
As Casiple alluded to, want and need had not been completely eradicated.  Yet the 
voters who were old enough to remember the famines and gross economic 
mismanagement of the Marcos Years (Scott, 1987; UCA News, 1985) should 
have been well placed to remind their younger counterparts, obsessed with avarice 
and Facebook-fuelled resentment, about the dangers of demagoguery and how a brave 
new order can also result in financial as well as moral collapse.       
Since these initial articles were first published other more measured and systematic 
studies have appeared.  Heydarian (2017) was the first to impose a theoretical framework 
on what Duterte represented.  Although this was an admirable effort it still feels rushed 
and crowded with far too many competing explanations to offer a truly definitive account 
of Duterte’s political appeal.  Heydarian’s belief that Duterte’s success represented a 
populist anti-establishment backlash confirms Casiple’s earlier conclusions.  However, it 
also becomes confused when it attempts to explain how the Mayor eroded the liberal 
Greco-Roman democratic norms of the Philippines (Heydarian, 2017).  This is because, 
just like the illiberal Duterte, Philippine liberalism has distinctively Filipino 
characteristics and is not always directly comparable to that of its non-violent Western 
counterparts.  However, in fairness to Heydarian his arguments also reflect the values 
and limitations of the word-class academic community he belongs to.  He successfully 
identifies Duterte as a strange admixture of right and left-wing principles without 
delving into what the implications of this hybridity really entail in a uniquely Filipino 
context.  In this respect he is no different to the other Philippine scholars who feel more  
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comfortable analysing the hypothetical foundations of Dutertismo rather than its deadly 
outcomes. 
Curato’s Duterte Reader (2017) provides the most comprehensive effort to date to 
systemically analyse the actual performance of the Duterte regime.  Its critical essays 
challenge many of the assumptions about Duterte’s popularity.  In particular, it suggests 
that exactly what those individuals who voted for Duterte expected or wanted from his 
presidency may be as elastic and fickle as the beliefs of other groups of Filipino voters 
(Curato, 2017).  Even though it is comforting to suggest that some of Duterte’s supporters 
had reservations about his use of violence it fails to acknowledge that violence is an 
inherent part of politics in the Philippines – and also, based on the country's high  
crime rate, plays a prominent role in many Filipinos’ interpersonal interactions as 
well.  In this respect, it struggles to accept that the appeal of machismo and violent 
retribution can cross and blur gender as well as class lines (Nery, 2017).  Despite its 
thoughtfulness and insights Curato’s collection lacks what this research also lacks – the 
voice of the Duterte supporters themselves and an attempt to justify their choices in 
their own words.        
The election of Rodrigo Duterte cannot be reduced to the inevitable outcome of 
Philippine media and political failures since 1986.  This review has shown that historic 
factors such as the country’s low literacy rates and a lack of regional mass media outlets 
providing anything other than escapist entertainment have helped limit the 
opportunities for genuine political and economic reform.  However, no analysis of the 
backlash against the established Filipino ruling elite in 2016 and its consistent inability 
to produce more widespread and inclusive prosperity can ignore the role Facebook 
played in Duterte’s victory either.  Any more than it can ignore the corruption and 
coercive violence which has made that restructuring so elusive for so long and for some, 
possibly undesirable.   
This research examines the Duterte campaign’s use of Facebook within the 
political and media context of the overall presidential race.  Rather than generalising about 
Duterte’s attributes or how he achieved power it categorises the content produced by 
individual Facebook accounts vital to the Duterte presidential campaign.  It also analyses 
the specific meanings those accounts attempted to convey during it.  These analyses are 
necessary because the inevitability of one particular candidate’s success may only be 
obvious after the final results are tallied.  Such assertions often obscure the agency of 
politicians and their advisors in addition to that of the country’s voters.  An underfunded 
campaign like Duterte’s which was forced to rely heavily on social media required an 
exceptionally high level of orchestration, especially when it needed voters to ignore 
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alternative sources of online information to succeed.  This is not to suggest that the other 
2016 Philippine presidential candidates refrained from manipulating vulnerable groups of 
poor and semi-literate voters – as many demonstrably did try to influence or bribe them 
(Gotinga, 2016; Mangahas, 2016; Occenola, 2016a, 2016b).  Yet there was something 
intrinsically different about the discourse of the Duterte campaign and its cult of violence 
– both online and offline.  For example, some of his critics were threatened on Facebook
with rape or death (Karunungan, 2016; “‘Sana ma-rape ka’: Netizens bully anti-Duterte
voter,” 2016).  However, far more importantly, after at least 24,000 extra-judicial
executions since his election (HRW, 2017; Regencia, 2018; Talabong, 2018) no one else
was ever in a position to apply the Davao solution to the entire country in the way that he
was.
There is no easy remedy to the enduring problem of inadequate voter information 
and knowledge in the Philippines.  However, the 2016 victory of Duterte’s new strain of 
populism has replaced that country’s contested and inadequate democracy with something 
that no longer requires even a shambolic electoral process. 
Chapter 3.  Methodology 
This research employs a mixed-methods approach (Jankowski & Wester, 1995) and 
utilises quantitative and qualitative methodologies.  Since few studies of Duterte’s election 
victory have been completed this project is also by necessity exploratory in nature.  It 
embraces a phenomenological approach which emphasises the meanings (Green, 1995) I 
assign to selected aspects of Duterte’s presidential campaign.  This analysis is also 
informed by a post-structural appreciation of how uniquely Filipino political and media 
conditions intersected and interacted between December 17, 2015, and May 9, 2016.  It 
only resorts to labelling candidates or group of voters as less legitimate than others when 
their behaviours deserve condemnation.  Although some degree of moralising is 
unavoidable when Rodrigo Duterte is directly responsible for the deaths of so many, this 
research attempts to explore the different perceptions (McKee, 2003) which may have led 
to his dictatorial rule.  
German sociologist Max Weber (2009) was one of the first scholars to suggest that 
a disciplined and scientific analysis of media content could lead to a greater understanding 
of how it affected its audiences (Hansen, Cottle, Negrine & Newbold, 1998).  However, 
despite what were for Weber unusually strong positivistic terms what became to be known 
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as content analysis still requires a large amount of subjectivity (Mathews, 2009).  This is 
inevitable because of the coding or classification labels required to analyse the data 
collected.  Labels are invariably selected by the researcher to reflect the research goals of 
their project – even when they also draw upon the systems developed by other academics. 
This labelling system allows the type of content produced by a specific source to be 
counted and compared to others (Mathews, 2009).  Yet there are distinct limits to this 
quantitative approach as it can only produce results based on numerical data.  Only 
further discourse analysis provides insights into the meaning individual texts are intended 
to convey.  
Discourse analysis rests upon the individual propositions or word meanings 
contained in the text being examined (Van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983).  The critical approaches 
employed by Dutch linguist Teun Van Dijk allow a researcher to take those individual 
word meanings and examine them to see if they establish a consistent overall message. 
Van Dijk (1997a) describes this stage as identifying the macro or overall level of discourse – 
a type of narrative construction which frequently relies on strong stereotypes (Condor & 
Antaki, 1997).  He also sees specific examples of discourse as evidence of unequal power 
relationships, which is directly at odds with the ideal discourse environment originally 
described by Jürgen Habermas (1991).  Instead of the model public sphere envisioned by 
the iconic German scholar, where everybody could participate in society’s construction 
through rationally discussing what form it needed to take (Habermas, 1991), Van Dijk 
(1997a), in a similar fashion to Michel Foucault (1988, 1995), sees language and how it is 
employed as a way for entities and individuals to maintain control over others by 
determining what kind of knowledge is acceptable and what isn’t.  This is particularly 
relevant to a country like the Philippines where many people do not have the literacy levels 
or the financial means to access the sophisticated discourses contained in sources such as 
online newspaper articles.  As a result, they frequently rely on the free Facebook access 
that automatically comes with their low-cost smartphones (Globe Telecom, n.d.; Smart 
Communications, n.d.) and the shorter news posts that Facebook provides (Williams, 
2017).
Van Dijk’s critical discourse analysis provides a way to identify power 
inequities in underlying social structures (Keller, 2013).  His ability to move 
seamlessly from microdiscursive analyses, the examination of individual words 
and phrases, to macrodiscursive conclusions, or overarching narratives 
supported by the earlier statements, are an integral part of determining the 
potential impact of any creation of meaning (Van Dijk, 1997a).  The meaning
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constructed by the discursive choices of the language employed in the text is also 
rigorously interrogated by comparing its conclusions with alternative sources and other 
discourses, all the while evaluating each of them for their accuracy and, hence, their 
overall veracity or truthfulness.  Even so, Van Dijk does not claim that there is only 
one truth, only some which are legitimised more than others (Van Dijk, 1997a).  
Comparative studies which analyse and contrast different data sets are capable of 
providing richer results than the isolated analysis of a single source of information 
(Wirth & Kolb, 2004).  However, when the researcher is not fluent in some of the 
languages to be analysed it also poses another set of challenges.  Even when 
professional translators are used much of the complexity and nuance of the 
discourse can be lost when decoding one set of meanings expressed in a particular 
linguistic structure and then reassembling it into the frameworks provided by another 
(Trosborg, 2002).  Although nearly 70 percent of the population of the Philippines 
claims to be fluent in English to some degree (Hernandez, 2015) many Filipinos are 
code-switchers and can jump from languages such as Tagalog – the regional dialect of 
the main Island of Luzon as well as the country’s other official language – to 
English and then back again when attempting to convey a particular meaning.  
One of the key strategies in minimising translation errors is to increase the 
cultural competency of the researcher (Trosborg, 2002).  This leads to a 
greater understanding of the field of discourse or what is happening in the 
background which might affect the original author’s language decisions.  This 
can be greatly enhanced by knowledge of local conditions and political 
developments (Trosborg, 2002).  As a result, this research was conducted with 
a Filipino research assistant based in the Philippines.  This individual assisted 
with the translation of Tagalog and other Filipino terms and phrases which 
formed part of the Facebook posts and other media content I analysed.  
They also provided insights into the political context of this media activity.         
3.1  Theoretical framework 
Parasociality was identified as a mass media effect in the mid-1950s through studying how 
television audiences responded to individual content clips which involved interpellation, 
a phenomenon in which viewers felt as if they were being directly hailed or addressed by 
a person on their TV screens (Dibble, Tilo & Rosaen, 2016; Rubin & McHugh, 1987).  
This allowed researchers to question participants about how they felt towards the 
person they had just viewed – and to see if their responses were like those 
previously observed during the formation of long-distance relationships (Rubin & 
McHugh, 1987).  After initially focusing on audience reactions to specific news    
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presenters (Rubin, Perse & Powell, 1985) research led by American academic Rebecca 
Rubin also began to look at how audiences responded to other television personalities 
as well.   
The approach they took was highly directed and asked the participants to answer 
three main questions; could they imagine becoming friends with the celebrity, did 
they find them physically attractive, and finally, were they competent at their jobs? 
(Rubin & McHugh, 1987).  Although this technique gathered valuable data which 
demonstrated how varied the reasons for parasocial responses were, they primarily 
showed how audiences interacted with time limited and predetermined content 
and not how parasocial relationships develop over longer periods.        
Contemporary developments have not radically revised the overall concept of 
parasocial behaviour.  It still remains an audience’s sense of being in an interpersonal 
relationship of some kind, whether platonic or not, with someone they do not know – or 
are ever likely to meet (Dibble et al., 2016).  However, a clearer distinction has begun 
to be drawn between parasocial responses which occur over a limited time period and 
those that are more enduring.  The former are classified as parasocial interactions 
while the longer-term response is more properly labelled a parasocial relationship (Dibble 
et al.).  
In this research I examine how Facebook contributed to the success of Rodrigo 
Duterte’s 2016 presidential election campaign.  While looking at how Duterte 
the candidate was constructed through selected Facebook accounts I also explore 
whether aspects of his popularity were due to the phenomenon of parasociality.    
3.2  Methods 
The data collection period for this project is from when Duterte’s candidacy was formally 
approved on December 17, 2015 through to the presidential election date of May 9, 2016.  
It subjects content produced during this period by two Facebook accounts, Rody Duterte 
and DU30 for 2016, to content and discursive analysis.  The collection of data for these 
Facebook content and discursive analyses was also influenced by the overall political 
context of the election campaign.     
The first stage of the project examines the type of material which was produced 
during the collection period by the two Facebook accounts selected.  Rodrigo Duterte’s 
official profile was created under the name of Rody Duterte while DU30 for 2016 is a 
representative example of the hundreds of Facebook pages organised and controlled by his 
campaign team.  The content analysis of these two Facebook timelines consist of tallying 
the total number of posts between December 17, 2015 and May 9, 2016 that fall into 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 29     
two categories.  These categories have been modelled on an early comparative content 
analysis of New York City daily newspapers by Byron Mathews (2009).  In his study, 
Mathews drew two distinct conclusions about the news coverage examined.  Either it was 
deemed by him to be trivial or worthwhile overall.  Those items Mathews’ classified as 
trivial would broadly fall under the description of human interest stories, or news which 
did not focus directly on political or economic affairs.  The articles which Mathews felt 
were genuinely worthwhile comprised only political and economic news (Mathews, 2009). 
I have applied similar principles to the examination of the Rody Duterte and DU30 for 
2016 Facebook accounts.  Any post which described a political policy or proposed law 
change was manually counted as worthwhile whereas any others which focused on 
Duterte’s personal attributes such as his popularity were classified as trivial – regardless 
of how significant perceptions of a candidate’s popularity can be in Philippine politics.  A 
total of 118 posts were made by the Rody Duterte account during the collection period 
while DU30 for 2016 was more prolific and responsible for 308.  No specialist software 
was used to identify the posts which fell within the data collection period because of the 
unreliability of Facebook’s search algorithms.  Instead, care was taken to only include 
those posts which were located by manual timeline scrolling.     
The next part of the project employs the discursive analysis techniques of Teun 
Van Dijk to examine individual posts from the two Facebook accounts.  This allows data 
to be extracted and analysed using in-depth qualitative methods.  The overall collection 
period remains the same – from December 17, 2015, to May 9, 2016.  However, the 
individual posts from the Rody Duterte and DU30 for 2016 accounts chosen for discursive 
analysis were taken from distinct periods during the election campaign.  Four posts from 
Rody Duterte and five from DU30 for 2016 were analysed because of the disparity in their 
overall activity and the type of posts each account produced.  This was particularly 
noticeable after March 1, 2016 when the Rody Duterte account made a concerted effort to 
avoid controversy as Duterte began to catch up to and then lead his rivals in mainstream 
opinion polls.  
Individual word choices in the posts selected are analysed to see if over the course 
of the campaign they constructed a macrodiscourse (Van Dijk, 1997a) about Duterte. 
Although the two Facebook accounts emphasised different Duterte qualities at different 
times, there was a high degree of co-ordination between them during the campaign (ABS-
CBN, 2016g; Williams, 2017).  Under the labelling system used during the earlier content 
analysis of the same accounts the posts chosen for discursive analysis are drawn from both 
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the trivial and worthwhile categories.  This is because the key factor in establishing strong 
discursive stereotypes is consistency (Condor & Antaki, 1997), something which is also 
critical in parasocial relationships (Rubin & McHugh, 1987).     
Throughout the project all the Facebook data collected was constantly compared to 
the information contained in other Philippine and international sources.  This was to check 
the veracity and accuracy of the Facebook data’s claims as well as to establish if key 
discursive themes promoted by the Duterte campaign were also reinforced and amplified 
by those other sources.  This comparative data is required to analyse whether other actors 
and factors (Wirth & Kolb, 2004) in the campaign also influenced its outcome.  For 
instance, regardless of the intentionality involved, this project also examines how Duterte’s 
interactions with the Philippines’ political and media elite enhanced his standing with the 
public and contributed to his victory.  A vital component of any comparative study is 
examining how a group of communicative acts can contribute to a new paradigm or norm 
(Wirth & Kolb, 2004).  In Duterte’s case, it is how he managed to normalise the violent 
discourse of the Philippines’ regions while campaigning for the highest office in a 
country still supposedly haunted by the nightmare of the Marcos dictatorship.      
Chapter 4.  Findings: Building tatak (brand) Duterte 
The role that Facebook played in Mayor Rodrigo Duterte’s successful 2016 presidential 
campaign cannot be understood without also examining how his candidacy – and the 
radicalism he represented – were able to exploit the culture of complacency which 
permeated the Philippines’ traditional political and media elite.  This is because the 
politicians and media outlets steeped in the traditions of the country’s capital had long 
tolerated rural feudal bosses such as Duterte as an unfortunate yet also unavoidable part of 
Philippine politics.  They never seemed to imagine that someone like him could really 
represent an alternative revolutionary system of government and failed to act decisively 
while he still appeared like a rustic novelty.  By the time they began to accept how 
dangerous Duterte could be to the country, and to them, it was already too late.     
This research subjects all the posts of the official Facebook account of Rody 
Duterte from December 17, 2015 to May 9, 2016 along with those of DU30 for 2016 – a 
page which is a representative example of the hundreds created to support him – to a 
content analysis.  DU30 for 2016 was selected because it was a part of the online network 
of part-time Duterte supporters who were tasked with promoting the Mayor’s candidacy 
through Facebook.  Although there were other pro-Duterte Facebook accounts such as that 
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of pop star Margaux ‘Mocha’ Uson and blogger Rey Joseph ‘R.J.’ Nieto who achieved far 
greater prominence during the collection period these individuals operated independently 
of the Duterte campaign’s Social Media Co-ordinator Jose Gabriel La Viña (Etter, 2017; 
Go, 2016a; Hofileña, 2016; Kabristante, 2016).  La Viña officially became the co-
administrator of DU30 for 2016 on March 11, 2016.      
Nine individual posts, four from Rody Duterte and five from DU30 for 2016, are 
subjected to further discursive analysis.  Six of these posts are from the first half of 
the data collection period while three were from after March 1, 2016.  This imbalance is 
because the Rody Duterte account produced fewer inflammatory posts after Mayor 
Duterte began to gain momentum in mainstream opinion polls.  
During this process the claims that were made through Facebook on Duterte’s 
behalf were subjected to constant comparative analysis using information derived from 
established Philippine media outlets.  It also drew upon international sources when the 
domestic Filipino coverage was lacking.  Media outlets in the Philippines are often 
expected to employ a degree of self-censorship out of excessive politeness and a desire not 
to offend individuals in leadership positions.  However, after Duterte’s election victory 
this has also become a matter of survival.   
Similar limitations are also inherent in the content and discursive analysis 
frameworks this research has adopted.  This is because, like the Philippines’ legacy media 
outlets, they were not designed to cope with a political candidate who embodied an East-
West elasticity which often made it difficult to take his pronouncements at face value. 
Although Duterte and other local leaders had benefitted from the return of multi-party 
democracy and a semblance of the rule-of-law after the end of the Marcos dictatorship, the 
role that these Western traditions played in Duterte’s control of Davao were minimal.  His 
one-man-rule of the city paid lip service to the values ostensibly espoused by the capital 
while also drawing on the pre-European traditions of Filipino chieftainship.  The 
Philippine politicians committed to perpetuating the country’s democratic norms were also 
guilty of underestimating the danger that Duterte’s regional experiment represented – and 
the surprising level of nationwide support it was able to attract.  None of the data collected 
during this research can be analysed in a meaningful way without also taking into 
consideration the context in which it was produced.  This requires an appreciation of how 
the 2016 presidential campaign developed as well as a sense of what factors between 1986 
and 2016 influenced the rise of populist sentiment in the Philippines.     
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4.1     The F factor 
Table 1: Monthly Facebook post totals (Note: The only complete months are Jan-Apr 2016) 
Dec 
2015 
Jan 
2016 
  Feb 
2016 
  Mar 
2016 
  Apr 
2016 
  May 
2016 
Rody 
Duterte   2   8 23 29 42 14 118 
DU30 
for 2016 95 36   1 60 101 15 308 
Between December 17, 2015 and May 9, 2016 the official Rody Duterte Facebook account 
only produced 38 percent as many posts as DU30 for 2016’s total.  DU30 for 2016 is also 
only a representative example of the 400-500 pro-Duterte Facebook pages that were 
active during the campaign period (Hofileña, 2016).  While Duterte’s official Facebook 
presence had attracted 4,259,607 followers by September 2017 DU30 for 2016 could only 
amass 158,979 by the same date.  This makes it difficult to estimate the relative online 
reach of the two Facebook accounts, especially when the number of followers they had at 
different stages during the data collection period cannot be established with absolute 
certainty – or how many of these followers were real and how many were merely fake 
profiles (Hofileña, 2016).  The only month in which the Rody Duterte account outposted 
DU30 for 2016 was in February 2016.  Despite the large number of Facebook 
followers accumulated by the official Rody Duterte account it posted on average less 
than once per day – and usually in English.  This would indicate that the main audience 
for its messaging was upper and middle-class Filipinos.      
4.2     Official Rodyisms 
    Table 2: Breakdown of Rody Duterte Facebook posts (Note: The only complete months are Jan-Apr 2016) 
Dec 
2015 
Jan 
2016 
Feb 
2016 
Mar 
2016 
Apr 
2016 
May 
2016 
Worthwhile 0 5 10 11 16   2 44 
Trivial 2 3 13 18 26 12 74 
118 
A strict interpretation of Mathews’ (2009) content analysis categories would only allow a 
handful of the Rody Duterte posts to meet his requirements for being considered 
worthwhile content.  Mathews felt that the sole kind of information worthy of an 
audience’s attention was that which directly addressed political or economic issues.  I have 
therefore recorded even the slightest mention of any Duterte policy initiatives or main 
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political themes as worthwhile.  This interpretation has also been applied to the analysis 
of the DU30 for 2016 account.  Yet even after the application of this revised standard a 
mere 37 percent of the Rody Duterte Facebook account’s activity could be deemed 
worthwhile.  The 63 percent of posts which are considered trivial under Mathews’ 
categories are what he would have referred to as human interest stories.  Mathews would 
dismiss these stories as irrelevant if they failed to provide audiences with any additional 
context about what he considered to be important political and economic developments 
(Mathews, 2009).   
However, this does not automatically imply that what Mathews would have 
regarded as trivial was unimportant to a Filipino presidential election defined by indirect 
context.  This is a political environment where every candidate ritualistically promises to 
be an anti-corruption crusader intent on eliminating poverty regardless of their prior 
achievements (Mangahas, 2016).  Although an absence of policy detail is not considered 
unusual in Filipino presidential politics out of all the candidates in 2016 Duterte was 
assessed by voters as having the least number of concrete proposals for solving the 
Philippines’ socio-economic challenges, with many charging that he seemed to have no 
plan at all (“Binay tops platform poll,” 2016).          
 
Table 3: Breakdown of Rody Duterte Facebook posts deemed worthwhile under Mathews’ criteria 
Anti-
corruption 
initiatives 
Peace 
plans 
Anti-narcotics 
drive Infrastructure 
Foreign 
affairs 
Overseas 
workers 
 
18 6 4 4 2 2 36 
Disaster 
response Health 
Climate 
change Labour laws 
Poverty 
reduction 
Women’s 
rights 
 
2 2 1 1 1 1  8 
      44 
 
Table 3 demonstrates how when all the worthwhile Facebook posts produced by the Rody 
Duterte account are broken down it is immediately apparent how central Duterte’s anti-
corruption stance was to him.  He devoted 41 percent of all his worthwhile official 
pronouncements to this single issue during the campaign.  Key elements of Duterte’s policy 
platforms were also linked to one another by the candidate.  For instance, as shown in 
Figure 1, on February 20, 2016 the Rody Duterte account shared a post originally created 
by the now-defunct Rody Duterte Volunteers For Change 2016 Facebook page.  It 
contained a quote attributed to Duterte in which he reportedly said “I can only promise you 
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the things I can accomplish.  Nothing 
beyond my term and what I can promise you 
is I can stop corruption.  We can start nation-
building.  We can start talking about peace.”  
This suggests that Duterte saw his anti-
corruption drive as the basis for everything 
else he would achieve during his six-year 
term as president.  It also demonstrates how 
challenging it was to classify some of his 
posts.  In this case, the post was counted as 
an example of Duterte’s peace plans for the 
Philippines.  Without the final sentence it 
could have been classified as a post about the country’s infrastructure needs or Duterte’s 
anti-corruption initiatives.  
February 2016 was the first month in which the Rody Duterte account posted any 
worthwhile content on the candidate’s plans to tackle the country’s corruption problems. 
Up until this point of the collection period his official Facebook page had posted a total of 
10 times and only five of these posts had qualified as worthwhile.  Immediately after the 
first Presidential debate was televised on February 21 five posts containing short 
embedded video clips from the debate coverage appeared.  All five addressed the 
corruption issue and a representative 
example is shown Figure 2. 
The post on February 22 was 
in Tagalog, one of the Philippines’ 
official languages, but the English 
translation provided by Facebook 
does not reflect the exact words 
Duterte used during the debate.  
Although describing it as Duterte’s 
determination to “finish up the mess” 
captures the spirit of Duterte’s debate 
statement what he actually said in the 
video clip visible below the posts’ text 
was: 
Figure 1
Figure 2 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 35                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 I love my country, and I love the people of the Philippines.  There’s so much 
corruption, there’s so much crime, and so much [sic] drugs flooding the country. 
[But I can] Stop corruption in government in matter of three to six months.  Because 
I believe without the peace [sic], without end[ing] corruption, we cannot really 
survive.    
This is another example of how Duterte tended 
to conflate several issues.    Here he seems to 
be claiming that the Philippines’ ability to 
sustain itself as a state was threatened by the 
crime and corruption caused by narcotics 
trafficking combined with the instability from 
the country’s ongoing insurgencies.  Yet as 
Figure 3 demonstrates, what was essentially the 
same message was also conveyed on February 
21.  Although the footage used in this earlier 
Facebook post was from a different stage of the 
debate and also linked eliminating corruption to maintaining the country’s high economic 
growth, the wording of the post’s text had simply been re-ordered to emphasise the anti-
narcotics aspects of Duterte’s plan.  No details were provided in any of the five posts which 
appeared after the debate – or in their supporting videos – explaining how Duterte would 
fight the droga (drugs), kriminalidad (criminality) and korapsyon (corruption) he felt were 
infesting the Philippine government.   
Although Duterte’s critics claim his 
war on drugs is his signature issue and the 
one thing with which he is truly obsessed 
(ABS-CBN, 2016a) the Rody Duterte 
Facebook account only produced four 
posts which exclusively addressed it.  As 
shown in Figure 4, the first drug-related 
post on January 26, 2016 asked supporters 
to watch the “warning” Mayor Duterte 
gave in a two-minute-long video interview 
about a “purported Shabu 
[methamphetamine] Laboratory” in Davao 
Figure 3 
Figure 4 
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City.  Duterte began by saying that if proof 
could be provided that drugs were still 
being produced inside the city that he had 
controlled since 1988 then he and the 
Davao police would “admit the failures” 
(1:20).  He also warned his opponents not 
to fabricate propaganda for political 
purposes or he would “break your heart. Or 
I will break somebody else’s heart” (1:34-
1:40).  
The second occasion is detailed in 
Figure 5.  This post was made on January 
30, 2016 after Duterte had made a 
campaign appearance at a local 
government anti-drug conference on the island of Palawan.  Without any indication of 
what the candidate’s policies were this type of photo opportunity would usually have been 
classified as trivial.  However, because the images posted showed a large number of 
women and children in the audience whose husbands and fathers may have been struggling 
with drug addiction, Duterte’s presence has been deemed worthwhile.  A media release 
was also issued on January 29, the day of the conference, by Duterte’s vice presidential 
running mate Senator Alan Peter Cayetano.  It confirmed that Mayor Duterte had told the 
families depicted that because “drug syndicates are armed and will resist arrest” when he 
was president he would give the national police “standing orders to shoot these criminals” 
(Senate of the Philippines, 2016, para. 3).      
Figure 3 has already demonstrated 
how Duterte’s anti-drugs message was 
linked to his fight against criminality and 
corruption.  The day before the first 
Presidential debate was also the only time 
Duterte’s team uploaded a post to his 
official Facebook page which specifically 
indicated in its text what this battle would 
entail.  Figure 6 is another quote attributed 
to Duterte by the Rody Duterte Volunteers 
   Figure 5 
   Figure 6 
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For Change 2016 account.  The English text used was: “The campaign against criminals 
and lawless elements will be relentless and uncompromising.  Criminals must know their 
lives are always on the line and law-enforcers shall hunt them to protect law-abiding 
citizens.”  According to the Philippine Daily Inquirer’s transcript of the debate Duterte 
defended his record as Mayor of Davao City and denied any extra-judicial killings had 
occurred during his time in office.  He admitted that people were legally killed by the 
Davao City Police while he was mayor and said that if he became president it would “be 
bloody because I will order the killing of all criminals” (“1st Presidential debate transcript: 
Round One,” 2016, para. 30).    
The other major worthwhile categories which the Rody Duterte account coupled to 
the Mayor’s efforts to combat drugs and corruption were his peace plans and pledges to 
improve the country’s infrastructure.  As shown in Figures 1-3 Duterte said the mess the 
Philippines was in could only be solved by ending the crime and corrosive dishonesty 
caused by the proliferation of illegal narcotics. 
Figure 4 suggests that he deeply resented any 
claim that he had not completely eradicated 
those problems from Davao City while Figures 
5 and 6 explained what methods Duterte 
intended to use to eliminate them nationwide if 
elected.  Only then would it be possible to 
address the remaining issues affecting 
Philippine society.  
Duterte’s peace plans consisted of 
demonstrating his influence with insurgent 
groups.  For instance, Figure 7 is a post made on 
January 1, 2016 which illustrated his ability to 
get hostages held by the New People’s Army (NPA) released.  Although the kidnapping 
and release of Corporal Adriano Bingil Jr. occurred in a part of Mindanao over 100 
kilometres north-east of Davao City, Rodrigo Duterte was still present at Bingil Jr.’s 
release ceremony along with members of the national media.  No other presidential 
candidates were present and the post failed to name the other regional figures who had also 
helped negotiate the soldier’s release.  These individuals – including a senior NPA 
commander – were visible in the photographs uploaded (Caduaya & Lagsa, 2016).   
Figure 7 
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The next post which mentioned peace was 
on February 20 and was discussed previously as 
Figure 1.  On February 28 photos were also posted 
showing Duterte meeting for the first time with the 
First Vice Chairman of the Muslim separatist Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) at their main 
camp in southwestern Mindanao.  Although no 
details were provided on Facebook it was reported 
that Duterte had promised the MILF leadership that 
the areas they controlled would be granted greater 
regional autonomy when he became president 
(Acosta, 2016).  These contacts continued 
throughout the campaign.  On April 10 Duterte 
promised a Muslim crowd near the site of the 2009 Maguindanao Massacre in which 58 
people including 32 journalists were killed (HRW, 2010) that he would “fix” the island of 
Mindanao if elected.  Then as shown in Figure 8, on April 27 he met with the NPA again 
and secured the release of five police officers and another member of the armed forces 
who had been held by the insurgents.  This post claimed the NPA felt “Mayor Rody has 
always stood ‘for peace’” and that he had been helping to free NPA prisoners since being 
appointed Vice Mayor of Davao City in 1986.  The final Rody Duterte peace-related post 
was on May 5, the week before the election, and involved the release of another batch of 
soldiers by the NPA.  It mentioned how the families of the captives had asked Duterte to 
intervene and that the NPA “has, time and again, chosen to turnover their POWs to Mayor 
Rody.”              
Posts referring to future infrastructure 
projects occurred three times during the 
collection period.  The “nation-building” efforts 
mentioned in Figure 1 were first detailed during 
a trip Rodrigo Duterte took to Taiwan in the 
early stages of his campaign.  The trip also 
produced a January 12 post which was classified 
as being primarily concerned with foreign 
policy because it highlighted the links the 
Duterte camp claimed it wanted to maintain 
  Figure 8 
Figure 9 
Figure 8 
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with the Taiwanese National Police and that country’s Investigation Bureau.  These law-
enforcement relationships had previously thwarted some of the large-scale attempts to 
smuggle methamphetamine – as well as the chemicals and equipment needed to produce 
it – into the Philippines (Esmaquel II, 2017).  Figure 9 shows an earlier post which 
appeared on January 10 after Duterte and his Executive Assistant Christopher ‘Bong’ Go 
had taken a ride on Taiwan’s High Speed Rail line.  It said that Duterte was “considering 
putting up the same railway system in Davao City.”  Taiwan’s 345-kilometre (km) high 
speed network had cost US$15 billion or around US$43.5 million per km and took nearly 
a decade to build (University of Pennsylvania, 2007). 
These ambitious statements continued to appear on the Rody Duterte page over the 
collection period.  On March 12 Duterte promised rice farmers in southern Luzon’s Laguna 
Province a new irrigation system while in a post on March 30 he pledged to build an airport 
and feeder road in Abra Province in northwest Luzon.  Abra is one of the least-populated 
and less-accessible areas of the Philippines.  It had 156,968 registered voters in 2016 and 
had taken Duterte’s team eight hours to drive to their rally venue (Macas, 2016a).  On the 
night of the third Presidential debate on April 24 a post was also uploaded showing Duterte 
declaring during a debate segment that “we have to build new railways.” 
The anti-corruption component of Duterte’s core message remained enigmatic 
throughout the campaign.  Although it wasn’t always explicitly linked to his anti-drugs 
crusade they often appeared as interchangeable elements of the same kind of social reform. 
At times, his anti-corruption measures also acted as a code for the less palatable actions 
Duterte promised to conduct as part of his wider transformation of the Philippines and the 
Filipino.  In the shadow of these violent pledges the other main themes of Duterteism, such 
as peace negotiations with the country’s insurgent groups as well as improving the 
country’s infrastructure, can seem incongruous.  However, Duterte had emerged from the 
maelstrom of Mindanao where the territorial control of large parts of that island by these 
armed movements was an accepted part of the political landscape.  His closeness to one in 
particular, the New People’s Army, also hinted at just how revolutionary he might be 
himself.  This radical rejection of incrementalism, the hallmark of post-Marcos politics in 
the Philippines, was consistently downplayed even when Team Duterte portrayed it as an 
essential aspect of finally realising the nation’s economic potential.    
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4.2.1  Beyond the core: The worthwhile periphery of Rody Duterte 
The remaining worthwhile posts made by the Rody Duterte account covered a wide range 
of topics.  Duterte’s main themes on his official Facebook page were his determination to 
eliminate corruption and illegal drugs, conduct negotiations with the country’s insurgent 
groups and build better infrastructure in the Philippines.  These issues, which Duterte 
appeared to believe were all interconnected, comprised 73 percent of all the worthwhile 
Rody Duterte posts.  The other 27 percent of his worthwhile content was made up of 
subjects which he only mentioned once or twice.  These included foreign affairs, overseas 
workers’ issues, disaster response, health, climate change, labour laws, poverty reduction 
and women’s rights.    
After his trip to Taiwan in January 2016 
Duterte’s only other official Facebook foreign 
affairs content was a commitment he made 
during the third Presidential debate.  In Figure 
10 he can be seen in an April 24 post which 
used a 21 second video from the ABS-CBN 
News debate coverage.  In this clip Duterte said 
“we have to establish the legitimacy of our 
claim [over the West Philippine/South China 
Sea]… and then we demand to China to empty 
the place [sic].”  Although he must have felt that the position he was taking was the key to 
resolving all the Philippines’ maritime disputes with China it also ignored the immense 
scale of the Chinese military build-up to the west of the Philippine island of Palawan.  
Their new air bases had been created on artificial islands at a tremendous cost and China 
seemed unlikely to unilaterally abandon them (Keck, 2014; Watkins, 2016).   
Even though a post highlighting a poverty reduction programme Duterte had 
created in Davao City which provided the city’s homeless and other vulnerable families 
with temporary accommodation had appeared as early as February 29, most of the other 
minor worthwhile categories were not mentioned prior to April.  However, in March there 
were three posts showing Duterte’s positions on health, disaster response and climate 
change.  In the March 12 post Duterte was pictured speaking to the members of the 
Philippine College of Chest Physicians about the ban on public smoking he had 
implemented in Davao – while the March 15 post showed him attending a large campaign 
rally in typhoon-ravaged Tacloban City on the central island of Leyte.  Back in 2013, 
Figure 10 
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Mayor Duterte had led a team of 55 Davao City medical technicians and other emergency 
workers to Tacloban to help with the city’s relief efforts.  He had also recommended that 
anyone attempting to loot aid convoys should be shot (Manlupig, 2013).  The third post is 
shown in Figure 11.  It is from March 21 and reproduces a passage from the second 
Presidential debate when Duterte had been discussing climate change (“Full transcript: 
2nd #PiliPinas2016 presidential debate in UP 
Cebu,” 2016).  He said: “I’ve said enough, this 
cannot really be solved by just talking it.  We 
need to just do it.”   This was the first and only 
time during the collection period that Duterte 
addressed any kind of environmental issue 
through his official Facebook presence.  
However, because of the time restrictions of the 
debate he didn’t have the opportunity to outline 
exactly what it was he intended to “do.”  Despite 
contained a detailed summary of his OFW 
policy proposals.  A total of 1.38 million OFWs 
were eligible to vote in the 2016 presidential 
contest.  These individuals are considered 
national heroes because without their remittances 
the Philippine economy would collapse (Gavilan, 
2015, 2016; Torres, 2015).  They were also 
expected to influence the votes of other members 
of their families due to their position as the main 
breadwinners.  According to the Philippine 
Duterte’s attempts since his election to end some of the country’s mining activity the 
Philippines is still heavily reliant on coal for generating its intermittent electricity supply 
(Rappler, 2018c; Rivera, 2018).     
In April, with only two weeks to go before election day, the Rody Duterte account 
continued to rely on posts highlighting statements Duterte had made during the third 
Presidential debate.  Two of these concerned the plight of the Philippines’ Overseas 
Foreign Workers (OFWs).  Both were uploaded 
on April 24 and Figure 12 shows the one which   Figure 12
Figure 11 
Figure 12 
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Department of Foreign Affairs this meant they could really represent a pool of 5.2 million 
ballots (Esmaquel II, 2016).  Duterte’s 3 Real Solutions for OFWs were: 
• To create a government dedicated to caring for OFWs
• To create a specialist remittances bank for them
• To require Filipino diplomats to monitor their wellbeing while abroad and at the first
sign of abuse, arrange for them to travel back to the Philippines at the government’s
expense.  Also, in the event any OFW became ill a Duterte administration would pay
for their treatment.
No other worthwhile post during the collection period provided anything like this degree 
of specific policy detail.  This might have been because a lot of the Facebook activists 
the Duterte campaign were relying on were OFWs. This would have also allowed them 
to upload online material while the campaign’s Philippines-based members slept.       
Duterte’s foray into women’s rights was an attempt to explain his controversial 
public comments about the 1989 gang-rape and killing of 36-year-old Australian lay 
missionary Jacqueline Hamill (Corrales, 2016b).  Hamill had been part of a Bible studies 
programme for the inmates of Davao City’s main prison during Duterte’s first term as 
mayor.  She was raped and killed after being taken hostage during an escape attempt by 
some of the prisoners (“Lookback: The Davao hostage crisis of 1989 – Part 1,” 2016).  It 
has also been alleged that Mayor Duterte personally killed some of those responsible for 
Hamill’s ordeal after ordering an operation which foiled the inmates’ escape plan (Canedo, 
2016).   During the 2016 presidential campaign he seems to have used these events as an 
example of how dangerous criminals should be dealt with, while also peppering his 
remarks with references to Hamill’s 
beauty and joking how as Mayor he 
should have been allowed to rape her 
first (Beatboxer ng Pinas, 2016; 
Corrales).     
Figure 13 shows the April 17 
post which attempted to mitigate the 
fallout from this scandal after a video 
of a Duterte speech in which he had 
mentioned Hamill went viral.  Up 
until this stage of the campaign, 
before he began leading in the polls, Figure 13 
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there seems to have been a reluctance on the part of the traditional Philippine media to 
report directly on Duterte’s vulgarity if they could avoid it.  As a result, the Liberal Party 
may have sent its activists to Duterte’s rallies in order to record what the fourth estate had 
been refusing to broadcast.  The video was recorded on April 13 by an audience member 
at a campaign rally in Greater Manila’s Quezon City (ABS-CBN, 2016b) and uploaded to 
YouTube on April 16.  The crowd can be heard laughing and yelling in appreciation at the 
rape reference (Beatboxer ng Pinas, 2016).  Duterte’s video response was 26 minutes and 
24 seconds long and showed the full unedited footage of the explanation he provided to 
the Philippine media on April 17 (Duterte, 2016).  In the video he discussed his reasons 
for making the comments he had made about Hamill.  Duterte’s explanations were a wide-
ranging and at times rambling account of his anger over her rape and killing.  He described 
her death as a waste and compared it to the losses many other families had suffered in the 
Philippines when their daughters had also been killed by drug addicts.  He ended with a 
call for those responsible for these kinds of unnecessary tragedies to be given what 
justice demanded.  Duterte also said that this justice should not take into account the 
human rights of those responsible for what had happened to victims like Hamill (Duterte, 
2016).     
During the third and final presidential debate Rodrigo Duterte pledged to end what 
is known in the Philippines as contractualisation or Temporary Employment Contracts 
(TECs) that don’t provide the workplace conditions and job security enjoyed by permanent 
employees.  A post appeared to this effect on April 24 but did not contain any details on 
how a Duterte administration would implement the ban.  TECs are extremely 
controversial in the Philippines and were opposed by most organised labour groups 
because they could keep wages in some sectors artificially low (Schnabel, 2016).  
However, there was also widespread concern among the country’s business community 
that their removal would result in additional underemployment and force more Filipinos 
into the informal economy (Sicat, 2015).  At the start of the collection period on 
December 17, 2015 Duterte had been the only presidential candidate demanding that 
employers place less reliance on contractualisation.  Yet by the third Presidential 
debate all his opponents were claiming they were against this practice as well (Schnabel, 
2016).   
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May 4, 2016 saw the release of an opinion poll showing that Duterte led his nearest 
rivals Senators Manuel Roxas II and Grace Poe by more than 10 percentage points.  He 
had achieved this result despite accusations that he and his family had personally profited 
from their control of Davao City (Cupin, 2016a).  Figure 14 depicts how Duterte responded 
on May 6, the Friday before the Monday, 
May 9 election.  He is shown holding up 
documentary proof of his bank account 
balances during a press conference at the 
offices of the Philippine Star newspaper.  
Although the specific amounts held in these 
accounts were not detailed in Duterte’s 
Facebook post the Philippine Star reported 
that they totalled just over US
$7500 (Ramirez, 2016).  Duterte had been 
accused of failing to disclose a balance of 
more than US$4 million in one of these 
Bank of the Philippine Islands accounts 
during his official Statement of Assets, 
Liabilities and Net worth for 2014 
(ABS-CBN, 2016c).  However, the   
Philippine Star article also disclosed    Figure 14
that Duterte had admitted that his close friend Pastor Apollo Quiboloy had given him 
several properties and allowed Duterte to use Quiboloy’s private jet and helicopter 
while campaigning (Ramirez, 2016).  Quiboloy is based in Davao Province and 
founded a movement called the Kingdom of Jesus Christ.  He claims he is the Son 
of God and estimates that he has six million followers worldwide (“In the know: 
Apollo Quiboloy,” 2016).  The sect leader has also previously expressed interest in 
running for president (National Geographic, 2010). 
Although Team Duterte’s commitment to worthwhile issues outside the scope of 
their core worthwhile message seemed sincere, all of these more peripheral areas only 
warranted either single or at most, two Rody Duterte posts. The only group deemed 
significant enough to require detailed policy prescriptions were the country’s overseas 
workers.  Yet as Figure 14 showed, it was Duterte’s anti-corruption credentials which 
defined his candidacy.  He could only be trusted to implement the rest of his agenda, 
whatever that might be, if the public remained convinced that he had not enriched himself 
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as a result of becoming the Mayor of Davao. The centrality of this construct within 
Duterte’s campaign and its contrast with so many other Philippine officials who had 
succumbed to temptation, might explain why his rivals tried so hard to dispel  it.  
 
4.2.2  The far from trivial Tatay (Daddy) D 
Table 4: Breakdown of Rody Duterte Facebook posts deemed trivial under Mathews’ criteria 
Political rallies Promoting 
media 
appearances 
Political 
endorsements 
Photo 
Opportunities 
 
45 7 5 4 61 
Miscellaneous 
posts 
    
13    13 
    74 
 
 Trivial posts made up 62 percent of the Rody Duterte Facebook account’s activity during 
the data collection period from December 17, 2015 to May 9, 2016.  As Table 4 shows, 
nearly 61 percent of these trivial posts were of Duterte’s political rallies and the crowds he 
was able to attract to them.  The posts about these rallies made up 38 percent of all the 
content produced by his official account.  Although they occasionally contained snippets 
of policy which allowed them to be classified as worthwhile instead of trivial, Duterte’s 
main method of communicating his policies 
was through his media appearances – 
primarily the televised presidential debates.  
Posts promoting these appearances 
comprised just under 10 percent of his trivial 
posts and six percent of his overall official 
Facebook activity.   
Table 2 demonstrated that before 
February 2016 the Rody Duterte account had 
only produced a total of 10 posts.  These were 
split evenly between the worthwhile and 
trivial categories.   
Figure 15 
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Figure 15 is a representative example of the four posts which appeared on February 
9 and 10 showing Duterte’s campaign rally in Tondo, the most densely-populated slum in 
Greater Manila and an area where poverty and crime are rampant (Corrales, 2016a; 
Rodriguez, 2015).  There is no text other than a series of hashtags confirming that his 
campaign ticket also consisted of vice presidential candidate Senator Cayetano, that his 
campaign song and overall slogan was “Change is Coming” and that the rally occurred in 
Tondo.  Although this was billed as Duterte and Cayetano’s proclamation rally and the 
start of their official presidential campaign the crowds visible in the uploaded images were 
fairly small.  There were suggestions some of the Duterte supporters present were actually 
from outside the Tondo area and reports that Duterte had even said that he had no idea why 
Figure 16
he was beginning his campaign there 
(Ansis, 2016).  On February 6 Cayetano 
claimed that Tondo symbolised how many 
Filipinos migrated to Manila in search of a 
better way of life despite not always 
succeeding and that it was where he and 
Duterte wanted real change to occur 
(Corrales). 
Figures 16 and 17 demonstrate how 
large Duterte’s rallies had grown by the 
following month.  Figure 16 was the Rody 
Duterte March 17 post which showed his 
grand rally in metropolitan Davao the day 
before.  The post alleged it was attended by more than 20,000 people and was the “biggest 
political gathering in the history of the city.”  Even though these claims cannot be 
independently verified the online media outlet Rappler – which has since come under 
concerted attack by the Duterte government (Placido, 2018) – estimated that thousands of 
his supporters had attended the event.  However, it seems not all of them were residents of 
Davao City (Caduaya, 2016) and that the photos used in the Duterte post might have been 
chosen because they showed the densest portion of the crowd closest to the stage.  Other 
overhead images published by Rappler showed considerably fewer people in the 
surrounding areas of the park where the rally was held (Placido, 2018).  
On March 20 a post was created showing Duterte’s motorcade in an area close to 
the northern outskirts of Manila on March 19.  Figure 17 shows some of the individuals 
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who clustered around the vehicle in which he 
was travelling.  The post also describes  how 
he had attended another grand rally later that 
night and additional images provided proof 
of greater attendance at his events outside of 
Mindanao.  Yet most of these images were not 
immediately visible and would only be 
revealed if they were clicked on at the bottom 
of the main post.         
During April Team Duterte 
crisscrossed the northern and central islands 
of the Philippines while still holding regular events in the South.  Throughout the month 
they produced 20 Rody Duterte posts showing their campaign rallies.  This was 44 percent 
of all the political rally posts produced by Duterte’s official Facebook account over the 20 
and a half weeks of the collection period.  Some, such as the one they held on April 1 in 
the  town of Malaybalay on the southern 
island of Mindanao, were scheduled to 
coincide with local festivals.  Even 
though this may have artificially boosted 
the number of attendees Figure 18 
illustrates the large crowd present at a 
Duterte rally in Alabang.  This April 10 
post describes the “much talked-about 
mammoth rally” as “one of the biggest in 
Metro Manila.”   Alabang is really 
Figure 17 
Figure 18 
southeast of the heart of the city – while 
still being within the boundaries of what this research refers to as Greater Manila.  A pro-
Duterte site calling itself ‘Philippine News’ had also claimed that the April 8 rally received 
no mainstream Filipino media coverage (Umbao, 2016).  However, there was an April 10 
opinion piece in the Philippine Star newspaper by Carmen Pedrosa which discussed it.  
Pedrosa has been a journalist since 1963 and is a high profile Duterte supporter 
(Bloomberg, 2016; Pedrosa, 2016).  In her column she described speaking to 
individuals who attended the event held in the overwhelmingly upper and middle-class 
area who were actually from nearby squatter camps (Pedrosa, 2016).   
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The culmination of Duterte’s presidential campaign was a rally in Central Manila’s 
historic Luneta Park on Saturday, May 7, 2016 which featured the unfurling of a giant 
Philippine flag as well as performances by the 
pop group the Mocha Girls and other 
musicians (Brainchild Radio/TV Network, 
2016; Guinto, 2016; Rappler, 2016a).  Figure 
19 was posted the same day and declared that 
“change is not only coming. Change is here.”  
The accompanying 30-second video depicts 
the crowd building up during the afternoon and 
by later on that evening the Metro Manila 
police had estimated it to be around 350,000 
strong (Guinto, 2016).     
The promotion of Duterte’s upcoming 
media appearances began the same month as 
the presidential debates.  Although his worthwhile posts containing excerpts from these 
debates were the main way that policy 
information was conveyed through the Rody 
Duterte account, the only two trivial posts 
promoting them occurred on the day of the first 
debate.  Figure 20 shows how one of these posts 
contained a link to the website of the television 
network hosting the debate which also allowed 
viewers to live stream it online.  The February 
21 post encouraged Duterte’s Facebook 
followers to listen to his “solutions to end the 
chaos experienced by ordinary Filipinos.”  
This debate was considered historic because it 
was the first time since 1992 that all the presidential candidates had bothered to attend 
(GMA, 2016a).  Despite being held in northwest Mindanao Duterte had previously 
threatened to walk out if his speaking time was unduly restricted.  There was also 
widespread public interest in his debate performance because of his penchant for 
outrageous statements and offensive language (Cerda, 2016b).      
  Figure 19 
Figure 20
   Figure 20 
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There had been earlier posts promoting Duterte’s other TV appearances in 
February.  However, none of these programmes matched the audience garnered by the 
GMA Network with its coverage of the 1st Presidential debate.  GMA estimated that one-
in-four households nationwide and nearly one-in-three homes in Mindanao had tuned in 
to their broadcast coverage while over a million additional viewers had watched their live 
stream (GMA, 2016a).  A single post on April 10 also promoted Senator Alan Peter 
Cayetano’s upcoming Vice Presidential debate while the final example of the collection 
period was a May 4 live Facebook Q & A with Mayor Rodrigo Duterte organised by the 
Philippine Star.      
 A total of five posts describing direct 
and overt political endorsements of 
Duterte’s candidacy were created 
during the collection period.  There 
were also eight others which implied 
that the political or religious leaders 
named in the post had some kind of 
relationship with him.  When these 
relationships were not sufficiently 
clear-cut to allow them to be placed in 
the political endorsement category 
they were classified as political rally 
posts if they also depicted events 
organised by the Duterte campaign in the local area.  A representative example of one such 
pseudo-endorsement is shown in Figure 21.  The April 3 post describes how Duterte “paid 
a courtesy call on Toledo Mayor John Osmeña” before his rally in the city on the central 
Philippine island of Cebu – even though the 81-year-old Osmeña had officially re-
endorsed Duterte’s rival Vice President Jejomar Binay on March 29 (Matus, Bongcac & 
Padayhag, 2016).  However, Mayor Osmeña had also said in an April 2 interview ‘“I am 
Duterte in my heart”’ (Palaubsanon, 2016, para. 16).   
Figure 21 
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The two highest profile explicit 
endorsements received by Duterte during 
his campaign were from former President 
Fidel Ramos on March 8 and Pastor 
Apollo Quiboloy on March 28.  Figure 22 
shows Duterte and vice presidential 
candidate Cayetano meeting Ramos and 
thanking him for “his advices [sic] and his 
trust.”  Although Duterte’s Campaign 
Spokesperson Peter Laviña did not claim 
that President Ramos had officially endorsed Duterte, he did say that the pictures of them 
together may have said a thousand words (CNN Philippines, 2016).  Fidel Ramos was 
president of the Philippines from 1992-1998 and has been praised for deregulating the 
economy and negotiating with insurgent groups during his time in office (Elegant, 1994; 
Wallace, 2015). 
Photo opportunities were four 
posts which did not fit into the main trivial 
categories of political rallies, promoting 
media appearances and political 
endorsements but which still had more 
significance than the Rody Duterte 
accounts’ miscellaneous ones.  They 
included Duterte’s “unplanned visit” to the 
multi-billionaire Consunji family 
(Dumlao-Abadilla, 2015) on Christmas 
Day 2015 as well as his trip to his parents’ 
hometown in Danao City, Cebu on 
February 26, 2016.  Figure 23 shows the 
March 8 post which described how he 
“was practically mobbed by admirers and 
well wishers” when he went to Antipolo City east of Manila.  The extensive list of local 
political notables there to greet him also makes this another example of a pseudo-
Figure 22 
Figure 23 
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endorsement even though Mayor Casimiro ‘Jun 
Jun’ Ynares had been charged with corruption in 
2014 (Tolentino, 2014).                     
The account’s miscellaneous posts 
consisted of content which was just too varied to 
fit into any of the other trivial categories.  Some 
examples were Duterte’s Christmas greetings, 
when he updated his cover photo on January 8 – 
and when he posted about praying for “real 
change” before the final presidential debate on 
April 24.  Figure 24 is the most interesting as it was uploaded the day before the May 9 
elections.  In the posts’ text Duterte reminded his supporters that his official vice 
presidential pick was Senator Cayetano.  This clarification may have been necessary 
because Duterte had previously said that he wanted Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos Jr., the 
son of the dictator President Marcos, to succeed him if he became president (Tejada, 
2016a).  Their tentative political courtship had begun in October 2015 before Duterte had 
settled on Cayetano as his running-mate (Caduaya, 2015).  In 2016 Marcos Jr. was also 
campaigning to be the country’s vice president and had described Duterte as one of his 
‘“longtime bestfriends”’ (Mangosing, 2016, para. 7).  Mayor Rodrigo Duterte’s father 
Vicente Duterte had been a cabinet minister under President Marcos and in 2016, 30 years 
after Marcos was deposed, Mayor Duterte continued to feel that he was “still the best 
president the country has ever had” (Tejada, para. 13).  These pro-Marcos sentiments were 
also reflected in some of the comments made by Duterte’s supporters under the main post. 
The prominence of the campaign’s rallies and the high-profile endorsements 
Duterte was able to garner, whether explicitly or through staged photo opportunities, 
demonstrates how trivial content  ̶  at least in a Philippine context – can be more critical 
that it would appear to most non-Filipinos.  Yet the failure to promote Duterte’s television 
debate appearances and that of his vice presidential running mate more frequently do seem 
like serious omissions.  It could reflect nervousness on the part of his campaign team about 
Duterte’s ability to remain presidential as well as a strange and yet to be fully explained 
indifference towards one of the campaign’s biggest assets, Senator Alan Peter Cayetano.  
Despite all the momentum Duterte had generated following the First debate and the large 
crowds he had begun to attract outside of Mindanao, the lack of promotion for his 
subsequent debates might indicate how fragile Duterte’s popularity looked to his advisors.  
  Figure 24 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 52     
It is almost as if they suspected that their candidate could self-destruct at any moment and 
that the images emphasising the crowds he was attracting would always be far more 
effective than any potentially disastrous televised event.     
4.3     The world of DU30 for 2016 
Table 5: Breakdown of DU30 for 2016 Facebook posts (Note: The only complete months are Jan-Apr 
2016) 
Dec 
2015 
Jan 
2016 
Feb 
2016 
Mar 
2016 
Apr 
2016 
May 
2016 
Worthwhile 28   6 1   8 17   3  63 
Trivial 67 30 0 52 84 12 245 
308 
DU30 for 2016’s activity was characterised by the frenetic pace it established early on in 
the campaign.  In the two weeks between December 17, 2015 and December 31, 2015 the 
account produced a total of 96 posts at an average rate of just under seven posts per day. 
This quickly tapered off in January 2016 before coming to a virtual halt during February.  
After DU30 for 2016’s activity resumed in March the page gradually re-established itself 
during the weeks leading up to the election on May 9, 2016.  However, even in April it 
only posted on average less than four times per day.  
Fully 80 percent of DU30 for 2016’s posts have to be considered trivial under 
Mathews’ categorisations.  The 20 percent that was deemed worthwhile mainly covered 
the same issues as the Rody Duterte Facebook account.   
     Table 6: Breakdown of DU30 for 2016 Facebook posts deemed worthwhile under Mathews’ criteria 
Anti-
corruption 
initiatives 
Peace 
plans 
Anti-
narcotics 
drive 
Disaster 
response Infrastructure 
16 8 7 6 6 43 
Law and 
order 
Calls for 
revolution 
Local 
govt 
reform 
Health Poverty reduction 
 3 3 3 2 2 13 
Education Women’s 
rights 
Foreign 
affairs 
Overseas 
workers 
Labour laws 
2 2 1 1 1  7 
63 
_________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 53     
An attempt has been made to use the same worthwhile categories for DU30 for 2016 that 
were used for the analysis of the Rody Duterte account.  Although anti-corruption 
initiatives only comprised 25 percent of all worthwhile DU30 for 2016 content compared 
with the Rody Duterte page’s 41 percent, this reduction was partially offset by an increase 
in explicit anti-drugs messaging.  These anti-narcotics posts made up a further 11 percent 
of DU30 for 2016’s worthwhile total.  When combined with the other themes of 
Duterte’s core populist message, ending the country’s civil wars and improving its 
infrastructure as well as two new categories – law and order and local government reform 
– these categories collectively comprised 68 percent of all the page’s worthwhile
activity.  This proportion is also close to the Rody Duterte account’s core message total
of 73 percent.  DU30 for 2016 produced five anti-
corruption posts in December 2015.  They all
described what a Duterte government
would do after taking office and Figure
25 is a representative example.  The
December 30 post used a Duterte 
quote which was first reported by the 
Philippine Star on December 28. It has 
been formatted into a Facebook meme 
by the Mayor Rodrigo Roa Duterte 
National Executive Coordinating 
Committee (MRRD NECC), shared by 
the Rodrigo Duterte Thumbs-Up Fever 2016 page and then uploaded to DU30 for 
2016.  Duterte had initially made the comment on his Sunday morning ABS-CBN 
Davao TV talk show ‘Gikan sa Masa, Para sa Masa’ (‘From the Masses, for 
the Masses’) on December 27.  He claimed that the nation’s drug problem had 
become so bad it was now a threat to national security (Frialde, 2015).  “In three to 
six months, everything has to stop.  Corruption, drugs and criminality.  You are 
oppressing the Filipinos, and I hate it.”  This post was assigned to the anti-
corruption category because by placing corruption ahead of the other issues 
Duterte seemed to imply that without corrupt and complicit government 
officials, illegal narcotics trafficking and other crimes in the Philippines would not 
be able to occur on the scale he claimed that they were.  This is similar to the 
messaging employed by the official Rody Duterte Facebook account where linkages 
were also made between a number of issues which according to the Duterte 
campaign, no other candidate had been talking about (Frialde, 2015).
Figure 25
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By April, DU30 for 2016 had begun to allege that a culture of corruption existed 
in the country because of the actions of the Liberal Party of President Benigno Aquino III. 
Figure 26 shows how DU30 for 2016 shared 
an April 22 Rappler post which appeared to 
imply that presidential hopeful Senator 
Manuel Roxas II, Benigno Aquino III’s 
official successor, might have engaged in 
blatant vote buying at one of his rallies.  
DU30 for 2016 replicated the text used in the 
Rappler Facebook post word for word and 
did not attempt to embellish it in any way.  
This technique is necessary because mobile 
internet services are so slow in the 
Philippines that the Rappler post DU30 for 
2016 shared may not have been displayed 
properly because the article preview 
Figure 26
contained a large image.  Although mobile 
Facebook data is free, the cost of clicking on the article link embedded in the Rappler post 
would have been beyond the means of many lower-middle-class Filipinos.  Furthermore, 
even with the use of ad-blocking software Rappler’s graphics heavy format would still 
cause the article to load at a such a slow rate that most mobile phone users would simply 
give up.  However, if they persevered they would have discovered that despite the clickbait 
wording of Rappler’s post the article preview emphatically declared that Roxas couldn’t 
be charged with vote buying based on the video evidence available.  The article went on 
to describe how the evidence consisted of a one-and-a-half-minute viral video showing an 
M.C. working the crowd before Roxas’ arrival at the venue.  Two women who the M.C. 
decided had cheered the loudest were given white envelopes (Go, 2016b; KutangBato 
Vlogger, 2016).  The video Walang sobre pag walang palakpak or ‘No envelope, no 
audience’ had been recorded on March 31 in Cotabato City, Mindanao and uploaded to 
Facebook on April 17 by a Duterte supporter calling themselves the KutangBato 
(Stonewall) Vlogger.  This emerged after the video showing Duterte’s comments about the 
gangrape and murder of Jacqueline Hamill had first appeared online on April 16 (Go, 
2016b).
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These counterattacks continued until election day.  On May 5, just after his official 
Facebook account had responded on May 4 to the allegations of personal corruption which 
had been levelled at Duterte, DU30 for 2016 posted content which appeared to show that 
Duterte’s chief accuser was also 
under a cloud.  Figure 27 is the 
GMA News article which was 
shared without any additional text 
from DU30 for 2016.  In the 
original GMA News post the 
headline of the article was 
“Oakwood mutiny leader wants 
Trillanes to explain trips to China, 
money he got from Imee Marcos.”  
Although the Tagalog summary 
above the article preview 
emphasised his 2016 trips to 
Mainland China the headline 
suggested that the senator who 
accused Duterte of corruption could 
be politically linked to the daughter of President Marcos and therefore was corrupt himself 
– as well as a Chinese agent.  The former Philippine Marine Corps Captain who made 
these allegations, Nicanor ‘Nic’ Faeldon, would go on to be appointed the head of the 
Bureau of Customs (BOC) by President Duterte.  Faeldon was detained in September 2017 
for failing to co-operate with a senatorial inquiry into the large-scale corruption and drug 
smuggling for which the BOC was still notorious for during Duterte’s first 12 months in 
office (Adel, 2017; Jumilla, 2016; Mendez, 2017).  Neither he nor former Philippine Navy 
Lieutenant and present-day Senator Antonio ‘Sonny’ Trillanes IV have ever been 
convicted of any offense by a military tribunal or civilian court.  They were both involved 
in multiple uprisings against President Gloria Arroyo (Macas, 2016b; “What went before: 
Oakwood Mutiny,” 2013). 
Figure 27 
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DU30 for 2016’s anti-narcotics posts during the collection period began with a 
December 21st upload which highlighted the drug rehabilitation programmes started by 
Duterte during his time in office in Davao 
City.  Figure 28 shows the post’s Visayan 
(Visayan is the main language of the 
Central Philippines and Mindanao) text 
above the English language article preview. 
The first paragraph has been accidentally 
posted twice and mocks those individuals 
who failed to take advantage of Mayor 
Duterte’s generosity while they still had the 
chance to kick their drug habits.  The article 
preview is from a site called Pinoy 
(Philippine) Trending News and is 
headlined “Mayor Duterte offers 2,000   Figure 28
pesos monthly allowance to the drug addicts who wants [sic] to change and… 
[rehabilitate].”  It is accompanied by an image from 2011 of six young men working in a 
garden, presumably at one of Davao’s drug rehabilitation facilities.  The article itself 
provides few details and is written by someone who isn’t fully fluent in English.  However, 
it does claim that if Duterte is elected then the programme and its US$40 monthly 
allowance will be rolled out nationwide (Pinoy Trending News, 2015).   It is this 
suggestion which prompts the poster to vehemently declare “enough” in their expanded 
text.   
In January DU30 for 2016 produced two posts denying that illegal drugs were still 
a problem in Davao City.  These posts – on January 25 and January 28 – bracketed the 
video denial released through the Rody Duterte Facebook account on January 26 (Figure 
4).  They shared links to articles from the pro-Duterte ‘Everything About Davao’ blog 
and the Philippine Daily Inquirer newspaper without any accompanying text from DU30 
for 2016.  Both articles said that Duterte believed that any drug labs discovered in 
Davao were fakes designed to discredit him (Alconaba, 2016a; Dabaw, 2016).  In the 
Philippine Daily Inquirer piece Duterte admitted that low-level illegal drug sales still 
occurred in Davao City.  However, he was adamant that since 2004 no 
large-scale production of methamphetamine was possible because “the last 
time they [drug manufacturers] tried it, they all died” (Alconaba, 2016a, para. 9).    
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In April posts began to appear that were even more explicit in their descriptions of 
Duterte’s anti-drugs crusade and what this might portend for the Philippines.  Figure 29 
shows the text of the April 11 post originally 
made by the Philippine Star’s Carmen 
Pedrosa on the InterAksyon News Facebook 
page.  It was uploaded in full by DU30 for 
2016 on April 12 and emphasised Pedrosa’s 
belief that the country was on the brink of 
becoming a narco-state like Mexico.  She also 
said: “it will take more than a wimp to lead 
the fight against drug lords and drug 
pushers.”  This was written the day after her 
opinion piece was published on Duterte’s 
April 8 rally in Alabang, Greater Manila 
(Figure 18).  Pedrosa goes on to say in the 
expanded text that “Duterte is the next president whether in clean elections or a 
revolutionary government.  Nothing can stop Dutertistas from bringing change.  They have 
the numbers to make it happen.” 
Figure 30 shows a meme 
shared by DU30 for 2016 on April 
18 which featured a Duterte quote 
from a May 20, 2015 media release 
(ABS-CBN, 2015a).  It was his 
response to the NGO Human Rights 
Watch asking for a formal 
investigation into Duterte’s public 
calls to kill all criminals.  He replied 
that “a leader must be a terror to the 
few who are evil in order to protect the lives and well-being of the many who are good.”  
This post was categorised as part of Duterte’s anti-narcotics drive because the criminals 
he seemed to single out for death above all others were those involved with drugs.     
Figure 29 
Figure 30
Figure 29 
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There were two subsidiary categories which complemented DU30 for 2016’s anti-
corruption and anti-drugs content – law and order and local government reform.  These 
posts comprised just under 10 percent of the page’s worthwhile total.  The three law and 
order posts all appeared in 
late December 2015, 
shortly after Duterte had 
officially become a 
presidential candidate.  
Figure 31 is a December 20 
post which illustrates what 
the Duterte campaign 
believed would be required 
to implement their law and 
order agenda.  It is an 
official quote provided by 
his campaign team which 
pledged that if elected 
Duterte’s “first order of the 
day [will be] for the police 
to hunt down all crime and 
drug syndicates.  I will double their salaries in the 1st and 3rd quarter of the year.  For 
policemen who die in the line of duty, I will continue their salaries for 3 to 5 years.”  
Although hardly any police officers have been killed in anti-drug operations since 
Duterte’s election, his pledge to double their salaries took effect in January 2018 (Corrales, 
2017).  There are 160,000 uniformed police officers in the Philippines and in 2016 it was 
estimated that this policy would cost the government an additional US$2.4 billion per year.  
Even low-ranking officers could end up earning more than past commanders of the 
Philippine National Police (Cupin, 2016b; Ranada, 2016a).  Although on the surface this 
would appear to be an anti-corruption measure designed to make the underpaid police less 
susceptible to bribery it could also be intended to politicise the force and promote personal 
loyalty to Duterte.   
  Figure 31 
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The local government reform 
category consists of posts which 
highlighted Duterte’s award-winning 
record as Mayor of Davao City.  Figure 32 
shows that Davao was recognised as the 
most “Child-Friendly City in the 
Philippines” three years in a row.  Official 
awards like this also allowed Duterte to 
combat criticism of his human rights 
record.  For instance, on January 20 DU30 
for 2016 shared an ANC News article which 
Peace and infrastructure 
posts comprised the rest of DU30 
for 2016’s core message.  Like the 
posts produced by his official 
Facebook page, DU30 for 2016 
chose to emphasise Duterte’s links 
to the New People’s Army (NPA) 
and other insurgent groups.  Figure 
33 is a personal endorsement from 
a member of the Armed Forces of 
the Philippines.  It declares that 
although there are other 
politicians who support the NPA “it is only Mr Duterte who has the balls to admit it.”  The 
post goes on to say that Duterte “is compassionate to fellow Filipinos who fight for a cause 
but merciless to the criminals whose motivations are pure greed and personal gains.” 
However, Figure 34 suggests that by April DU30 for 2016 felt compelled to 
reassure some of Duterte’s supporters by explaining how “those who say Call Centres & 
investors will leave if Duterte wins are idiots.  The most important thing for businesspeople 
Figure 33 
Figure 32 
described how Manuel Roxas II had called 
Duterte a “stain” on the country’s reputation (Bigornia, 2016, para. 1).  Duterte reminded 
his presidential rival that when Roxas had been the Department of the Interior and Local 
Government Secretary Davao City had received a certificate of good governance 
(Bigornia, 2016).   
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is peace & order.  If there is peace & order the 
economy prospers & investors come.”  Under 
Duterte new foreign direct investment projects in 
the Philippines declined by 90.3 percent during the 
first half of 2017 (De Vera & Avendaño, 2017; 
Punongbayan, 2017).  His government planned to 
offset this by spending US$178 billion on 
new infrastructure (De Vera & Avendaño, 2017).  
Some of this infrastructure investment 
seemed dedicated to rail and was consistent with 
Duterte’s official statements about the Philippines need for new railways.  Posts first 
appeared on DU30 for 2016 on December 19, 2015 and January 11, 2016 describing what 
the Duterte campaign had in mind.  These initially focused on a US$1.5 billion rail network 
for Mindanao.  This system was originally going to be 200km long but was increased to 
2000 kilometres after Duterte’s election (Dancel, 20017). 
Figure 35 is from an April 17 
post which depicted the conditions 
commuters face when using the Metro 
Rail Transport (MRT) line in Manila. 
The unusually detailed text was 
provided by Willy Ramasola, a former 
tennis champ and Duterte supporter. 
Although the provenance of the 
initiatives Ramasola attributes to 
Duterte cannot be established they 
appear to provide a common-sense 
approach to the MRT’s existing 
maintenance issues – while also 
outlining an ambitious expansion 
programme for Greater Manila’s rail 
systems.  Yet 18 months after Duterte’s victory the overcrowding and breakdowns 
afflicting the MRT network showed no sign of abating (Bueza, 2017; Jiao & Bacungan, 
2017).  
Figure 34
Figure 35 
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4.3.1  What’s Left? The worthwhile remains of DU30 for 2016 
The three posts which called for a revolution if Rodrigo Duterte was not declared the 
winner after the May 9 ballot began with a meme uploaded on December 30, 2015.  Figure 
36 shows the quote attributed to columnist Carmen Pedrosa by the official Duterte 
campaign team.  She said that “if the May elections are fair and free, that is the will of the 
people.  We live in a democracy.  But if 
they are not fair and free, I shall take part 
in a revolution.”  These words did not 
feature in any opinion piece Pedrosa 
wrote for the Philippine Star newspaper.  
They came from a December 26 
Facebook post she made on the page of 
the Freedom Wall group and this quote 
was also used by DU30 for 2016 on 
March 11 and March 14, 2016. 
Material highlighting Duterte’s 
disaster response record figured more 
prominently on DU30 for 2016 than it did 
on the official Rody Duterte Facebook account.  A total of six disaster response posts were 
produced by DU30 for 2016 during the collection period compared to two by the Rody 
Duterte page.  They comprised nearly 10 percent of the DU30 for 2016 worthwhile total 
while representing less than five percent of the Rody Duterte accounts’.  Four of these 
posts occurred in December 2015 and Figure 37 is a representative example.  It is a 
screenshot of a Duterte Dailynews Service Facebook post which detailed the money 
distributed by the Davao City calamity fund to 
other Local Government Units (LGUs) in the 
Philippines.  The amounts involved were worth 
a total of US$220,000 and would be in addition 
to the efforts of the LGUs of the affected areas.  
These local emergency workers are often able 
to provide faster relief than the central 
government’s agencies (Bueza, 2014).  
Typhoon Nona did not provide Duterte with an 
opportunity to demonstrate his LGU’s 
 Figure 36 
Figure 37 
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uniqueness during the election campaign – even though it is unlikely that any other out-
of-area LGU would have offered similar assistance.  Under his leadership Davao City had 
a history of helping other LGUs, especially in the aftermath of Super Typhoon Yolanda 
which hit the Central Philippines in 2013. (Manlupig, 2013).  A DU30 for 2016 post on 
December 21 also drew attention to the Duterte-led efforts to assist earthquake victims in 
another part of the Central Philippines during the same year.  However, central government 
auditors have criticised Davao City in the past for misusing its municipal disaster relief 
funds and for failing to adequately account for the resources provided by central 
government agencies (Bascos, 2015).  
 Other worthwhile categories consisted of health, poverty reduction, education and 
women's rights – while single posts also addressed foreign affairs, overseas workers and 
labour law issues.  Two health-related posts were uploaded in December 2015.  The first, 
on December 17, showed the ultra-modern interior of a Davao City hospital while the other 
depicted the city’s House of Hope child cancer treatment centre.  This second post on 
December 26 tried to draw a link between the patients in the treatment centre and the 
Mayor’s ban on smoking by suggesting that all forms of child cancer would eventually be 
eliminated thanks to Duterte’s actions.  The DU30 for 2016 posts about poverty reduction 
showed the programmes which were being implemented in Davao City.  Although the 
implementation of these programmes was made possible by the increased security in the 
Davao region, the programmes DU30 for 2016 chose to emphasise on March 23 were 
actually funded by central government rather than Duterte’s Local Government Unit.  As 
shown in Figure 38, posts on education followed the same format as the law and order 
category and involved Duterte promising 
to increase teachers’ salaries and give 
them ‘“more than double.”’  On the other 
hand, any direct reference to Duterte’s 
record on women’s rights was usually 
defensive and a reaction to the 
controversy caused by his comments 
about Jacqueline Hamill.  This was 
reflected in the posts DU30 for 2016 
uploaded on April 18 and 19 – both of 
which attempted to focus attention on the 
Figure 38 
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programmes Duterte had created which 
benefitted the women of Davao City.  Their 
dates also suggest these posts were part of an 
orchestrated effort by the Duterte campaign to 
manage the fallout from the Hamill affair (see 
Figure 13).  It is even alleged that despite his 
misogynistic outbursts the Mayor would 
personally threaten Davao residents arrested 
for assaulting their partners and that as a 
result, very few risked reoffending (Ranada, 
2017).    
 Foreign affairs content on DU30 for 
2016 consisted of the single image shown in Figure 39 in which Duterte is depicted with 
the Philippine flag.  The text of the meme declares that if elected Duterte “will ask to be 
brought to the nearest border and plant the flag there. I will say ‘this is our[s]’ – I will die 
for this country.”  It appeared on April 25, the day after the third Presidential debate and 
accurately summarised the statements made by Duterte on the West Philippine/South 
China Sea dispute (see Figure 10) if the final attribution after the hyphen is ignored. 
 On December 29, 2015 DU30 for 2016 produced a post which encapsulated the  
dilemma of the Philippine Overseas Foreign Worker (OFW).  It asked: “is going abroad 
the only way?” but failed to provide details of any OFW policy proposals.  Even after the 
Rody Duterte Facebook account had released specific OFW initiatives on April 24 (see 
Figure 10) these were not distributed through 
DU30 for 2016.             
 The April 23, 2016 post shown in 
Figure 40 attempted to address the issue of 
contractualisation just before the final 
presidential debate by framing the Duterte 
campaign’s official position as a series of 
generalities.  This post comprised a DU30 for 
2016 image first shared on August 21, 2015.  It 
said that Duterte had a preference for the 
“regularisation” of private sector workers as it would lead to “social and economic order.”   
At the same time, public sector workers were encouraged to put “public service first before 
Figure 39 
   Figure 40 
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service to thyself.”  The following night the Rody Duterte Facebook account uploaded a 
post describing his call for a total ban on Temporary Employment Contracts (TECs) or the 
process known as contractualisation.  This policy change was announced by Duterte on 
live television a few hours before and immediately overturned what his position on TECs 
had been over the previous eight months. 
 Despite his local government success implementing innovative and unorthodox 
initiatives designed to improve drug rehabilitation, domestic violence and public health 
efforts while also assisting other provinces affected by natural disasters, DU30 for 2016 
broadly maintained the Rody Duterte account’s emphasis on the necessity of an aggressive 
nationwide anti-corruption campaign.  Conventional posts discussing foreign policy or 
labour relations pale in significance when the core message of Duterteism seemed to be a 
promise to terrorise whoever Duterte deemed to be evil.  In essence, this was a plan to roll 
out his Davao experiment across the rest of the country and to impose his control over 
millions of Filipinos who had no idea of the scale of the bloodletting which was taken for 
granted in Mindanao.      
           
4.3.2  The new People Power 
Table 7: Breakdown DU30 for 2016 Facebook posts deemed trivial under Mathews’ criteria 
Supporters’ 
photos & vids 
Miscellaneous 
posts 
Political 
endorsements 
Political 
rallies 
 
75 61 46 38 220 
Political 
polls 
    
25     25 
    245 
 
Table 7 illustrates how crucial photos and videos provided by Duterte supporters were to 
DU30 for 2016.  They comprised 31 percent of all the page’s trivial content and just under 
a quarter of its overall total.  In contrast, nearly 61 percent of the Rody Duterte account’s 
trivial posts were of official campaign rallies.  Although these events still featured 
prominently on DU30 for 2016 they only made up 16 percent of the page’s trivial total. 
Political endorsements were used more extensively on DU30 for 2016 as well.  They 
comprised 19 percent of the page’s trivial content in comparison to the seven percent 
posted by the Rody Duterte account.  However, DU30 for 2016’s endorsements weren’t 
restricted to national level or even regional political heavyweights.  The majority of DU30 
for 2016’s were testimonials from individual supporters explaining why they intended to 
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vote for Duterte.  Unlike on the Rody Duterte account the promotion of Duterte’s 
upcoming media appearances did not occur through DU30 for 2016.  There were posts 
promoting his rallies but these have been assigned to the miscellaneous category unless 
they also contained images of crowds.  All crowd-related content has been collated under 
the political rally category.  Likewise, photo opportunities with Duterte have been 
reassigned to supporters’ photos and videos because the images used by DU30 for 2016 
were originally provided by individual 
supporters rather than members of the 
official Duterte campaign team.  Finally, a 
new category called political polls has been 
introduced.  This is because this type of 
content consisted of more than 10 percent 
of all DU30 for 2016’s trivial content. 
          Between December 17 and 
December 31, 2015 DU30 for 2016 
uploaded 27 posts of supporters’ photos and 
videos.  Many were from individuals based 
inside the Philippines while others showed 
how well organised the Duterte campaign was among Overseas Foreign Workers (OFWs).  
Figure 41 depicts Diehard Duterte Supporters (DDS) in Dubai and was originally shared 
by Peter Laviña – Duterte’s Campaign Spokesperson.  There may be as many as one 
million Filipinos living in the United Arab Emirates (Casas, 2016).  However, not all of 
them would have been eligible or registered to vote in the 2016 presidential election 
(Esmaquel, 2016).                                     
          An earlier December 17 post 
showed the Facebook administrators 
and leaders of various pro-Duterte 
OFW groups receiving formal 
campaign training in Davao City.  Yet 
Figure 42 also demonstrates the 
grassroots support Duterte received 
from the Filipino diaspora.  This 
individual living and working in Dammam, the capital of Saudi Arabia’s main oil-
producing region between Kuwait and Bahrain, is posing by himself with a home-made 
Figure 41 
    Figure 42 
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cardboard sign.  It proclaimed who he intended to support in the May 9, 2016 presidential 
race while maintaining the DU30 for 2016 account theme; May 5 + 9 + [20]16 = thirty 
which is often pronounced by Filipinos in a way which sounds like Duterte, hence 
‘DUthirty’ or DU30. 
On March 23 Duterte supporter 
Melga Zara was able to document 
through DU30 for 2016 the difficulties 
which she and others had allegedly 
experienced while trying to organise a 
rally just north of Mindanao on the island 
of Camiguin.  In Figure 43 Zara claimed 
that despite numerous attempts to secure 
proper venues in the stronghold of the 
Romualdo clan, her group was forced to 
build its own improvised stage.  If the 
image originally uploaded to her personal 
Facebook account had depicted the 
crowd which attended then it would have been classified as a political rally post.  It is not 
possible to independently verify whether Zara was really prevented from hiring “grand 
stands and gyms” on Camiguin by the Romualdos.  Nonetheless, these claims are 
consistent with the systematic hostility the Philippine Centre for Investigative Journalism 
felt had been shown by figures aligned with the 
Liberal Party government towards Duterte 
throughout the campaign (Mangahas, 2016).  
The Philippine Daily Inquirer reported 
that despite “threats and intimidation” around 
1000 people still showed up to hear 
Duterte denounce feudal warlordism without 
a trace of self-conscious irony (Alconaba, 
2016b, para. 7).  
The majority of the content in this 
category consisted of still images of Duterte’s 
supporters.  The images selected by DU30 for 
2016 usually depicted the original uploader or 
 Figure 44 
Figure 43 
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their family and friends.  Although DU30 for 2016 would share these Facebook images 
independently of the official campaign they still seemed to adhere to the general template 
provided by key Duterte officials such as Peter Laviña.  Figure 44 is a post shared on April 
22, 2016 depicting the kind of neighbourhood store with which every less affluent Filipino 
is familiar.  The images were taken by Jojo Lontoc, a Duterte campaign organiser from the 
island of Mindoro just south of Luzon.  They show that the store owner Mrs Kendie Luna 
Dacs had agreed to distribute Team Duterte material through her business.  As in the image 
shared by Laviña earlier in the campaign (Figure 41), Figure 44 also depicts a child giving 
the revolutionary closed fist salute of Duterte’s candidacy. This symbol was also used 
during Corazon Aquino’s 1986 People Power revolution.       
Political endorsements shared through DU30 for 2016 were sometimes similar to 
those produced by the official Rody Duterte account.  For instance, the Duterte campaign 
team produced a meme which was shared by DU30 for 2016 on December 30 showing the 
praise showered on Duterte by a prominent Philippine academic.  However, the 
endorsement, whether intentional or not, by University of the Philippines Political Science 
Professor Clarita Carlos was not indicative of the majority shared through DU30 for 2016.  
These were often personal testimonies like that of Liezel Salera shown in Figure 45.   
     Salera does not have an international academic reputation to rival that of Professor 
Carlos and only studied at the Jesuit-run Ateneo de Davao University in Davao City.  Yet 
her original post was turned into a meme and shared by pro-Duterte Facebook accounts 
within 48 hours of her posting it.  Salera’s physical appearance may have played a part in 
why it was picked up so quickly – but it also described the city Davao had allegedly become 
under Duterte’s rule.  The quote used is accurate as Salera had read an account describing 
the behaviour of Davao City taxi drivers and 
wanted to test its validity (Galvez, 2015).  She 
wrote in her original post how she had hidden 
behind some plants late at night and watched her 
taxi driver drive off only when he assumed she 
was safely inside her home.  Salera also went out 
of her way to assert that her motives had been 
non-political.  She claimed that her only reason 
for using the #MyDuterteStory hashtag was 
because of her love for the stories about her 
Figure 45  hometown shared through it (Galvez, 2015).  
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Although this anecdote is likely to be an attempt to perpetuate an urban legend it does 
not change how in 2015 Davao City was declared the 9th safest city in the world 
(Nawal, 2015a).  Salera’s testimonial was uploaded on December 17, 2015 and 
appeared a month before Duterte’s Hamill video raised public concerns about his 
attitude towards women.  It also provided a strong contrast between life in Davao and 
Manila’s rape epidemic (Guidaben, 2014). 
This type of personal 
endorsement also featured on March 18. 
At the start of 2016 Geraldine Donato 
was working in South Korea and helping 
to organise support for Rodrigo Duterte 
among other Overseas Foreign Workers 
there.  Figure 46 shows the start of her 
lengthy endorsement of the man the post 
claims Filipinos don’t necessarily want 
but most definitely need.  Like Salera 
(Figure 45), she insists that she has “never 
ever written something like this nor 
promoted or have ever voted for a 
politician all my life.”  Donato claims that 
although ‘“people do crazy things when 
they’re in love”’ she’s not in love with Duterte.  Regardless, she goes on to praise his core 
political message in an extremely positive manner.  This expanded part of the post would 
not be accessible to many of DU30 for 2016’s followers which is why the account’s 
administrator has made the article’s text part of their main post.   
Donato listed three primary reasons why she had gone from being an apolitical 
health professional to an ardent Duterte supporter: Duterte’s ability to negotiate with 
insurgent groups, his clampdown on crime in Davao City and his determination to help 
other Local Government Units with their disaster relief efforts.  Even though she’s not 
from Davao she claims to have received “first-hand information that these drug 
addicts/pushers/users/lords, culprits are not executed the way [we] think they are.”   
Prior to Duterte’s presidency most criminals in the Philippines seemed to avoid 
armed confrontations with the police, especially if they had an existing financial 
relationship with them (Baldwin & Marshall, 2017a).  However, since July 2016 thousands 
Figure 46
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of people suspected of involvement with illegal narcotics have been fatally shot while 
supposedly resisting arrest.  Reuters investigations have shown that in areas of Manila 
where special teams of Davao City police officers were assigned the proportion of targeted 
individuals killed during anti-drug operations increased from zero to 97 percent 
(Baldwin & Marshall, 2017a; Baldwin, Marshall & Sagolj, 2016).  Despite being a 
qualified nurse, Donato expressed no interest in the lack of affordable healthcare 
options in the Philippines – or even why it was necessary for her to pursue her 
nursing career in South Korea rather than in her home island of Cebu.   
Only four DU30 for 2016 posts in 
December 2015 showed pictures or videos 
taken at Duterte’s rallies.  The main 
difference between DU30 for 2016 political 
rally posts and those produced by the Rody 
Duterte Facebook account is that DU30 for 
2016 would frequently share content taken 
by other Duterte supporters which failed to 
identify where the rally had taken place. 
This may have been because the images and 
videos selected by DU30 for 2016 
emphasised the crowd size at these events at 
the expense of everything else.  Figure 47 is the December 31, 2015 post which used an 
image originally uploaded by Dalia Sahipa to the Facebook page Freedom Wall.  The 
photo shows Duterte speaking to a large crowd without providing any other details.  There 
are no visual clues to help identify the location of the rally but because Sahipa is from Mati 
in Mindanao it is possible it was taken there or at nearby Davao City.  An image search 
suggested Davao City was the most likely location and that it was used by other Duterte 
supporters as well.  Even though the date of the rally is still uncertain Sahipa would have 
had difficulty attending it while she was working in Dubai.  Her role as an Overseas 
Foreign Worker organiser for Duterte and the use of the image by others associated with 
the campaign suggests that the concealment of the rally’s location and date might have 
been part of a deliberate effort to demonstrate that the Mayor’s popularity was not 
restricted to just the southern portion of the Philippines. 
Figure 47 
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 Sometimes the photographs shared by 
DU30 for 2016 were of identifiable rallies.  
For example, the images in Figure 48 were 
shared by DU30 for 2016 on March 18 and 
were clearly attributed in the accompanying 
text to Duterte’s March 16 grand rally in 
Davao City.  They were taken by Davao City 
Councillor Jackson Reyes and like those 
shared by Dalia Sahipa they show the crowd 
from the perspective of the individuals on 
stage with Duterte.  This suggests that the 
person responsible for taking the pictures 
Sahipa used must also have been important 
enough to stand behind the candidate while he 
was campaigning.  Three other DU30 for 2016 posts close to this date shared similar 
images including the one employed by the Rody 
Duterte Facebook account on March 17 (Figure 
16).  DU30 for 2016 continued to mirror the Rody 
Duterte page’s promotion of seminal campaign 
events throughout the collection period.  As 
Figure 49 shows, by May 7 it was exhorting 
Duterte supporters to “observe discipline and 
cleanliness” while attending the closing rally of 
the campaign in Luneta Park, Manila.  The post 
contained an image of a saluting child (top right-
hand corner) similar to those in Figures 41 and 
44.  This event was also featured by the official 
Rody Duterte Facebook account (Figure 19). 
 In addition to the political polls used by major news outlets DU30 for 2016 also 
made use of polls from less conventional sources.  However, the use of political polling 
data collected from sample groups such as registered teachers and Philippine Stock 
Exchange workers was limited.  Most DU30 for 2016 polling posts were like that of 21 
December, 2015 which used the results from an Illustrado poll.  The magazine surveyed 
5000 Overseas Foreign Workers in 92 different countries.  However, because the data used 
Figure 48 
Figure 49 
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in this poll had been gathered 
electronically it may have been 
subjected to a co-ordinated attempt to 
manipulate it.  The results showed that 
87 percent of respondents intended to 
vote for Duterte.  Figure 50 shows the 
results of an online Rappler poll shared 
by DU30 for 2016 on January 16 which 
may have also been the victim of an 
intentional manipulation campaign.  The tallies for Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago 
and Manuel ‘Mar’ Roxas II are not displayed properly while those for Senator Grace Poe 
and Vice President Jejomar ‘Jojo’ Binay 
showed they had received 816 and 387 votes 
respectively.  Duterte managed to garner 
approximately 39,000. 
 By March DU30 for 2016 did not need to 
rely on this kind of data any longer.  Figure 51 
depicts the Pulse Asia results shared by DU30 
for 2016 on March 23, 2016.  For the first time 
in a major reputable poll Mayor Rodrigo 
Duterte was trailing Senator Grace Poe by only 
a single percentage point after 25 percent of the 
respondents had indicated their willingness to 
vote for him.  This was within the poll’s margin of error (Varona, 2016). 
 Miscellaneous posts made up 25 
percent of DU30 for 2016’s trivial total and 
20 percent of the account's overall activity.  A 
lot involved the sharing of pro-Duterte 
artwork.  DU30 for 2016 would share images 
uploaded by the Facebook pages of other 
Duterte supporters and upload its own memes 
– perhaps in the hope that they would be 
shared in turn.  An example of the latter is 
shown in Figure 52.  Although this image Figure 52 
Figure 51 
Figure 50 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 72     
contains politicised text it does not provide any policy details.  Other posts advertised 
where supporters could get their pro-Duterte t-shirts printed.  The wearing of such t-shirts 
is vital to a Philippine political campaign’s perceived popularity and success, even though 
there are complex laws governing when they can be worn.  These laws are meant to ensure 
that individuals attending political rallies are able to express their support for their 
candidate without assembling in an intimidatory way (Brands, 1992; GMA, 2007).  
Minimising the potential for paramilitary violence is considered essential in a country 
where hundreds can die during elections (Scharff, 2011; Traywick, 2013). 
       Confusing campaign finance laws are also a feature of Philippine elections and in 
theory make candidates vulnerable to legal action even if they prevail at the ballot box 
(ABC, 2016b; Rodriguez, 2016).  As a result, some of DU30 for 2016’s miscellaneous 
posts warned its followers not to solicit campaign contributions or attempt to profit from 
Duterte’s candidacy.  Figure 53 shows 
an example from December 22, 2015 
which also admonished the Mayor’s 
supporters to not use abusive or 
derogatory language and to avoid 
disseminating “false and unverified” 
information online.  Similar demands 
for campaign discipline were reiterated 
on April 5, 8, 10 and 27. 
Overall, the messages conveyed by 
DU30 for 2016 and the official Rody 
Duterte page were primarily concerned with emphasising Duterte’s popularity and 
therefore his electability.  There seemed to be no coherent or detailed policies at the heart 
of the Mayor’s campaign and core messages – just a blanket reassurance that everything 
would somehow be better once he was in power.  The most troubling aspect about this lack 
of specificity was how unconcerned many Filipinos were by it.  Within the context of 
Philippine politics what appeared more important was showing how many people believed 
in Duterte’s ability to deliver genuine transformational change.  The use of Facebook to 
help achieve this also meant that the two accounts this research analysed were used to 
demonstrate how many and what kind of Filipinos believed in Duterte.  His elevation to a 
national rather than just a regional celebrity required a huge amount of faith in his personal 
attributes, an aspect of Mathews’ framework which is usually considered trivial in 
Figure 53 
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comparison to the worthwhile political and economic positions that Mathews felt that 
Western politicians were meant to espouse.  In this respect, Duterte could represent the 
inevitable endgame of Southeast Asia’s preference for ‘strong’ personalities over polices 
and in particular, the widespread Filipino desire to be immediately delivered from 
everything which ails them.       
Chapter 5.  Analysis: The Rodrigo Duterte talk show 
Content analysis can only provide quantitative data on specific metrics.  The labelling of 
the researcher’s category choices may also cause complications as a result of the inherently 
subjective aspects of this process.  However, the qualitative properties of critical discourse 
analysis allow it to produce far less restrictive results.  This approach seems ideally suited 
to a phenomenon like Rodrigo Duterte because what Duterte said during the 2016 
Philippine presidential election wasn’t always as instructive as the discursive frame he 
created.  He did this by making his pronouncements in a manner which perhaps no other 
major candidate could, or would.   
5.1       More than words – the discourse of Rody Duterte 
On the surface, few posts of any real significance appeared to have been produced by the 
Rody Duterte Facebook account during the initial weeks of the data collection period.  As 
Table 1 showed, the 145 days from December 17, 2015 to May 9, 2016 saw the Rody 
Duterte page post a total of 118 times.  However, if the approximate mid-point of the 
collection period is considered to be March 1, 2016 then Table 1 also demonstrated that 
only 33 posts were made by Rody Duterte prior to this date.  Only 28 percent of the 
account’s total activity took place from December 17, 2015 to March 1, 2016.  This period 
also encompassed what was considered Duterte’s proclamation rally and official campaign 
launch on February 9 in Tondo, Manila (see Figure 15) as well as the first Presidential 
debate on February 21.  The day before the debate saw the first concerted attempt by the 
Rody Duterte account to establish what the Mayor’s policies were.  Journalists covering 
his campaign during these early stages of the collection period had been speculating about 
what Duterte’s priorities might be if he was elected.  They then updated their articles once 
more details had been confirmed by Duterte or his vice presidential running mate Senator 
Cayetano (Ansis, 2016; Ranada, 2016c). 
February 20’s Figure 1 encapsulated the core messaging which would remain at 
the heart of the Duterte campaign’s Facebook activity throughout the data collection 
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period.  The first proposition which Figure 1 presents us with is that of Duterte’s English 
fluency.  It presupposes that the Mayor could articulate a coherent vision for the country 
in English despite his preference for Visayan, the main language of the Central and 
Southern Philippines (Casas, 2018).  This presupposition sits uneasily alongside the other 
necessary assumption that due to the candidate’s time constraints all his Facebook content 
would have been created by his campaign team rather than by Rodrigo Duterte himself.  If 
we accept that Figure 1 must still represent an accurate reflection of Duterte’s political 
positions rather than something simply crafted on his behalf, then it might also require us 
to accept that these positions have been tidied up so they convey their intended meaning 
more clearly.  This is especially true when considering how challenging Duterte’s 
unpolished spoken and written English can be to comprehend (Figures 2-4; Martija, 2018). 
The central proposition of Figure 1 is contained in its initial sentence.  When 
Duterte declares “I can only promise you the things I can accomplish” he, or perhaps more 
accurately his campaign team, is establishing his credibility as a straight talker – someone 
who always tells it like it is rather than just stating what we want to hear.  This is intended 
to create a macrodiscursive environment (Condor & Antaki, 1997) where all Duterte’s 
pronouncements contain a presupposed validity.    
What follows are three further specific claims or specifications.  Each of them is 
distinct and from a microdiscursive perspective (Van Dijk, 1997a) they contain 
unusual sentence choices.  This is because all of Figure 1’s propositions were cobbled 
together by Duterte’s campaign team from a speech he gave at his National Campaign 
Conference in Davao City on January 8 (Alontaga, 2016).  The first: “Nothing beyond my 
term and what I can promise you is I can stop corruption” implies that the 
achievements of a Duterte presidency will only last as long as he does and that 
traditional Philippine politicians will seek to undermine and dismantle his legacy as soon 
as he leaves office.  The key element of this sentence’s discursive components (Van 
Dijk, 1997a) is the word “stop.”  Reducing corruption might have been a more 
realistic aim as it would have built on what had already occurred under the preceding 
administration of Benigno Aquino III (“Aquino’s corruption fight marks modest progress 
– experts,” 2015; Butuyan, 2017).  However, what Figure 1 promises us is that with 
Duterte at the helm not only will all corruption cease, but other things will come to 
pass as well. 
The other two propositions were: “We can start nation-building.  We can start 
talking about peace.”  They are couched in imminently reasonable language and were 
linked to the ending of corruption by Duterte in his original speech (Alontaga, 2016).  Yet 
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this is the core distortion at the heart of Duterteism.  Usually, macrodiscursive 
manipulations rely on false linkages and extreme examples (Condor & Antaki, 1997).  The 
Duterte campaign did not need to openly employ such tactics in Figure 1 as no one disputes 
that the Philippines’ inadequate infrastructure and its long-running insurgencies have, 
along with widespread corruption, inhibited its economic development over many decades. 
The problem with these assertions are that they ignore the high economic growth rates 
achieved during the 21st Century in the Philippines (The World Bank, 2017) and in other 
Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand and Indonesia with similar corruption, 
infrastructure and residual security challenges.  These factors may retard prosperity and 
even severely restrict it in some localities, but they don’t automatically prevent it from 
occurring at a national level (Asian Development Bank, 2016; The World Bank, 2011).  
Figure 1 therefore reflects a provincial perspective, a Mindanao-centric view of the 
Philippines and its problems.  By 2016 the Islamic and Maoist insurgencies which had 
plunged that island into the abyss in 1972 were only a shadow of their former selves 
because of the radical and effective actions of local bosses like Rodrigo Duterte 
(Makabenta, 2016; Mong, 2010; Rabasa et al., 2011; Turbiville, 2002; Zabriskie, 2002).   
In the speech which formed the basis for Figure 1 Duterte also admitted that his bid 
for the presidency was a long shot (Alontaga, 2016).  His National Campaign Conference 
was ignored by the country’s major media outlets and the only coverage was provided by 
the SunStar Davao newspaper and local pro-Duterte bloggers (Alontaga, 2016; 
Jose, n.d.; Villareal, 2016).  This would also help to explain why non-traditional 
online channels became so vital to the Duterte campaign.  Nonetheless, it still took 44 
days before the Rody Duterte Facebook page was able to post an official synthesis of the 
Mayor’s views online. This post seems to have appeared because of the impending 
presidential debate and might represent the Duterte campaign’s indifference towards 
detailed policy rather than a commitment to strong message discipline.  Despite the 
apparent improbability of Duterte’s electoral victory in January 2016 there was still no 
concession anywhere in Figure 1 that solving all the Philippines’ problems of the past 50 
years in a single six-year presidential term was also going to be a formidable task.    
The early-to-mid stages of the data collection period involved adding more 
substance to the framework of Duterteism.  Figure 6 showed how on February 20, just 
prior to the first debate, Team Duterte was also more forthcoming than at any other time 
about the Mayor’s plans to fight the criminality which he had repeatedly linked to the 
country’s drug epidemic.  His campaign “against criminals and lawless elements [was to] 
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be relentless and uncompromising.”  This in itself would seem relatively uncontroversial 
as long as the willingness of the candidate to pursue this course under any circumstances 
is ignored.  It is therefore an example of revolutionary populist conviction politics designed 
to usher in irreversible changes (Cannon, 2009) rather than a proposal for a series of 
informed interventions.  At no point did Duterte introduce any statistics to support his 
claims even when such data was available.  For instance, dramatically higher drug usage 
among vulnerable low-income Filipinos was thought to have contributed to a 778 
percent increase in reported crimes between 2012 and mid-2015.  Moreover, only about 
29 percent of the murders, rapes and robberies being reported to the police during this 
period were being solved compared with the 89 percent success rate achieved only a few 
years before (Ranada, 2016b).  This was a development which no other presidential 
candidate appeared able to acknowledge or to exploit for political purposes.  Figure 6 
also required his audience to dismiss the possibility that such a campaign might have to 
be recalibrated if it proved politically unpopular during its implementation – or if it could 
result in a future president being indicted by the International Criminal Court (Petty & 
Serapio Jr., 2018; Social Weather Stations, 2017).  This statement is therefore intended to 
create a legitimate partiality and force audiences to take sides (Van Dijk, 1997b).  
Voters needed to choose between candidates who seemed incapable of accepting that 
there was any kind of crisis affecting the Philippines and one who sometimes appeared to 
be proposing more than just the usual rhetoric and half-measures to solve it. 
What Duterte seemed to be proposing was an extra-legal effort to rid the land of 
some people who broke the nation’s laws.  Figure 6 went on to describe how “criminals 
must know their lives are always on the line and law-enforcers shall hunt them to protect 
law-abiding citizens.”  However, after his election it wasn’t white-collar fraudsters or 
cybersex providers who were being shot.  The tens of thousands subsequently 
killed by the police – reportedly in self-defence – or by as yet unidentified assailants, 
were all suspected of drug-related activities (Buan, 2018; HRW, 2018).  This 
suggests that when a direct quote attributed to Duterte uses the term “criminals” he 
is really referring to a specific kind of law-breaker.  Its usage also appears to involve a 
loyalty test of some kind. Under a Duterte presidency “law-enforcers” must be trusted 
to “hunt” these individuals down rather than merely pursuing and arresting them.  The 
hunting of criminals would be relatively innocuous and easily dismissed as law-and-
order posturing if this language had been employed by any other candidate.  However, 
because of the methods Duterte had allegedly used to pacify Davao City, this February 
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20 post is the closest the Rody Duterte Facebook account came to openly proposing a 
policy of targeted killings prior to the election. 
The hints contained in Figure 6 were quickly disavowed by Duterte during his 
February 21 debate performance (“1st Presidential debate transcript: Round One,” 2016). 
Duterte denied that targeted killings were routine while he was Mayor of Davao and 
claimed that every shooting by his police had been justified and therefore legal.  However, 
under the pressure of the debate format he also undermined these denials by saying that if 
elected he would “… order the killing of all criminals” (“1st Presidential debate transcript: 
Round One,” para. 30).  The limited challenges that these statements solicited meant that 
Duterte’s deadly rhetoric was being normalised by the Philippine media and political elites 
over the course of the campaign.  His outrageousness helped to boost TV and online 
streaming audiences while he was sharing the stage with candidates who had traditionally 
represented different discursive norms (Cerda, 2016b; GMA, 2016).  Duterte’s 
macrodiscursive narrative implied that as a coercive provincial boss he was accustomed to 
solving difficult problems in ways that senators or vice presidents from Imperial Manila 
were not.  An ambiguous and understated subtext of this narrative was that a final solution 
to the challenges which were preventing the Philippines from reaching its full potential 
required someone who was prepared to employ violence in order to eliminate them.  As a 
lawyer and former prosecutor he seemed to couch his language around this issue in a legal 
veneer by presenting it as the ordinary outcome of enhanced police operations, while still 
occasionally lapsing into calls for mass killings similar to the pogroms Indonesia suffered 
under General Muhammad Suharto in 1965-66 (Curato, 2017; De Guzman, 2018; Roosa, 
2006; Sørensen & Oppenheimer, 2012). 
The normalisation of Duterte as a 
national-level candidate created what 
Foucault (1988, 1995) would call a new 
power imbalance.  This saw the taboo 
surrounding the reality of rural feudalism and 
its associated violence in the Philippines 
(HRW, 2009; Sidel, 1999, 2005) overturned 
and freely discussed on live television.  It also 
saw Duterte treated as a serious presidential 
candidate and an equal of former Philippine 
political titans such as Senator Miriam    Figure 54
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Defensor-Santiago.  Senator Defensor-Santiago’s praise of Mayor Rody’s record in Davao 
City during the February 21 debate was pounced on by his campaign and uploaded to the 
Rody Duterte page within a few hours of its conclusion.  Figure 54 shows how she claimed 
that “nobody has done very much against graft and corruption except Mayor Rody 
Duterte.”  The video clip portraying this gracious but also highly impolitic remark garnered 
at least 7.2 million views.  It provided new impetus to Duterte’s status as the potential 
saviour of the country while needlessly denigrating the Senator’s own imperfect history of 
combatting fraud, despotism and human rights violations (Evangelista & Curato, 2016).  
Despite only securing about 4 percent of votes cast in the 2016 presidential election 
(“Official Election Results,” 2016) Defensor-Santiago proved over the course of her public 
service that not every trapo or traditional politician in the Philippines was bereft of moral 
standing.  Although “nobody had done very much” some had refrained from pursuing 
ceaseless lawfare against their rivals – their unjustified prosecution and detainment – or 
arranging for their blatant assassination.  Defensor-Santiago’s past attempts to change her 
country’s political culture were worthy of respect.  Yet by 2016 her opportunistic embrace 
of Ferdinand Marcos Jr. as her official vice presidential running mate and her poorly 
disguised disdain for under-educated Filipino voters had made her politically 
irrelevant, except as an inadvertent facilitator of Duterte’s rise (Evangelista & Curato, 
2016).  Defensor-Santiago’s candidacy resulted in the additional fragmentation of the 
already fragmented anti-Duterte vote while her accidental legitimation of Duterte’s 
mayoral legacy also gave his methods further respectability.       
The format of the presidential debates prevented any of the five candidates from 
providing detailed policy prescriptions.  The large number of candidates who participated 
ensured that their individual speaking time was always going to be limited (“2nd 
Presidential debate adds ‘Yes or No’ segment,” 2016).  This meant the Rody Duterte 
account appeared to lose an opportunity to upload more substantial posts outlining the 
Mayor’s agenda either before or after his debate performances.  The account’s activity 
focused more on promoting Duterte’s TV appearances and what he said during them than 
it did on coherent policy positions.  Jose Gabriel La Viña’s comments after the campaign 
suggested this was a deliberate strategy which reflected the different Facebook 
demographics of the Philippines in 2016.  La Viña, Duterte’s Social Media Co-ordinator, 
had previously worked on Benigno Aquino III’s successful 2010 presidential bid (Cantera, 
2016).  This was when only eight million or around nine percent of Filipinos were online 
(Internet Live Stats, 2016) and Facebook was still mainly the preserve of affluent and 
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educated PC users who would usually access the internet through fixed-line connections 
from work or home (Kirkpatrick, 2011).  Before smartphones had become ubiquitous La 
Viña would carefully  compose 1000-word 
Facebook posts supporting his candidate. 
However, by 2016 he felt that this tactic was 
superfluous because even if he had continued to 
upload long statements to Facebook too few 
Filipinos among the 40 million with mobile 
internet capable devices (Jiao, 2016) would 
bother – or be able – to read them (Cantera, 
2016).   
This reality, when coupled with a 
candidate who simply adopted his vice 
presidential running mate’s detailed economic 
policies whenever he was confronted with the absence of his own (Ranada, 2016c), meant 
that the limited text shown in Figure 55 is the most representative of all Duterte’s official 
messaging during the 2016 campaign.  It was created on March 21, the day after the 2nd 
Presidential debate.  In the post’s image the debate statement made by Duterte was “I can 
tell you now that I CAN PROVIDE LEADERSHIP.”  The block capitalisation of “I can 
provide leadership” makes it easy to ascertain what microdiscursive element the Rody 
Duterte account considered to be the most important in this statement.  By this stage of the 
campaign (Figure 51) Duterte was poised to eliminate Senator Grace Poe’s lead in the polls 
and needed to avoid saying anything controversial which would undermine his new status 
as one of the frontrunners in the presidential race.  No macrodiscourse can be removed 
from the political context of which it is a part (Van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983) and Figure 55 
was declaring that Duterte was ready to be presidential, or as they say in the Philippines, 
presidentiable.  What wasn’t clear was precisely what kind of leadership he was proposing 
to deliver.   
This clarity was provided by the additional text uploaded by the Rody Duterte 
account’s administrator above the debate image.  Using perfect English and the hashtag 
#tamasiDuterte or “Duterte [is] right” it claimed that Duterte would “provide strong 
leadership to end the country’s disorder.”  Although the critical word here is “strong” this 
statement also contains a crucial presupposition.  What Team Duterte actually proposes is 
the kind of strong leadership which only Mayor Rody can provide.  When this ‘I alone-
ism’ is combined with the crisis-solving “ending the country’s disorder” it meets one of 
Figure 55 
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the more accepted definitions of populism (Acemoglu et al., 2013; Moffitt, 2016; Range, 
2016a, 2016b).  Populism is often described as a thin ideology because its substance does 
not derive from a consistent framework of ideas which it has proposed itself.  How the 
populist movement interacts while identifying either with or against the frameworks of 
others has traditionally been seen as its core characteristic (Aslanidis, 2016; Muddle, 2004; 
Stanley, 2008).  However, contemporary thinking challenges the idea that populism is an 
ideology at all.  This is because it is so chameleonic it lacks one of the key characteristics 
of all other political ‘isms’  ̶  coherence.  It may be more accurate to think of it as a 
discursive frame as it is not the content or substance of populist policies that matter, but 
how they are articulated (Aslanidis, 2016).   
In Duterte’s case, he and his supporters are responding to a crisis which others 
aren’t sure even exists, another common populist trait (Acemoglu et al., 2013).  Due to this 
lack of national consensus the discourse surrounding illegal drug manufacturing, 
trafficking and usage is not over what to do about it, but whether it is even sufficiently 
troubling to warrant discussion.  In order to successfully decode Duterte’s discursive 
message (Van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983) in Figure 55 audiences would have to experience the 
disorder he mentioned or to know someone who had, even if this person was only one of 
their servants.  If it wasn’t for Duterte’s suppression of narcotics in Davao City he may 
have been as blind to the day-to-day realities most Filipinos face as the other candidates in 
the 2016 contest were (Heydarian, 2017).  The Philippines is also a major hub, perhaps the 
world’s pre-eminent facilitator, of fake pharmaceuticals (Al Jazeera English, 2015; “Fake 
drugs,” 2017; Padilla, 2013).  Although this trade is more lucrative and corrupt than the 
methamphetamine industry and also results in colossal suffering and death, it 
doesn’t produce the street violence that illegal drugs do.  A candidate focused exclusively 
on corruption and its pernicious evils would not ignore this source or others such as car or 
clothes smuggling if it was their primary concern (Alcober, 2016). The drug-fuelled 
violence and disorder affecting poor communities were invisible to other members of the 
Philippine political elite except when they could score points by castigating their rivals for 
allowing it to encroach on the gated and guarded areas where middle and upper-class 
Filipinos lived and worked (Romero, 2016).  Only Duterte was in a position to offer his 
compatriots leadership that was supposedly strong enough to change the country and 
banish it forever, regardless of the warnings that this goal might prove illusory.  As he 
reminded the Liberal Party candidate Manuel Roxas II during the 2nd Presidential 
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debate: “the problem is you’re afraid to die and kill.  If you can’t do that, look for another 
job” (Romero & Romero, 2016, para. 30).   
This was the macrodiscursive message which reached its natural conclusion in 
Figure 55.  From this point on in the campaign the Rody Duterte account would make no 
further attempts to articulate what Mayor Duterte actually stood for.  This was no longer 
necessary when Duterte’s participation in the first two presidential debates had already 
caused the country’s media to genuflect the socio-economic norms and discourses of the 
provinces rather than the urbane, sophisticated and only occasionally violent world (Flores, 
2016) of the capital’s elites.  Instead, the Duterte campaign’s official Facebook activity 
would focus on emphasising the political momentum his candidacy had achieved and how 
it was in the process of sweeping him to power with slogans like “Duterte is right” and 
“Change is coming”.  The populist discursive frame is best described as a sense of 
motivational urgency, the desire to act before it’s too late (Aslanidis, 2016).  This 
was the consistent narrative DU30 for 2016 attempted to sustain as well.      
5.2     DU30 for 2016’s solution to discursive anomalies 
Consistency is impossible for populists to achieve when they invariably shift their policy 
content to appease different audiences (Aslanidis, 2016).  From a discourse perspective 
this causes difficulties.  This is because the only way to create macrodiscursive realities is 
to maintain message consistency until your intended audience align themselves with you 
while rejecting your rivals’ narratives (Van Dijk, 1997a).  As a result, the chimaera of 
worthwhile Duterte policy detail can draw attention away from the discursive meaning 
which had been consistently proposed throughout his campaign’s Facebook activity – and 
which would also become the foundation of his electoral victory.    
As Table 5 showed, despite the reboot which DU30 for 2016 underwent during 
February when it posted only once, 55 percent of its worthwhile content still appeared 
before the approximate mid-point of the data collection period on March 1, 2016.  This 
seemed to create a more even worthwhile spread than the 28 percent the Rody Duterte 
account produced during the first half of the collection period.  However, 44 percent of all 
DU30 for 2016’s worthwhile activity was condensed into December 2015. 
This was the stage of the campaign which Team Duterte later identified as their 
most critical (Cantera, 2016).  It was shortly after Rodrigo Duterte had criticised the extra 
traffic congestion caused by Pope Francis’ trip to Manila and this had driven his staff to 
despair.  To many Filipinos hell is not just a theological abstraction but an actual place to 
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which they could be condemned to for all eternity.  As a result, it might have been 
impossible for some of this group to vote for Mayor Duterte after he had called the Pope a 
son-of-a-whore ‘in jest’ (Cantera, 2016; Hegina, 2015a).  The whirlwind of activity on 
DU30 for 2016 and other Facebook pages like it during December 2015 may have been 
an attempt to reassure Duterte’s supporters that his campaign was still on track and not 
predestined to fail.   
By the start of the data collection period on December 17, Mayor Duterte was no 
longer acting penitent and directly trying to recover from the outrage caused by his 
pontifical faux pa.  It is within this context that pro-Duterte journalist Carmen Pedrosa’s 
call for revolution occurred (Figure 36).  From a discourse perspective her December 30 
statement that she “would take part in a revolution” if the May 9, 2016 election was not 
“free and fair” seems extremely revealing.  Yet because of the overthrow of President 
Marcos in 1986, revolutionary government does not have the same connotation or meaning 
in the Philippines that it does elsewhere.  Although it remains uncertain exactly how 
Marcos was able to manipulate the presidential ballot that year, the subsequent 
demonstrations against his rule, coupled with the dissatisfaction and disloyalty that existed 
among his armed forces, led to Corazon Aquino taking power (Anderson, 1988; Celoza, 
1997; Nemenzo, 2016).  The period after she was declared the winner of the snap 1986 
presidential election – which Marcos claimed he’d won – and before fresh Congressional 
elections could be held in early 1987 is referred to as her revolutionary government (David, 
2017).  It is this process that Pedrosa’s comments were really meant to reference regardless 
of how the Duterte campaign and DU30 for 2016 tried to utilise them.  Pedrosa only 
advocated seizing power if the Liberal Party thwarted Duterte the way President Marcos 
had robbed Corazon Aquino.  She was concerned about the possibility of widespread 
election fraud, not by Duterte’s temporary dip in the polls (Cantera, 2016).    
DU30 for 2016 did produce a genuine revolutionary post the following day on 
December 31, 2015.  Figure 25 showed that Duterte felt drastic action was required to 
prevent the Philippines from becoming a failed state.  He declared that “in three to six 
months, everything has to stop.  Corruption, drugs and criminality.  You are oppressing 
the Filipinos, and I hate it.”  What DU30 for 2016 was proposing by using this quote was 
that a vote for the Mayor would transform Philippine society.  Duterte’s assertion that 
“everything has to stop” which oppresses the Filipino is the most intriguing.  This 
proposition appears to link these oppressive circumstances to “corruption, drugs and 
criminality.”  However, the key to understanding what had to stop is that after he became 
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President nothing Duterte hated would be tolerated.  Audiences attempt to make sense of 
discursive propositions by using their existing schemas and knowledge (Van Dijk & 
Kintsch, 1983).  By presenting himself as a tough-talking provincial boss Duterte always 
implied that he wasn’t seeking to persuade others to reform.  This proposition suggests a 
coercive paradigm shift would occur after Duterte was elected and that anything, or 
anyone, who defied his future proclamations would be in great peril.  
The other microdiscursive component which warrants further examination is the 
time period within which Duterte claimed these fundamental changes needed to be 
completed.  In 2015 the Philippines was still one of the most corrupt countries in Asia and 
its high methamphetamine usage seems to have contributed to a record crime rate (Ranada, 
2016b; Transparency International, 2015).  Duterte’s conviction that Philippine society 
was unravelling was to an extent based on some kind of actuality, especially for those 
living on the socio-economic fringes.  Yet his proposed cure was to “stop” those he felt 
were slowly strangling the rest of the Philippines even when the drug-users he planned to 
target first were also likely to be the friends and family members of many of his low-
income supporters.  In proposing that all these individuals could be stopped “in three to 
six months” Duterte was engaging in utopian messaging (Espiritu, 2017).  The timeline 
required to achieve this perfect society – led by a president who felt nothing but love for 
his people (Espiritu, 2017; La Viña, 2016) – was so short that the presupposition it 
required to be understood was that the Philippine National Police couldn’t achieve this 
miracle by themselves.  This meant the Philippine public would need to help create the 
real change they had been promised by taking part in purges which would rid the country 
of their hated oppressors.  The day after his inauguration on June 30, 2016 President 
Duterte described what this road to [self-]liberation would involve.  He said: “If you 
know of any addicts, go ahead and kill them yourself as getting their parents to do it 
would be too painful” (VICE News, 2016, para. 2).  His congressional allies also 
presented a bill which would allow the police to legally target children as young as 
nine in anti-drug operations (Baldwin & Marshall, 2017b).  In comparison, Duterte’s 
predecessor President Benigno Aquino III had confined his efforts to education 
initiatives designed to gradually reduce the drug offending rates among the 
country’s teens (Agatep, 2016).   
Duterte’s candidacy was always meant to be distinctively different.  Proof of just 
how different it would be was provided earlier in December.  As shown in Figure 56, on 
December 19 – the third day of the data collection period – DU30 for 2016 posted a number 
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of quotes from the president of PDP-Laban 
(Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan 
or Philippine Democratic Party-People Power).  
This was the minor party whose ticket Duterte 
was ostensibly running on.  Senator Aquilino 
‘Koko’ Pimentel III:  
said his party picked Duterte as its 
standard-bearer because ‘he is able to 
think outside the box in looking for 
solutions to our country’s problems.  
Some candidates want to continue 
western doctrines and theories in 
solving our problems. Some want only 
cosmetic change.  President Duterte 
will introduce change: change we will all 
feel.’ 
These comments were originally reported by ABS-CBN News using the headline “Duterte: 
Political clown or social phenomenon?” (Esguerra, 2015) – which explains why DU30 for 
2016 did not provide a link to the full article.  No other major presidential candidate in 
2016 was thinking as far “outside the box” as Rodrigo Duterte – nor were they seeking to 
appropriate the mantle of the country’s anti-Western independence struggle in the same 
way he was either.  Some of his rivals dismissed his antics as too ridiculous to warrant 
serious criticism (Esguerra, 2015).  As a result, his radical solutions which seemed to 
involve the killing of large numbers of people were often downplayed as mere macho 
rhetoric.  It is this aspect of his candidacy which deviated from “western doctrines and 
theories” and which took traditional urban Philippine politicians by surprise.  It is also 
the aspect which non-Filipinos struggle to understand and which causes further 
difficulties for researchers who, like this one, are relying on Western theoretical 
frames to examine the texts of a distinctly provincial Filipino political figure.   
The content and discourse lenses provided by Mathews and Van Dijk reflect the 
norms and conventions of highly developed North American and Western European media 
and political environments.  These limitations were also inherent in the worldview of the 
Philippine elite, often educated at the best American and British universities, who failed 
to realise Duterte was deadly serious (Esguerra, 2015).  He was not playing at being a rural 
Figure 56 
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boss, warlord and thug.  This was who he had become, perhaps by necessity, while 
reinventing himself – and Davao City.  What Senator Pimentel III’s specific claims were 
proposing (Van Dijk, 1997a) were consistent with the overarching macrodiscursive 
narrative of the entire Duterte campaign.  Although “some [of Duterte’s rivals] want only 
cosmetic change.  President Duterte will introduce [real] change: change we will all feel.”  
This change was meant to be fundamental, irreversible and revolutionary.  In the new 
Philippines the persecution and killing of drug addicts was not an end unto itself and was 
not meant to solely eradicate crime and corruption.  Instead, it was intended to underscore 
exactly what kind of change Duterte was really going to deliver and how in his Utopia, 
just as in Thomas More’s (1997) original, laws would no longer be necessary.  This wasn’t 
because Duterte would teach Filipinos to govern their own behaviour so well that there 
would be no more need for courts or lawyers, but because as the corpses produced by a 
nationwide Davao Death Squad mounted the Duterte regime’s use of non-Western 
methods would make the rule of any kind of law, no matter how flawed, superfluous. 
It is this comparative example which Aquilino Pimentel III and other establishment 
Duterte supporters ignored as well.  By dismissing the counter-narrative of effective 
incremental change provided by President Aquino III’s administration, they were then free 
to focus on the aspects of Duterteism they felt were the most reasonable, while ignoring 
the other discourse elements which weren’t.  In Senator Pimentel III’s case, a new 
constitution which would bring lasting peace and additional investment to Mindanao was 
so desirable he felt it was worth overlooking the excesses of the deadly authoritarian 
populism on which he was relying to deliver it (De Jesus, 2018; Palatino, 2018).  This 
reluctance to embrace Rodrigo Duterte’s totality and what it represented seemed to be a 
hallmark of many of Duterte’s upper and middle-class supporters during the 2016 
campaign.  It also might be why the official Rody Duterte Facebook account emphasised 
his candidacy’s normalcy to the extent it did.   
PDP-Laban had not always been a congressional minnow with only a handful of 
members in the House and the Senate (Arcangel, 2016; Legaspi, 2016).  In the ultimate 
example of Filipino political fickleness the party which had once been instrumental in 
ousting President Marcos and bringing about Corazon Aquino’s People Power revolution 
was now, thanks to Duterte, formally aligned with the likes of Vladimir Putin’s United 
Russia (Alvarez, 2017).  Thirty years after Marcos’ fall, which had presaged the 1989 
democratisation of Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War (Macaraig, 2014), 
individuals at the forefront of the non-violent resistance to the Marcos dictatorship thought 
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that they could tame Duterte’s wilder impulses and theatrical coarseness by pretending he 
was one of them.  As Figure 54 has already shown, Senator Aquilino Pimentel III was not 
the only stalwart of Philippine politics who made this mistake.  Pimentel III, who had 
merged his Mindanao-based Philippine Democratic Party with Benigno ‘Noynoy’ Aquino 
Jr.’s People Power in 1983, just before Aquino Jr. was assassinated, would go on to be 
elected President of the Philippine Senate after Duterte’s presidential victory.  The former 
Chair of the Senate’s Justice and Human Rights Committee claimed that his party’s 
ideology would always remain the ideology of federalism and the rule of law (Ager, 2017).  
However, he also said in 2015 that PDP-Laban’s support for Duterte was “unconditional 
and permanent” (Chua, 2015, para. 12). 
  The mythologising of Duterte 
continued during the middle and 
closing stages of the collection 
period.  Figure 57 shows a trivial 
post uploaded by DU30 for 2016 on 
March 16, 2016.  It is another 
example of the digital artwork 
frequently shared by DU30 for 
2016’s administrator and other online Duterte supporters who were in direct contact with 
the Mayor’s official campaign team (See also Figure 52).  It comprised a black and white 
image of a smiling Duterte and bold text which declared: THIS MAN IS READY TO 
SACRIFICE HIS OWN LIFE! Will you support Him?  The lettering for “THIS MAN” 
was larger than all the rest.  Also, the use of block letters immediately emphasised the 
determination of Duterte to die for his audience, to die for the Filipino.  This is not an 
example of conventional utopian messaging as it makes no claims about what Duterte can 
deliver other than his own sacrificial death.  Yet in an overwhelmingly Christian country 
like the Philippines this portrayal of Rodrigo Duterte as a Christ-like figure is intended to 
appeal to the nation’s dysfunctional messiah complex.   
Rational discourse and detailed policy discussions which offer the opportunity for 
further economic development have only a limited audience in the Philippines, as 
admittedly they do in most other countries.  However, the critical difference is the long-
standing belief among the Philippine masses that a saviour could change everything 
overnight (Fallows, 1987; Heydarian, 2017; Juego, 2017) – if that person has been called 
upon by God to do so.  This role was once assumed by the widowed Blessed Virgin 
Figure 57 
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Corazon Aquino in 1986 and is sometimes seen as evidence of a damaged Philippine 
culture (Fallows, 1987).  The macrodiscursive conclusion that Figure 57 reinforces is that 
in 2016 Heaven has chosen a new champion, a candidate who pandered to the Filipino 
acceptance of hierarchical violence (Boykoff & McKirdy, 2017) while his campaign also 
placed the mantle of Christian saviour around him.        
There is no mention of killing or building in the post or the discursive anomalies 
which they represent.  However, the most interesting part is the way it hails its audience. 
The question: “Will you support Him?” is an attempt to establish an interpersonal 
relationship between the candidate and his potential supporters.  The earlier proposition 
has already created the assumption that he is worthy of support as this man, unlike other 
individuals, is willing to die for them.  It is now up to his supporters to do the rest.  The 
capitalisation of “Him” is a Christian convention usually only reserved in the Philippines 
for God or the Son of God (Tanseco, 2014), not for the PDP-Laban presidential candidate. 
However, it does suggest what level of sacrifice activists such as the administrator of the 
DU30 for 2016 account thought might be required to support Duterte.   
On November 30, 2015, the day that Rodrigo Duterte accepted his party’s 
nomination, he discussed his love for all 100 million of his countrymen and women and 
his willingness to do everything he could for them (Dioquino, 2015b).  However, he also 
said that he would not sacrifice his love life for anything, even the presidency.  Although 
by 2015 Duterte’s legal wife was dying of cancer and he had an 11-year-old daughter with 
his long-term de-facto partner, the 70-year-old Mayor still boasted of having at least two 
and as many as three other regular girlfriends with the help of Viagra.  It was during these 
interviews after his acceptance speech that his cult of self-sacrifice first received real 
national prominence (Dioquino, 2015b).  Despite becoming a re-occurring theme 
during the data collection period (See also Figure 39) the context in which his 
original comments were made was understandably never highlighted by his supporters on 
Facebook.  Campaigning in the Philippines is such a gruelling undertaking (Figure 17; 
Macas, 2016a) that the risks to Duterte’s health were real.  However, this was not the 
message which Figure 57 was trying to convey. 
As Figure 27 demonstrated, by the last few weeks of the campaign Duterte was 
facing allegations of corruption which may have represented a desperate attempt to prevent 
his impending victory.  It is possible that the person leading the charges, Senator Antonio 
Trillanes IV, was acting on behalf of the Liberal Party as he had been closely associated 
with it after being freed from detention in 2010 (GMA, 2012; Hegina, 2015b).  However, 
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the most critical factor of the 2016 campaign was the lack of unity among the traditional 
Philippine elite when faced with Duterte’s autocratic agenda.  Trillanes IV’s role as a 
possible cut-out or proxy for Manuel Roxas II showed how desperate and demoralised the 
Liberal Party had become.  Although Roxas II had feuded openly with Duterte and 
challenged his fitness for office earlier in the campaign (Bigornia, 2016; Figure 32) by late 
April 2016 caution needed to be exercised.  This is because there is a tradition in Philippine 
politics that incoming governments prosecute and imprison members of previous 
administrations and their families (Cupin, 2017; Dizon, 2016).  President Benigno Aquino 
III’s relative silence must also be seen within this context.  Nonetheless, Aquino III seems 
to have made no protest to the U.S. about meddling in the Philippines’ democratic process 
when the Manila Times reported on April 25 that the Obama administration considered 
Duterte to be a criminal and the leader of the Davao Death Squad.  This was based on 
Duterte’s confidential statements to representatives of the U.S. government in 2003 and to 
Australian diplomats in 2005.  The planting of this information seems to have been 
prompted by Senator Grace Poe’s April 14 declaration that she would appoint Rodrigo 
Duterte as her [anti]crime czar if she was elected president (Makabenta, 2016).  Finally, 
on May 8, the day before the election, Aquino III also compared Duterte’s rise to that of 
Adolf Hitler’s (GMA, 2016b).    
Other figures like Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago had nothing to gain or lose. 
The Senator’s failing health meant she could never be a beneficiary or a victim of a Duterte 
Presidency.  Figure 58 shows how DU30 for 
2016 continued to use her residual status to dispel 
the corruption allegations swirling around 
Duterte.  This April 28 upload was classified as a 
worthwhile post.  It occurred while Duterte was 
solidifying his lead in the polls and a day after 
Senator Trillanes IV had first alleged that the 
Mayor was attempting to conceal the extent of his 
actual wealth (ABS-CBN, 2016d; Cupin, 2016a).  
What DU30 for 2016 shared in Figure 58 was a 
quote the Twitter account of the Manila Bulletin 
newspaper had attributed to Senator Defensor-
Santiago.  The English component was: “I 
always visit Duterte’s house. His house has been 
   Figure 58 
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very humble, so is the neighbourhood.”  The Tagalog text beneath it, “di niya pinepera ang 
pamumuno,” implied that Duterte’s virtues were why he would be able to provide 
leadership.  The key word in this quote is “humble.”  The equivalent in Tagalog is 
kapakumbabaan.  Although it is a highly contested concept, it can be taken in this context 
to mean remaining righteous despite the temptations that great power can bring.     
 Duterte’s residential property in Davao City is humble in comparison with the 
mansions the country’s elite usually use to wall themselves off from the masses (Ranada, 
2016d).  Although the quote from Defensor-Santiago was intended by DU30 for 2016 to 
perpetuate the macrodiscourse of Duterte’s exceptionalism, a few days after she made it 
the Senator began to express serious doubts about Duterte’s integrity (Pazzibugan, 2016).  
However, macrodiscursive conclusions require extreme examples which can only be 
provided by taking them out of context (Condor & Antaki, 1997).  Duterte’s friendship 
with the Kingdom of Jesus Christ leader Pastor Quiboloy or his son’s marriage into one of 
the wealthiest Muslim families in Mindanao (Figure 14; Guno, 2017; Ramirez, 2016; 
Ranada & Elemia, 2017; Rappler, 2017) could only serve to create additional discursive 
anomalies.  This is why the portrayal of him through Facebook needed to employ an East-
West hybridity that frameworks like Van Dijk’s critical discourse theories and Mathews’ 
content analysis categories are inadequate to describe.   
The content analysis structure this research employs has shown that Team Duterte 
attempted to run something which resembled a conventional campaign.  Although specific 
details were lacking, there was a relatively consistent general core message employed 
across both the Rody Duterte and DU30 for 2016 Facebook pages accounts.  The 
worthwhile content these pages uploaded showed that a Duterte presidency was going to 
offer a final solution to the country’s crime and corruption problems.  Their trivial content 
of well-attended rallies and endorsements of Duterte by public and private individuals, 
‘big’ people as well as ‘little’, also demonstrated how popular Duterte’s solutions 
supposedly were.   
However, critical discourse analysis reveals the contradictory aspects of  Duterte’s 
campaign.  In a Filipino context Duterte’s candidacy could be all things to all people at 
once in a way that makes little sense to the non-Filipino observer.  It suggests that it is 
futile to try and pin down what individual concepts were communicated by the Duterte 
campaign through Facebook.  Instead, a modified version of  Mathews’ framework is 
required because as Van Dijk’s shows, it is how Duterte communicates rather that what he 
says which really matters.  What Filipino voters actually vote for is what they believe is 
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their candidate’s personal attributes or personality, not a slate of prescribed measures.  In 
Duterte’s case this meant the cacique or native chief comfortable using violence to better 
the country the way he had improved Davao, the man called by God who was willing to 
sacrifice himself if that was what was required to enact irreversible change, and the only 
candidate immune to all earthly temptations – except perhaps the ones of the flesh.  As the 
Trump of the East demonstrated over the course of his campaign this was not a political 
liability for Duterte the way it could have been for others.  However, unlike his populist 
namesake, he really did prove that it was possible to gun down people in the middle 
of the street without losing any votes (Johnson, 2016; Rauhala, 2016a).        
Chapter 6.  Discussion: Here comes the new boss  
This research can only provide a brief overview of the 2016 Philippine presidential 
campaign and the events which may have influenced Team Duterte’s use of Facebook. 
From this perspective, the most critical weeks of the data collection period appear to have 
been the early-to-mid stages – before Rodrigo Duterte began leading in mainstream polls 
immune to online manipulation.  After that point, he was able to cruise to victory despite 
the desperate attempts of his rivals to damage his candidacy.  The momentum Duterte was 
able to build seemed to take his opponents and the Philippine media by surprise – and may 
have even surprised his own campaign staff as well.   
6.1     Mathews just needs a helping hand 
A rigid interpretation of Mathews’ (2009) content analysis categories suggests that only 
one type of Facebook material should have mattered during the most critical phases of the 
collection period.   According to Mathews, these were the Rody Duterte or DU30 for 2016 
posts which dealt with specific political or economic policy proposals.  It is therefore 
necessary to re-examine how each of these Facebook account’s core messages evolved 
prior to April 1, 2016, approximately five weeks before the election.   
The Rody Duterte account was the public face of the campaign on Facebook.  It 
seems reasonable to expect that at some point Team Duterte would have used it to convey 
to the page’s millions of followers what the Mayor’s election platform was.  Perhaps the 
most natural time to do so was leading up to Duterte’s proclamation rally in Tondo, Central 
Manila, on February 9, 2016.  Yet as Table 2 showed the Rody Duterte account produced 
zero worthwhile posts in December 2015 and only five in January 2016 – while all the 
worthwhile content it did upload in February was between February 20-29.  This meant 
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that prior to the official launch of Duterte’s campaign in Tondo there was only a limited 
amount of information available through Facebook outlining his vision for the Philippines. 
The worthwhile posts which did appear prior to February 9 also lacked the specific 
policy details Mathews’ (2009) categories were designed to identify.  In chronological 
order they were:  
• Figure 7 – January 1: Duterte’s presence at the National Democratic Front/New
People’s Army release ceremony for Philippine Army 
Corporal Adriano Bingil Jr. 
• Figure 9 – January 10: Contemplating the construction of a high-speed rail network
for Davao City 
• January 12: Meeting with senior Taiwanese law-enforcement officials (Described
on pp. 38-39) 
• Figure 4 – January 26: The Mayor’s video warning to his critics not to spread
‘disinformation’ about the illegal drug situation in Davao 
City       
• Figure 5 – January 30: Post showing Duterte at the January 29 anti-drugs meeting
on Palawan. 
This lack of substance is characteristic of populist political figures.  They are more like 
political entrepreneurs searching for a product which is capable of capturing the 
imagination of the voting public (Aslanidis, 2016).  In Duterte’s case, his straddling of the 
Philippines’ Left-Right divide meant that the product he eventually settled on was himself.  
The self-declared Socialist who claimed to be the nation’s last hope was happy to flaunt 
his contacts with the New People’s Army (Cinco, 2016) while also posturing, or being 
expected to posture, as a conventional politician committed to maintaining the country’s 
existing foreign ties with states like Taiwan (pp. 38-39).  However, the suggestion he was 
thinking about building a high-speed rail network within Davao City meant that there may 
have been difficulties conveying Duterte’s thinking in English.  This is because expensive 
high-speed rail networks are designed to decrease travel times between cities, not within 
them.  Pronouncements like this, along with Duterte’s habit of speaking off the cuff and 
needlessly insulting others like he did when discussing the Pope’s visit to Manila, might 
have made his advisors wary.  This is because some of his public statements had only 
served to erode his credibility as a candidate – at least as far as many of the country’s elite 
political and media commentators were concerned (Bigornia, 2016; Sison, 2015).  Finally, 
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his threats against others, be they critics of his crime-free Davao claims or drug-users 
throughout the Philippines, were also repetitive enough to raise alarm (Figure 4, 5).   
The main problem with this analysis is that some of Duterte’s outrageous comments 
were not being as widely reported as they could have been.  Initially, this may have been 
because the potential appeal of his candidacy was seriously underestimated.  As a result, 
some key influencers appeared to believe his campaign could be safely ignored until the 
mercurial Filipino public grew wary of it and transferred their allegiance to someone else 
(Sison, 2015).  It might also have been a deliberate attempt to starve Team Duterte of 
national media coverage and therefore of political oxygen.  This would help explain the 
lack of national-level media outlets at Duterte’s National Campaign Conference in Davao 
City (p. 75) and his massive Alabang rally in Greater Manila (Figure 18).    
However, his proclamation rally in the capital’s most notorious slum could not be 
ignored by Manila-based reporters.  This venue choice might have caused a considerable 
amount of tension within the Duterte campaign as even the candidate himself seemed 
uncertain why he was there and additional supporters had to be brought in to bolster the 
Tondo crowd (Ansis, 2016).  Yet despite these obvious issues this Duterte campaign event 
received relatively sympathetic coverage even from the journalists and media outlets he 
would go on to persecute after he became president (Lozada, 2018).  
This may have been because of the respect in which his vice presidential running 
mate Senator Cayetano was held, perhaps because he had previously considered joining 
Manuel Roxas II’s ruling Liberal Party slate (ABS-CBN, 2015b; Ravanes-Higham, 2015).  
After Duterte’s January 29 speech at the Palawan anti-drugs meeting it had been up to 
Senator Cayetano to reach out to the media with a senatorial press release.  Although it 
was ignored by every media outlet his staff forwarded it to Cayetano still faithfully 
recounted how Duterte had told the crowd that if he was president drug lords would 
be shot (Senate of the Philippines, 2016).  It was statements like these which created a 
quandary for his campaign as well as for the reporters attempting to cover it.   
Rappler’s Pia Ranada had visited Duterte’s Davao City home in September 2015 
and described how modest it was (Ranada, 2016d).  She would eventually be barred from 
covering Duterte’s presidency because she wrote about what he actually said at public 
events rather than sticking to the inaccurate official transcripts released by the president’s 
press office (Nawal, 2018; Ranada, 2018; Rappler, 2018a, 2018b).  However, in February 
2016, Ranada was simply trying to make sense of Mayor Duterte’s candidacy.  This often 
required her to contact Senator Alan Peter Cayetano to clarify what Duterte had really 
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meant (Ranada, 2016c).  Unlike other outlets such as the Philippine Daily Inquirer 
newspaper or the broadcaster CNN Philippines, Rappler uploaded an unedited video of 
Duterte’s full speech at his February 9 proclamation rally (Ranada, 2016e; Rappler, 
2016b).  Ranada also described how Duterte had spoken for an hour without notes and 
declared that ‘“this [current] motherfucking government, it is not for the people”’ (Ranada, 
2016e, para. 7).  The other reporters present discreetly ignored his profanities as well as 
how he had insisted on raising his left hand instead of the customary right while taking his 
oath as the new chairman of the PDP-Laban party.  Apparently, this break with tradition 
was because Duterte considered himself a Leftist (Ranada, 2016e).  Duterte’s irreverent 
attitude towards protocol and his constant swearing would cause continual challenges for 
traditional broadcast media who were reluctant to screen footage featuring it.  However, 
the multimedia online news site Rappler felt no such compunctions and seemed genuinely 
intrigued, at least at this early stage, by Duterte’s unconventional style and creative use of 
Facebook (Etter, 2017; Ranada, 2016e).  Ranada even uploaded a video of a January 
11 interview she had conducted with Duterte where she tried to gently talk the 
candidate through his own positions.  Duterte, perhaps suffering from fatigue, seemed 
unsure of what his main policies were other than some kind of railway for the island of 
Mindanao.  He claimed this was his first priority.  His platform’s other initiatives 
were attributed to Cayetano because Duterte insisted that his own specialty was law and 
order, an area which could get bloody (Rappler, 2016c).  Randa also reminded her 
readers that at his proclamation rally Duterte insisted that if he promised something 
he would really do it. Her February 10 article led with his assertion that “I will do it 
even if I lose my life, my honor, and even the presidency” (Ranada, 2016e, para. 3.)   
It was this rejectionism, this refusal to accept ‘business as usual’ which was the 
worthwhile bedrock of Duterte’s candidacy – not his campaign team’s efforts to craft 
coherent policy from the substance of his statements.  The latter is what Mathews’ 
categories are accustomed to measuring.  Yet it was the rebellion against traditional elite 
thinking which the Diehard Duterte Supporters were lapping up.  Although it would 
become a common theme after the campaign (Casiple, 2016) Ranada and De La Salle 
University Professor Richard Heydarian (Ardenia, 2016) were some of the few who 
appeared to recognise it while it was unfolding.     
The way some Philippine media removed Duterte’s offensive outbursts from their 
reporting – as well as how they edited and re-interpreted his improvised statements into 
what resembled conventional policy positions – helped his campaign staff to project an 
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image of normalcy onto their candidate when it suited them to do so.  This was particularly 
apparent on the official Rody Duterte Facebook page. 
The Rody Duterte posts which appeared either just before or after the first two 
presidential debates were the Mayor’s only concerted attempts to convey his political 
platform to his official Facebook audience prior to overtaking his rivals in the polls.  Under 
Mathews’ framework the significance of this activity is best ascertained by tallying the 
number of posts each major policy issue received.  As has already been discussed, no 
worthwhile Rody Duterte Facebook activity occurred in February until after the Mayor’s 
Tondo proclamation rally.  Then on February 20, two posts were created outlining 
Duterte’s positions prior to the first Presidential debate on February 21.  Figure 1 was a 
broad outline of everything Duterte wished to achieve as president.  It was categorised as 
evidence of his peace plans for the country because even though it encompassed three 
separate policy threads Duterte appeared to link them to each other.  However, this 
interpretation may represent this researcher’s needs rather than those of Duterte’s 
Facebook audience.  There seemed to be a linear progression to Duterte’s argument.  If 
you are for a Duterte presidency then you are for ending corruption so real nation-building 
can occur – and only then will it be possible to conduct serious negotiations with the 
country’s insurgent groups.  Insurgents who threaten parts of Mindanao in a way they do 
not threaten the security of the areas where most Filipinos live.  However, if you are with 
Duterte rather than merely just for him, then the precise details of his peace plans or how 
he intendeds to implement any of his proposals are immaterial.  It is the difference between 
a candidate and an idol.  Yet while a candidate only requires support an idol demands 
fealty.     
This is why the second post on February 20 is so instructive.  Figure 6 warned 
criminals that under a Duterte presidency their lives would always be on the line.  This 
warning was in English and appeared to signal to his upper and middle-class supporters 
that the Mayor was planning to unleash some version of the Davao solution on the rest of 
the Philippines.  Perhaps a formalised Davao Death Squad indistinguishable from more 
aggressive and better resourced conventional policing.  This upload was categorised as an 
anti-drugs post since the criminals Duterte seemed determined to target initially were 
involved with illegal narcotics.   
Table 2 showed how the Rody Duterte Facebook account produced 15 worthwhile 
posts between 17 December 2015 and March 1, 2016.  If the peace post created on 
February 28 (p. 38) and the poverty reduction post from February 29 (p. 40) are ignored, 
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then that leaves a total of 13 which appeared either leading up to or just after the first 
Presidential debate.  Mathews’ (2009) content analysis framework requires worthwhile 
and trivial content to also be sorted into news sub-categories.  These can then be compared 
to each other to demonstrate which sub-category is the most representative of the media 
source which produced it.  This producer of content could then be classed as either 
predominantly worthwhile or trivial overall (Mathews, 2009).  After being inspired by 
Max Weber’s call for a “global long-term systematic study of press coverage” (Hansen 
et al., 1998, p. 92) Byron Mathews originally devised his system in the early 20th 
Century.  It was designed to compare the news coverage of New York’s daily newspapers 
and reflected a concern that elite tastes were no longer being adequately catered 
to (Mathews).  Mathews’ fear that the New York public was being fed a diet of trivial 
news is similar to the concerns raised in the 21st Century about Facebook and whether 
its users are well served by the information presented to them by the tech giant 
(Kirkpatrick, 2011).  By using his classification system it should be possible to show 
whether the Rody Duterte Facebook account behaved more like the trivial tabloid 
press or the worthwhile broadsheets of Mathews’ era.     
A conventional analysis using Mathews’ categories shows that of the 13 worthwhile 
posts made between 17 December 2015 and February 22: 
• Five were about Duterte’s anti-corruption crusade
• Four touched on his anti-drugs proposals
• Two dealt with his peace plans
• And one described a potential infrastructure programme for Davao City.
The most notable absence is any mention of the detailed centre-right economic policies of 
his running-mate Alan Peter Cayetano.  Anti-corruption initiatives comprised 38 percent 
of this Rody Duterte sub-total while his anti-narcotics drive featured 31 percent of the time. 
These four anti-drug posts were also the only time illegal narcotics were directly 
mentioned during the entire collection period by the Rody Duterte Facebook account.  
Ostensibly, this category was no longer relevant after the first Presidential debate.  This 
does not suggest that the system Mathews’ devised is intrinsically limited.  One of its most 
useful roles is that it can also tell us what the Duterte campaign was not about.  In this 
case, despite the profound threat posed by the country’s population growth and Duterte’s 
history of supporting programmes designed to manage this challenge (“Population, 
poverty, politics and RH bill,” 2012; Ranada, 2017; Rappler, 2014), women’s rights only 
featured in a single worthwhile Rody Duterte post.  The five anti-corruption posts 
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mentioned above all appeared immediately after the first debate.  In order to understand 
why this was and why no further overt anti-drug posts were produced after February 21, 
Duterte’s conduct during the debate also needs to be examined. 
Even though it was held in northern Mindanao’s Cagayan de Oro City, of the five 
participants in the first Presidential debate Duterte was the least well known and was in 
danger of being overshadowed by the others.  He was at a serious disadvantage because 
he was a provincial level politician rather than a national level one (Ranada, 2016f).  His 
opponents were three senators and the country’s vice president.  There are only 24 senators 
in the Philippines’ Senate and voters elect them as if the entire country were a single 
nation-wide electoral district (Reilly, 2016; Senate of the Philippines, n.d.).  For instance, 
although she technically ran as an independent, Senator Grace Poe was elected to the 
Senate in 2013 as an ally of President Benigno Aquino III with over 20 million votes. 
However, much of this support may have been due to the popularity of her father, the 
action movie star and unsuccessful 2004 presidential candidate Ferdinand Poe Jr. (ABS-
CBN, 2013; Banyan, 2015).  During the first Presidential debate the telegenic yet 
inexperienced Senator was extremely composed but also appeared relatively passionless.  
This could have been because the restrictive format of the debate did not allow any of the 
candidates to express themselves for more than 90 seconds at a time.  Speaking 
opportunities were therefore limited to a handful of rehearsed talking points and rebuttals 
(Macabenta, 2016; Nicolas, 2016).  Senator Grace Poe was polling around 30 percent 
going into the debate which meant she was about 10 percentage points ahead of her main 
rivals, Vice President Jejomar Binay, Senator Manuel Roxas II and Mayor Rodrigo 
Duterte.  The debate’s other participant, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, was only 
registering four percent support – perhaps because most voters realised she was terminally 
ill (Evangelista & Curato, 2016; Rappler, 2016d).  
Vice President Binay’s presidential ambitions were hobbled by one of the 
Philippines’ worst corruption scandals since the overthrow of President Marcos.  What 
became known as the pork barrel scam was an entire sub-industry devoted to diverting the 
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) allocations provided to each member of 
Congress.  The businesswoman Janet Lim-Napoles had perfected the art of creating fake 
charities which were used to secure the release of the central government’s PDAF cash.  
The funds deposited into these charities were then shared between Members of Congress 
and Lim-Napoles.  It has been estimated that around US$200 million was stolen this way 
(“Janet Napoles and the pork barrel scam: An Inquirer special report,” n.d.; Rappler, n.d.; 
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“Stolen riches,” 2015).  Although the specific charges levelled against Binay had predated 
the exposure of this scheme it was alleged that he had become significantly wealthier over 
the 21 years he was the Mayor of Makati in Central Manila (Fonbuena, 2014).  He had 
also overseen major improvements in Makati’s infrastructure and schools during this same 
period and had been at the forefront of the anti-Marcos resistance when the entire country 
had been under martial law (Cepeda, 2016; Macabenta, 2015).  Yet the pork barrel scam 
still contributed to a general feeling of disillusionment towards the whole traditional 
ruling-class which might have crippled Senator Roxas’ candidacy as well.     
Despite this, both Binay and Roxas were considered to be experienced technocrats 
and policy wonks.  Although they could sound scripted and unemotional at times, or in the 
73-year-old Binay’s case downright insipid and uninspiring, they were also expected to be
at ease with granular detail and able to quote statistics at will (“Binay tops platform poll,”
2016; Cupin, 2016c; Macaraig, 2016).  This was the opposite of Senator Defensor-
Santiago and Mayor Duterte’s style.  These two preferred generalities, improvised
statements and humorous asides.  The main difference between them was Defensor-
Santiago’s were delivered with all the wit and intelligence that the fading Philippine icon
could muster – while Duterte’s could sometimes seem slightly coarser (INQUIRER.net,
2016).  However, Filipino culture also insists on a ritualistic politeness that all the
candidates were expected to embrace despite their political differences (Billones, 2016).
When Defensor-Santiago was challenged about her health Mayor Duterte defended her
decision to run for president while battling lung cancer.  The Senator repaid this courtesy
by saying no one had done much about corruption except Duterte (“1st Presidential
debate transcript: Round One,” 2016; Figure 54).
What was remarkable about Duterte’s performance was how charismatic and 
effective he could be.  Especially if the part where he seemed less than clear about his 
plans for Mindanao was omitted (“1st Presidential debate transcript: Round Three,” 2016).  
The only time the audience at the venue did not cheer or laugh with Duterte was when 
he talked about crime.  There was complete silence while he denied being responsible 
for the extra-judicial killings committed in Davao City – possibly because most of 
the crowd were from Mindanao and knew this was not a subject usually deemed 
appropriate for a televised debate (HRW, 2009; INQUIRER.net, 2016).  
Although Rappler’s Pia Ranada said afterwards that she didn’t think Duterte 
was always serious when he discussed shooting people (Ranada, 2016f) other 
analysts felt that the key to the Mayor’s future success would be whether he could 
soften his tough guy image.  De La Salle University’s Julio Teehankee believed that there
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was no support outside of Mindanao for Duterte’s machismo and that he risked 
alienating voters in the rest of the country if he persisted in using it (Billones, 2016).      
Although he was only slightly combative towards Roxas and tried to employ 
statistical information which might have been supplied to him by Alan Peter Cayetano, 
Duterte’s best moment of the debate came when he was responding to his Liberal Party 
opponent’s encyclopaedic grasp of policy.  Speaking softly, Duterte reminded Roxas that 
no matter what programmes were created to improve primary industries and alleviate rural 
poverty, the nation’s potential would always remain unrealised when the central 
government’s budget was underspent each year due to the corruption and incompetence of 
the Philippine bureaucracy (“1st Presidential debate transcript: Round Two,” 2016; 
INQUIRER.net, 2016;). 
One of the main focuses of the first debate was meant to be food prices and agrarian 
reform as Mindanao is the ‘breadbasket’ of the Philippines (“1st Presidential debate 
transcript: Round Two,” 2016; INQUIRER.net, 2016).  Agriculture remains so central to 
the country and to so many Filipinos (Marcelo, 2017; Philippine Statistics Authority, 
2015) it is unusual that the Rody Duterte account only produced a single post about this 
topic during the collection period.  Even then, like all his other infrastructure 
pronouncements, Duterte’s promise of a new irrigation system to rice farmers in Luzon’s 
Laguna Province on March 12 (p. 39) seemed to lack a degree of credibility.  In many 
respects, it simply represented the standard bidding war that comprised much of 
Philippine electioneering (INQUIRER.net, 2016).  This is because in a clientelist system 
every serious candidate is expected to offer some kind of largesse or patronage in order 
to secure the allegiance of a district’s voters or an industry sector (Hedman & Sidel, 
20005; Quimpo, 2005).  Although this specific Duterte commitment did not warrant its 
own agriculture category on Table 3 it was this kind of uncosted spending promise that 
Defensor-Santiago had criticised.  In her closing statement she warned of the growing 
ridiculousness of Philippine politics.  She also explained that it was the responsibility of 
Philippine voters to ensure their elections did not turn into personality contests where 
the best entertainer won (“1st Presidential debate transcript: Closing Statements,” 
2016).  This debate highlight was not uploaded to the Rody Duterte page, nor was the 
footage where Duterte adamantly denied that he had ever ordered any illegal killings 
(See also p. 37).  A good campaign team can reconstruct their candidate into what they 
need them to be.  This is what the individuals managing Duterte’s official Facebook
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presence attempted to do after the first debate.  A similar pattern was also evident 
around the time of the second.   
6.2      What Duterte will they choose? 
The Rody Duterte account completely de-emphasised the anti-drugs component of the 
Mayor’s core message after the awkwardness caused by Duterte’s contradictory remarks 
during the first Presidential debate.  In many respects, Duterte’s debate performance 
simply mirrored his tactics while Mayor of Davao City.  If Duterte felt his audience were 
comfortable discussing the messy realities of taming a place like Davao then he was all 
too happy to be the Death Squad Mayor.  As he initially said during the first debate: “Totoo 
‘yun (It’s true) – I do not deny anything” (1st Presidential debate transcript: Round One,” 
2016, para. 28).  Of course, in response to a direct accusation a few seconds later he then 
denied everything and replied: “Extrajudicial killing? Of course not, it never happened. 
But [legal] killings, yes.”  Although Duterte is not fully fluent in either English or Tagalog 
it is this duality that was at the centre of his campaign.  The Mayor had no difficulty openly 
discussing the most contradictory aspect of his candidacy.  If some voters didn’t want to 
believe he’d killed in the past and would kill again then they didn’t have to.  Duterte’s 
threats could simply be construed as an attempt to discourage law-breaking rather than a 
vow to kill law-breakers or anyone else he labelled a criminal.  However, his campaign 
team decided that getting Duterte elected meant showcasing something else.           
Mathews’ categories allow us to track what aspects of Duterte’s platform were the 
most prominent during the interval between the first and second debates.  As has already 
been discussed (pp. 94-96), the Rody Duterte account produced 13 worthwhile posts 
between December 17, 2015 and February 22, 2016.  The largest sub-category during this 
period was Duterte’s anti-corruption initiatives with five posts followed by his anti-
narcotics drive with four.  Over the same time-frame the Rody Duterte page also produced 
16 trivial posts.  According to Mathews’ system this means that Rodrigo Duterte’s official 
Facebook presence was slightly more trivial than it was worthwhile during the early stages 
of the data collection period.  The three largest trivial categories between December 17, 
2015 and February 22, 206 were: 
• Political rallies – six posts
• Promoting media appearances – five posts
• Miscellaneous posts – four.
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Content showing Duterte’s rallies comprised 38 percent of this period’s total while 
promoting his TV appearances made up a further 31 percent.  Although miscellaneous 
posts had been uploaded 25 percent of the time these were not as significant as the others.  
This is because they were Duterte’s Christmas greetings, photos showing his campaign 
staff (January 7) or about when he changed his cover photo on January 8 (p. 51) or asked 
his supporters to become more active on Facebook (February 2).   
Four of the six posts showing Duterte’s campaign events were of his Tondo 
proclamation rally while two out of the five uploads promoting his media appearances 
highlighted the upcoming first Presidential debate.  The modest number of posts devoted 
to this appearance belied how crucial the debates were to become to Duterte’s electoral 
success and to the failure of his opponents.  The first debate attracted a huge television and 
online streaming audience (Figure 20; GMA, 2016a).  This meant that about 30 percent of 
the country’s 54 million registered voters were watching on February 21 (“How many 
Filipinos, votes will shape PH future?” 2016; Philippine Statistics Authority, 2013, 
2016b).  The audiovisual-based format held immense appeal for those voters with low 
literacy levels.  Similarly, the Philippines high-level of smartphone ownership allowed 
these individuals to follow Facebook pages dedicated to promoting their presidential 
candidate – especially if those Facebook accounts used a limited amount of text and their 
supporting images displayed properly.  Some of the lowest levels of functional literacy in 
the Philippines are in western and southern Mindanao.  For instance, low-income residents 
of Davao City have an official literacy rate about 15 percentage points less than the low-
income inhabitants of Greater Manila (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2013b).  As a result 
of child-caring responsibilities the female members of many low-income Philippine 
households are also often the least educated, least employed and heaviest consumers of 
television and Facebook (De Guzman Centeno, 2010, 2016, Williams, 2017).  
During the interval between the first and second president debates the Rody Duterte 
account produced only six worthwhile posts.  These were uploaded after February 22 and 
before the second debate on March 20, 2016.  The two that were created in late February 
and addressed peace and poverty related issues have already been discussed on pages 38, 
40 and 94.  The other four covered health, infrastructure, disaster relief and corruption.  
The March 12 health and infrastructure posts were insignificant from a policy perspective. 
The Rody Duterte references to the Mayor’s Davao City smoking ban (p. 40) and his 
decision to build an irrigation scheme in southern Luzon (p. 39) do not fit into a coherent 
policy framework.  However, they do illustrate how many campaign stops Duterte had 
scheduled by the middle of March.  On March 12 he spoke at three separate conventions 
in Central Manila – to organisations representing the country’s shipping workers at 
the Diamond Hotel, to the Philippines’ top 12 church leaders who were also having 
their annual conference nearby, and to the Philippine College of Chest 
Physicians.  He also spoke at the University of the Philippines’ Los Baños campus 
south of the capital where he made his irrigation promise to Laguna Province’s rice 
farmers.  The lack of policy detail from these appearances suggests that Duterte 
was speaking without prepared remarks or positions.  On March 15 the account showed 
Duterte campaigning in the central Philippine city of Tacloban with Alan Peter 
Cayetano and mentioned his 2013 disaster relief efforts in the area (Also described 
on pp. 40-41).  Then on March 19, the day before the second debate, Duterte was 
back in Greater Manila talking to trike drivers about the corruption issues they faced 
while trying to register their vehicles (Taruc, 2015).   
Mathews (2009) would consider this activity to be inconclusive when no content 
sub-category received more than a single post.  By the second debate Duterte had closed 
the gap between himself and former front-runner Grace Poe.  They were both now polling 
about 25 percent (Varona, 2016).  This research has not produced any data which suggests 
this surge in Duterte’s popularity was linked to how the Mayor’s core policies were 
being articulated on his official Facebook page.  It is therefore necessary to consider 
other alternatives. 
     During the same interval between the first and second presidential debates the 
Rody Duterte account produced 14 posts which Mathews (2009) would have classed as 
trivial.  Eight showed Duterte’s rallies, three depicted his political endorsers, two 
were photo opportunities and one was a miscellaneous post calling for more online 
volunteers to join his campaign.  Under Mathews’ content analysis system these 
totals indicate that the Rody Duterte accounts produced predominately trivial content 
between February 22 and March 20, 2016.  The overwhelming majority of these 
trivial posts were about the Mayor’s campaign events and the individuals who were 
willing to publicly endorse him.  Two of these rallies were discussed in Figures 16 
and 17.  Figure 16 in particular, because it showed Duterte’s March 16 grand 
rally in Davao City, emphasised the impressive crowds Duterte was able to attract in 
his ‘Solid South’ heartland.  However, Figure 17 was also important because it 
demonstrated that Duterte’s support was no longer restricted to Mindanao and he 
was generating considerable crowds on the main island of Luzon as well.  Of the three 
overt endorsements the Duterte campaign received during this period the most vital 
was from former President Fidel Ramos on March 8.  Although Ramos would quickly 
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disassociate himself from Duterteism after Duterte became president (ABS-CBN, 
2016e; Aguinaldo, 2016; Cruz, 2017) his stature added further respectability to 
the Mayor’s candidacy.  The Duterte campaign also focused on building 
support in the Central Philippines.  That’s why something as innocuous as the 
February 26 photo opportunity of the Mayor visiting his parents’ hometown of 
Danao City on the central island of Cebu (Also described on p. 50) can take on extra 
significance.  Mathews always felt that trivial content could be more 
consequential than it first appeared if it provided additional background context to 
an important political or economic issue (Mathews, 2009).  In this case, the Mayor’s 
leveraging of his Cebuano heritage was an integral part of his campaign strategy to gain 
votes in this region (Pacia, 2016).      
It was this appearance of popularity and acceptability which characterised the 
Duterte campaign’s official Facebook activity during this critical stage of the campaign.  
These themes also dominated the activity of DU30 for 2016. 
6.3     DU30 for 2016 before the turning of the tide 
Table 5 demonstrated how immediately prior to the first Presidential debate on February 
21 DU30 for 2016 was virtually silent.  The single February post the page produced was 
on February 2 and highlighted Duterte’s commitment to eliminate all kidnappings and 
insurgent activity in the Southern Philippines.  This Mindanao-centric content was 
classified as worthwhile and assigned under Table 6 to the Mayor’s peace plans.  Table 5 
also showed how DU30 for 2016’s activity from the start of the data collection period on 
December 17 up until the first debate was overwhelmingly trivial.  Of the 132 posts 
uploaded about 74 percent were classified as trivial under Mathews’ categories.  This 
means that Mathews would consider DU30 for 2016 to be a predominantly trivial source 
of information.   
Of the 35 worthwhile posts that DU30 for 2016 produced before February 21, 29 
were created in December.  These covered every topic identified in Table 6 except 
Duterte’s policies on foreign affairs and the Philippines’ labour laws.  They addressed: 
• Anti-corruption – 5*
• Combatting drugs – 1*
• Law and order – 3*
• Local government reform – 2*
• Duterte’s peace plans – 2*
• Infrastructure – 4*
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• Calling for a revolution – 1
• Disaster response – 4
• Education – 2
• Health – 2
• Overseas Foreign Workers – 2
• And poverty reduction – 1.
(*= Topics which comprised Duterte’s core worthwhile message)  
Some of this activity appeared to have been co-ordinated by Duterte’s official campaign 
team.  During December 2015 Figures 25, 31, 32 and 36 showed evidence of being 
provided to DU30 for 2016.  This is consistent with the supply of a daily theme along with 
suitable supporting material to online Duterte activists such as the administrator for DU30 
for 2016 (Etter, 2017).  Despite this the diverse range of topics addressed by DU30 for 
2016 in December seemed to lack an overall focus.  Although the material supplied by 
Duterte’s staff helped reinforce aspects of what this researcher has defined as his core 
message of anti-corruption, anti-drugs, law and order, local government reform, peace and 
nation-building policies – these topics still only comprised 59 percent of DU30 for 2016’s 
worthwhile posts in December.  It was almost as if the Duterte campaign was searching 
for a coherent platform for their candidate to run on.  This could also be evidence of the 
political entrepreneurship inherent in populism and the influence that Cambridge 
Analytica’s parent company Strategic Communications Laboratories (SCL Group) 
allegedly had on the Duterte campaign’s choices.  In May 2015 the SCL Group had 
suggested that emotional topics like crime could offer candidates a better chance of gaining 
traction among some key voters than the usual Philippine staple of combatting poverty 
(Aslanidis, 2016; Robles, 2018).        
However, the six posts uploaded in January suggested that a higher level of co-
ordination and message discipline was beginning to be imposed on DU30 for 2016’s 
anonymous administrator.  A post on January 11 shared details of the proposed new rail 
system for Mindanao, a policy which seems to have originated with Alan Peter Cayetano 
despite the island’s significance for Duterte.  This might also help to explain why the 
Mayor struggled to describe its details when interviewed by Rappler’s Pia Ranada on the 
day that the policy was announced (Rappler, 2016c; See also p. 93).  The most 
interesting aspect of this group of worthwhile posts is how they were used to support the 
official campaign’s efforts to attack Duterte’s critics.  By late January the Liberal Party 
standard bearer Manuel Roxas II was openly criticising Duterte’s mayoralty of Davao City 
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(See Figure 32).  Davao was what Duterte called his Exhibit A.  The mythology 
surrounding its transformation under his leadership had made him a celebrity in Mindanao 
and had also helped catapult him onto the national political stage.  Duterte had benefitted 
from Corazon Aquino’s beneficence in 1986 and had even campaigned for her son 
Benigno Aquino III in 2010 at Manuel Roxas II’s request.  However, during the early 
stages of the 2016 presidential campaign Duterte had threatened Roxas with physical 
violence when Roxas claimed that Duterte’s crime-free Davao was a lie (Ramirez, 2015).  
Duterte repeated these threats whenever he was challenged on his anti-drugs record and 
DU30 for 2016 played its part by producing posts defending Duterte’s legacy on January 
25 and 28 (See Figure 4 and p. 56).    
Roxas’ previous courtship of Duterte undermined his subsequent attempts to 
destroy him.  As Duterte said, no one cared about his human rights record while they were 
trying to secure his endorsement and the regional presidential votes he could be counted 
on to deliver (Ramirez, 2015).  The acceptance of this neo-feudal system allowed Duterte 
to push back against the concerted attempts to undermine his 2016 candidacy during this 
period.  It effectively silenced Roxas for a while and forced him to attack his other rivals 
instead.  As a result, Duterte’s support stayed relatively consistent leading into the first 
debate and this breathing space allowed his Facebook activists to portray him as a serious 
contender with nationwide support.  It also raises questions about the way the Philippine 
media handled Duterte’s propensity for threatening language.  As Figure 4 showed, 
Duterte’s unedited video response to the allegation that large-scale methamphetamine 
production still occurred in Davao City contained a promise to break the hearts of those 
responsible for the ‘smear campaign’ against him.  DU30 for 2016’s role was to help 
Duterte fight back against these claims regardless of their accuracy.  Yet Duterte’s ‘tough 
talk’ seemed to be accepted by the nation’s media as an integral part of his unconventional 
candidacy even when a few of them – including the Philippine Daily Inquirer’s Nico 
Alconaba (Alconaba, 2016a; See also p. 56) – were prepared to quote him verbatim. 
The 97 trivial posts produced by DU30 for 2016 before the first Presidential debate 
comprised: 
• Pictures and videos of Duterte supporters – 36
• Political endorsements – 21
• Political rallies – 9
• Political Polls – 8
• Miscellaneous content – 22.
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Although February 21 falls just short of the approximate mid-point of the collection period 
the sub-totals for political rallies and political polls are noticeably low.  Between 
December 17, 2015 and February 21, 2016 DU30 for 2016 uploaded only 24 percent of 
Table 7’s political rally total and 32 percent of its political polling results.  This suggests 
that at this stage Duterte’s official campaign team felt there were few rallies and polls 
worth uploading to Facebook.  The pictures and videos of Duterte's supporters shared by 
DU30 for 2016 made it look like the page of an online community.  This impression was 
strengthened by the account’s use of political endorsements by private individuals.  
However, many of these posts were actually prepared by Duterte’s social media staff in 
Davao City and then distributed to the campaign’s regional Facebook administrators and 
online activists.  Some content from these sub-categories such as Figure 42 seemed organic 
and authentic while other posts such as Figures 41, 45 and 46 did not.  These last three 
were originally created by Peter Laviña, Duterte’s Campaign Spokesperson, the Mayor 
Rodrigo Roa Duterte National Executive Co-ordinating Committee (MRRD NECC) and 
by the pro-Duterte ‘Pinoy Trending News’ site.  The difficulty faced by the campaign and 
Facebook pages like DU30 for 2016 was how to present Duterte as an electable candidate 
prior to the first debate.  This was partially achieved by obscuring the location of some of 
his early rallies.  As Figure 47 showed, sometimes large crowds were being photographed 
from the perspective of an individual alongside Duterte while he was onstage campaigning.  
These were then uploaded to Facebook while concealing that the event had really occurred 
in Davao.  This kind of manipulation also extended to early online opinion polls.  These 
appear to have been deliberately targeted by the campaign in order to give the impression 
that the Mayor was more popular nationally than he actually was.  Unfortunately for 
Duterte, the enthusiasm of his online supporters meant that the results of these polls 
became so skewed that they could not be taken seriously.  Yet the success of these efforts 
did show that the Duterte campaign had previously overestimated the cyber capabilities 
of their rivals while underestimating their own (See also Figure 50 and p. 71). 
DU30 for 2016 required extensive support before it could resemble a genuine 
online community.  Although it was able to attract 158,979 followers by September 2017 
many of these seem to be fake Facebook accounts designed to flood the news feeds of 
friends of actual Duterte supporters with pro-Duterte information.  They were able to do 
this by making automated comments on posts which then forced Facebook’s algorithms to 
promote them ahead of other less commented on or liked ones.  To put this in 
perspective, Filipino journalists tracking a mere 22 pro-Duterte Facebook profiles which
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they suspected were fake estimated that these 
accounts alone managed to promote content which 
might have been seen by as many 3.8 million real 
Filipinos (Hofileña, 2016).   
This researcher does not have the resources to 
replicate the investigative journalism of Rappler.  
However, he did find suspicious activity while 
collecting data on DU30 for 2016.  This activity was 
also consistent with the behaviour described by 
Rappler and the social media template developed by 
the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab 
(Hofileña, 2016; Nimmo, 2017).  It is important to 
emphasise that before March 11, 2016 DU30 for 2016’s online reach was very limited. 
This began to change after the announcement shown in Figure 59 confirming Duterte’s 
Social Media Co-ordinator Jose Gabriel La Viña had become the co-administrator of the 
account.  From this point on La Viña was able to automatically post material directly onto 
DU30 for 2016’s timeline as well as to those of the 400-500 other Facebook accounts like 
it.  This was a tremendous advantage which also helped to compensate for the regional 
basis of those accounts.  The original administrator of DU30 for 2016 was fluent in English 
and Visayan (See Figure 28), the main language of the Central and Southern Philippines.  
They may even have been based outside the country.   This use of automation meant posts 
could be uploaded around the clock and seen by more people – which would also achieve 
DU30 for 2016’s original purpose before it had 
amassed a real following.  Yet this artificial 
audience gave the Facebook account the best 
chance it had of quickly getting actual voters to 
engage with it.  Figure 60 shows how limited 
DU30 for 2016’s initial Facebook footprint was. 
This December 23, 2015 effort promoted an 
article from a pro-Duterte Facebook account 
which tried to mimic Newsweek’s name and logo.  
The website this Facebook page represented no 
longer exists.  The Facebook profile of 
Newsdesk.Asia claims it was established by 
Figure 60 
Figure 59 
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freelance journalists in Mindanao.  Figure 60 only generated 15 likes and a single share. 
The post was classified as a picture of Duterte’s supporters even though there was no way 
to authenticate whether the people in the group photo 
realised how their image was going to be used.  If the 
article still existed and provided the names of 
the former ABS-CBN employees then it would 
have been deemed a political endorsement.  It is 
unusual for images of Duterte supporters to be 
shared by DU30 for 2016 without them posing 
with a sign or making the People Power clenched 
fist salute.    
 Figure 61’s April 30, 2016 post, which also 
shared content from yet another pro-Duterte account, 
attracted at least 1100 engagements.  This 
demonstrates just how dramatically the number of 
individuals exposed to DU30 for 2016’s content had increased by the end of the campaign.  
The photo used by the Rodrigo Duterte Thumbs-up Fever 2016 page had been supplied by 
MRRD NECC – which was Duterte’s official campaign committee.  Although the image 
depicts Liberal Party Senator Ralph Recto it was not clear if he was officially endorsing 
Duterte’s presidential candidacy.  After Duterte’s victory he joined the President’s PDP-
Laban and helped it establish formal ties with the Communist Party of China and Putin’s 
United Russia (Elemia, 2017).   
Figure 62 shows the top comments received by Figure 61.  Ruffy Estrella Sanchez 
asked on April 30: “Has Ralph Recto & company switched to Duterte’s camp by flashing 
the Laban (People Power) sign?”  The next comment on May 1 from ‘Tala Marquez’ 
appears automated.  ‘She’ declared: “YOU CAN 
NEVER PUT A GOOD MAN DOWN! DU30 
FOR THE WIN” and posted an image showing 
how “no amount of black propaganda 
[‘disinformation’ about Duterte] can change our 
minds.”  In Figure 63 it is apparent that on May 
3 ‘Marquez’ used the same exact comment down 
to the last emoji she had previously used on May 
1. The comment below ‘hers’ from ‘Akimoto
Yusuke’ also appears automated.  This evidence
Figure 61 
Figure 62
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isn’t sufficient to declare with absolute certainty that 
‘Marquez’ and ‘Yusuke’ are fake Facebook profiles. 
There seems to be a real Filipino called Tala 
Marquez studying in California and her profile 
picture even matches that of the ‘Tala Marquez’ 
commenting on the DU30 for 2016 posts.  The real 
Tala Marquez only seems interested in uploading 
pictures of her lunch to her Facebook timeline.  This 
doesn’t preclude the possibility that she was paid to 
support the Duterte campaign by allowing her 
legitimate profile to be used as part of an automated 
network of Facebook accounts.  The use of genuine accounts makes it harder for Facebook 
to detect the use of automated activity and also prevents the company from promptly 
deleting some of the profiles involved (Hofileña, 2016; Nimmo, 2017).  However, it could 
also mean that the real Tala Marquez had her name and profile stolen by someone 
contracted to provide support to the Duterte campaign’s Facebook activities.  There is no 
evidence in Figure 60 of this kind of activity because in late December 2015 DU30 for 
2016’s posts were struggling to attract even a single comment. 
DU30 for 2016 produced only three worthwhile posts between the first two 
presidential debates.  One of these was a March 17 post about Duterte’s plans to solve the 
insurgencies in Mindanao by granting the island’s Muslims a greater degree of autonomy. 
The other two replicated Carmen Pedrosa’s call for revolution described in Figure 36 (See 
also p. 82).  They appeared on DU30 for 2016’s timeline on March 11 and 14 – 
immediately after Jose Gabriel La Viña became the account’s co-administrator.  No 
establishment newspaper columnist had taken Duterte’s candidacy as seriously as the 
Philippine Star’s Pedrosa.  Although her belief in his victory had seemed far-fetched at 
the end of 2015 by the middle of March 2016 it was beginning to appear prescient.  This 
development was confirmed by a March 19 DU30 for 2016 miscellaneous post which 
showed the latest data from Facebook tracking the account’s performance.  In the first 
week since March 11 DU30 for 2016’s posts had reached 90,369 other Facebook accounts 
and generated 10,097 engagements. 
Under Mathews’ (2009) classification system the activity of DU30 for 2016 
between the first Presidential debate on February 20 and the second on March 21, 2016 
continued to be overwhelmingly trivial.  However, the main limitation of using Mathews 
Figure 63 
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to analyse this data is that no allowance can be made for the extra significance of individual 
DU30 for 2016 posts.  Of the 36 created during this sub-period the two worthwhile uploads 
repeating Pedrosa’s call for revolution seemed more relevant in March 2016 than when 
Figure 36 was first uploaded on December 30, 2015.  This is because of the boost Duterte’s 
candidacy received after his performance in the first Presidential debate (pp. 96-99).  As 
discussed previously (p. 82) these calls for revolution served as warnings that wide-scale 
electoral fraud would not be tolerated by Duterte’s supporters – even though the 
electronic vote-counting machines used in the 2016 ballot weren’t susceptible to the kind 
of tampering Pedrosa implied that the Liberal Party might resort to (Marañon III, 2016).  
It was these safeguards which made the allegations of vote buying levelled against Manuel 
Roxas II so incendiary (See Figure 26).  This was because paying for votes was the only 
way the presidency could still be stolen.  Pedrosa had also helped the Duterte campaign to 
appropriate the language and symbolism of the People Power movement which had 
deposed President Marcos.  Although it might not have been what she originally intended 
to imply the way the Duterte campaign used her comments suggested a second 
revolution was required to realise the promises of 1986.       
The credibility of Duterte’s claim to be a transformational change agent increased 
as his candidacy gained in prominence.  However, Duterte’s television appearances and 
campaign rallies also played a central role during this stage of the data collection period. 
The additional online reach gained by DU30 for 2016 after La Viña’s intervention meant 
that the digital footprint of all its posts – not just the ones considered worthwhile under 
Mathews categories – were being amplified.  Yet at this point in the campaign Facebook 
activity was supporting the other elements of team Duterte rather than leading them.  
Although the Mayor would never have formally entered the presidential race without the 
social media efforts of an earlier incarnation of his cyber army (Zamora, 2015) his March 
2016 TV appearances and rallies were not staged simply so his online activists could post 
about them on Facebook.  As a result, the online component along with the more traditional 
aspects of Duterte’s campaign acted to mutually reinforce each other just like they had 12 
months earlier when Duterte had conducted his nationwide ‘listening tour’ (“Rody Duterte 
embarks on nationwide ‘listening tour,’” 2015).    Even when many of the accounts DU30 
for 2016’s content was reaching may have been fake the ambitious scale of the Duterte 
campaign’s Facebook activity still had an impact.  This is because it allowed individual 
DU30 for 2016 posts to be viewed by a real audience larger than anything the page had 
been able to communicate with prior to the first debate.  Within this wider context, 
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Mathews’ categories seem less relevant than they otherwise would have.  In a standard 
Western election campaign the tallying of policy categories makes sense.  However, DU30 
for 2016 only produced a single worthwhile post highlighting any of the Mayor’s policies 
between the debates which secured his victory.  As a result, the significance of his peace 
plans fades into irrelevancy when compared to the other content his online supporters were 
sharing. 
Although there were only three political endorsement posts during this stage of the 
collection period one of them was Geraldine Donato’s.  As shown in Figure 46 this March 
18 post appeared just three days before the second debate and was an attempt to turn her 
pro-Duterte comments into an online sensation.  The immaturity of the Duterte campaign 
in March 2016 is demonstrated by how few engagements this DU30 for 2016 post was 
able to achieve.  As Figure 62 showed, through the use of extensive automation by the end 
of April even some innocuous DU30 for 2016 posts were capable of attracting as many as 
1,100 engagements.  Whereas on March 18 Donato’s endorsement only managed 115.   
However, it was shared 66 times which implies that most of this Facebook activity was 
still being generated by a small but real audience.  It also fails to track how many people 
DU30 for 2016’s followers were then able to share Donato’s endorsement with.   
On March 18 DU30 for 2016 also created a political rally post.  This post shared 
images from Duterte’s March 16 grand rally in Davao City (Figure 48).  It was evident 
from these pictures that Duterte was generating considerable political momentum even if 
this was mainly in his ‘Solid South’ of Mindanao.  Comparative political analysis can help 
establish if a political message is being reinforced by multiple sources (Wirth & Kolb, 
2004).  In this case even though media outlets like Rappler might quibble over the actual 
numbers attending Duterte’ rallies they never disputed that seismic shifts were occurring 
in the Philippine political landscape.  Their collective failure was assuming that the 
challenge Duterte represented could be withstood by the establishment candidates because 
Duterte’s ‘real change’ was not going to occur without large-scale electoral support in the 
Northern and Central Philippines as well as in the South.  As a result, DU30 for 2016’s 
role was to ensure that the new People Power became a self-fulfilling prophecy.  It helped 
maintain the appearance of a nationwide movement until one could actually be generated. 
What the Duterte campaign still struggled to articulate coherently was exactly what their 
candidate intended to do once he occupied the presidential palace.       
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6.4     Look where all this talking got us 
The Rody Duterte account tried to present Duterte as a fundamentally different Philippine 
politician prior to the first Presidential debate.  They did this by crafting a discourse around 
the Mayor which suggested he was uniquely trustworthy (Figure 1; p. 74).  However, the 
main problem with Duterte’s central propositions were that they ignored the progress 
that the country had made under the presidency of Benigno Aquino III.  Duterte claimed 
that he was going to eliminate all corruption in the country within six months so that 
the Philippines could invest more in its infrastructure and finally achieve peace.  
Essentially, he was proposing to fix all the problems which had bedevilled the republic 
for the last 50 years in one fell swoop.  Figure 6 then provided too much detail about how 
Duterte planned to achieve this.  It risked alienating his more squeamish 
supporters by advocating what seemed like a policy of extra-judicial killing.  
Although some of Duterte’s activists were excited by the prospect of mass 
slaughter (Figure 28) the Mayor’s awkward handling of a question on this topic 
during the first debate (p. 77) meant that the most controversial elements of his 
campaign were deliberately downplayed on his official Facebook account from then 
on. 
It is this aspect of his discourse and how it was handled by the Philippine media 
and his political rivals which is the most troubling.  It seems incomprehensible from 
a Western perspective that they allowed a violent provincial thug like Duterte, a man 
who relished keeping a gold-plated revolver on his desk (Peel, 2017), to position himself 
as just another presidential candidate.  Yet this instinctive appeasement of Duterte 
and his followers, what this researcher considered to be an example of excessive 
cultural politeness (p. 97), might actually represent the kind of accommodation strategy 
necessary for a fragile democracy to function.  Most behavioural and cognitive analysis 
studies use subjects from democratic environments where large-scale election violence 
does not occur (Henrich, Heine & Norenzayan, 2010).  In this respect the cognitive 
frames of Teun Van Dijk’s (1997, 1997b) critical discourse analysis also contain the 
same inherent flaws.  If the Philippine media had made their disdain for Duterte too 
obvious then the Philippines could have been plunged into chaos if he had lost the 
presidential election while the country’s entire establishment had been openly hostile 
towards him.  Instead, like his political opponents, they were forced into a delicate 
balancing act where criticism towards Duterte had to be muted whenever possible in 
order to avoid a potential bloodbath.  The main difficulties with this tactic is that it 
presupposes that Duterte was capable of losing gracefully and would be magnanimous  
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or at least manageable in the unlikely event that he won. 
The discourse of the 1st Presidential debate showed how this 
accommodation strategy was continuously applied, evaluated and adjusted (pp. 
96-99).  Of course, the personalities involved in this process could also have resorted to 
an alternative stratagem whenever they sensed there was an advantage in doing so.  
However, the relative political strength of the five participants affected the language they 
chose to employ.  Manuel Roxas II was reasonably aggressive as Grace Poe’s 
commanding lead in the polls had placed him in a difficult position.  He could be critical of 
her and Vice President Binay without running the risks that direct attacks on Duterte 
entailed.  Binay’s struggles were compounded by his inability to adjust his 
microphone so he could be heard and his enormous unexplained wealth.  Although 
Poe could afford to be slightly aloof because of her ten-point lead over her rivals it 
was Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s night.  Her limited support meant her presence 
should not have been very consequential but by acting as Duterte’s foil she 
helped elevate his status during a debate which was meant to result in his self-
immolation.  Instead of the obscenity laced tirades Duterte was expected to 
deliver he was restrained and courteous.  This ability to compose himself and act 
more presidentiable was rewarded by Defensor-Santiago and to a lesser degree, by the 
other candidates as well.  Since neither of them used prepared statements to the extent that 
Poe, Roxas II and Binay did Defensor-Santiago’s praise of Duterte’s anti-
corruption record seemed spontaneous.  The way it was seized upon by the 
Duterte campaign and quickly uploaded to his official Facebook page also 
showed the importance his advisers placed on the discursive value of this unexpected 
endorsement (Figure 54; pp. 77-78).  If every one of the 7.2 million people who 
watched it had been registered to vote then this video alone would have been 
seen by 13 percent of the electorate (Commission on Elections, 2016).  Duterte 
went on to receive 16.6 million votes in total, over 6.6 million more than Manuel Roxas 
II who ended up finishing ahead of Poe and Binay (“Official count: Duterte is new 
president, Robredo is vice president,” 2016).        
Figure 55 (pp. 79-81) was the culmination of the Rody Duterte account’s 
macrodiscursive conclusions (Condor & Antaki, 1997).  There was no attempt after March 
20 to even pretend that Duterte was running on a coherent policy platform.  This was 
because it was his opponents who had self-destructed on stage during the 
2nd Presidential debate when the other candidates had focused on discrediting 
each other rather than Duterte (Bloomberg TV Philippines, 2016; Cerda,  
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2016c; “Full transcript: 2nd #PiliPinas2016 presidential debate,” 2016).  As a result, 
Figure 55 insisted that it was now up to him to provide leadership in the absence of any 
viable alternatives.  It was Duterte’s offer of “strong leadership to end the country’s 
disorder” which defined his candidacy and marked him out as a populist strongman.  
This discursive reality (Van Dijk, 1997a) was not always apparent on his official 
Facebook account.  Yet beneath the veneer of normalcy which the discourse of campaign 
rallies, political endorsements and photo opportunities presented it is difficult to 
imagine how anyone could fail to see the real foundation of Duterte’s appeal (See also 
Figure 6).  His promise of revolutionary rather than evolutionary change required a 
high level of trust in his ability to deliver it – and it was up to Facebook pages like 
DU30 for 2016 to reassure the Diehard Duterte Supporters while the Rody 
Duterte account focused on wooing those slightly uncomfortable with the total 
Duterte brand. 
Although the Rody Duterte account did not stop producing content after March 20, 
2016 the character of these later posts reflected the new context of the race.  By May 4 
Duterte was leading the other candidates by the same ten-point margin Grace Poe had led 
by prior to the first debate (Cupin, 2016a).  This demonstrated just how volatile and fickle 
the Filipino electorate was and encouraged one of his rivals to believe that a swing 
against Duterte could still be engineered.   As a result, Duterte come under sustained yet 
indirect personal attack by Manuel Roxas II’s Liberal Party proxies just prior to voting 
on May 9 (Figure 14).  This mirrored an earlier attempt to derail his momentum a week 
before the April 24 third Presidential debate by drawing attention to his rape jokes 
(Figure 13). However, Table 2 demonstrates that the Rody Duterte posts between March 
21 and May 9 continued to be predominantly trivial.  Some of the worthwhile 
uploads during this sub-period appeared to be attempts by the campaign to make 
Duterte seem less radical and more reassuring.  Figure 10 showed how during the third 
Presidential debate Duterte had maintained that he would not surrender the 
Philippines’ sovereign rights over its maritime Exclusive Economic Zone.  Yet even 
before he took office he is alleged to have had extensive contacts with the People’s 
Republic of China over resolving these sovereignty issues (ABS-CBN, 2016f).   
Under Mathews’ (2009) classification system it was the 23 trivial posts showing 
the size of Duterte’s political rallies which dominated the activity of the Rody Duterte 
account in the final seven weeks leading up to the election.  Figure 18 (p. 47) showed the 
under-reported April 8 rally Duterte had held in Greater Manila.  This post demonstrated 
to his official Facebook audience that the real change he had promised was on its way.  
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However, the rally’s lack of mainstream media coverage is difficult to explain.  Even if 
some major media outlets felt the need to rest its reporters that night it still seems 
curious that only the pro-Duterte correspondent from the Philippine Star was present.  
Despite this, Facebook still provided the Duterte campaign with an 
alternative mass communications channel which allowed them to reach an audience of 
millions.  This rally also contained a strong parasocial message (Rubin & McHugh, 
1987) – a feature which mimics aspects of interpersonal relationships and would be 
replicated by pages such as DU30 for 2016 as well.  This is because the sheer size of the 
crowd in Alabang, an affluent area which appeared an unlikely venue for the Duterte 
campaign to stage such an ambitious event in, suggested that this Mindanaoan Mayor had 
become a national celebrity (Pedrosa, 2016).  His supporters were no longer just from 
the Southern Philippines and Figure 18 proved that he had the support of many upper 
and middle-class Filipinos – if the way his campaign team had bussed in some 
supporters from neighbouring slums was ignored.   
Well-educated and well-off voters were meant to feel that Duterte could be trusted 
with the presidency because they could see that other well-educated and well-off voters 
appeared to trust him.  This perception of performative competency is a key element of 
any parasocial relationship (Dibble et al., 2016).  No one from these affluent 
socioeconomic groups would vote for such a radical candidate unless they felt that 
Duterte understood their concerns.  He couldn’t be feared or misunderstood if they 
believed that his concept of strong leadership would lead to the country’s salvation 
rather than its destruction.  The Philippine Star’s columnist Carmen Pedrosa was equally 
excited.  This is because she recognised that Duterte’s candidacy was a revival of the 
populist anti-corruption and anti-drugs promises that Ferdinand Marcos had represented 
when she first began her journalistic career in the mid-60s (Anderson, 1988; “Marcos: 
Rise and fall of a dictator,” 2016; Pedrosa, 2016; Tejada, 2016b).  Of course, Pedrosa 
and the residents of Alabang also had to be utterly convinced that unlike Marcos 
(Quimpo & Quimpo, 2006) Duterte wouldn’t fail those Filipinos who had more than 
just their lives to lose under his new society. 
DU30 for 2016’s discourse was more consistent than the content produced by the 
official Rody Duterte account.  In late December 2015 Figure 25 (pp. 82-83) showed how 
Duterte’s statements on crime and corruption meant that nothing would ever be the same 
after he was elected.  Although his individual propositions can be difficult to accept at face 
value Duterte essentially declared in Figure 25 that everything he hated must cease after 
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he become president.  It would usually be perceived as disadvantageous for a serious 
candidate in a relatively free and fair democratic election to issue such a radical 
proclamation.  This might explain why the Rody Duterte Facebook account only produced 
a single post similar to Figure 25 on the eve of the first Presidential debate (Figure 6) and 
then quickly abandoned this kind of discourse immediately afterwards.  However, it was 
DU30 for 2016’s role to reassure the hardcore Duterte supporters that despite the Mayor’s 
more moderate statements he still planned to deliver on his promise of irreversible 
transformational change.  By declaring that the whole country was to be purified within 
three to six months Duterte was engaging in utopian messaging (p. 83).  Under Duterte, 
the new Philippines was going to be built exceedingly quickly – and based on the language 
he used during the campaign as well as after he was elected Duterte appeared to suggest 
that ordinary Filipinos should play a part in this revolutionary nation-building.  Sometimes 
nation-building could mean additional infrastructure and sometimes it could mean 
mass killings.  Only Duterte could decide what Duterteism really entailed and what 
aspect would be emphasised at any given moment.  The idea that Filipinos themselves 
would have to shoulder the majority of this burden has been difficult to implement in 
practice.  Despite the killing of thousands of people in the first months of Duterte’s 
presidency there is very little evidence that any of these deaths were the result of 
vigilantism (HRW, 2017).     
Figure 56 was uploaded earlier in December 2015 by DU30 for 2016 and had also 
helped to reaffirm Duterte’s revolutionary credentials (pp. 83-86).  It demonstrated how 
stalwarts of the anti-Marcos resistance such as Aquilino Pimentel III rationalised their 
support for Rodrigo Duterte.  The macrodiscursive conclusion that the president of the 
PDP-Laban party was offering was that “western doctrines and theories” had failed the 
Philippines and that it was now time to try something else.  This is an extremely harsh 
indictment of the entire post-Marcos period and deliberately ignores the incremental 
improvements which had occurred from 1986-2016, especially under the presidency of 
Benigno Aquino III.  Yet the discourse employed by Pimentel III indicated that 
incrementalism would only ever lead to cosmetic change whereas the “outside of the box” 
thinking of Mayor Duterte would deliver “change we would all feel,” (pp. 83-86).  The 
tragedy was that Pimentel III seemed to be endorsing the candidate Duterte could have 
been instead of the candidate he was.  The Rody Duterte Facebook account proved 
that during the campaign Duterte showed signs of being a business-friendly pragmatist 
who was capable of overseeing the creation of innovative poverty reduction and welfare 
programmes (p. 40; Table 2).  It also showed how he appeared committed to ending the
Philippines’ civil wars (pp. 37-38).  Yet even after the largest single slaughter of civilians 
in Southeast Asia since the fall of the Khmer Rouge (Lozada, 2018) neither Aquilino 
Pimentel III or Duterte’s other allies have been prepared to abandon him.  This 
suggests that their support might really be more “unconditional and permanent” than it 
first seemed (Figure 56).     
DU30 for 2016 was able to take Duterte’s deification further than the Rody Duterte 
account ever could.  Figure 57 demonstrated how the Philippine electorate’s messiah 
complex made some voters extremely susceptible to a particular kind of utopian messaging 
(p. 83).  Duterte’s more enthusiastic supporters – such as the original administrator of 
DU30 for 2016 – felt comfortable portraying him as a Christ-like figure.  To 
many Filipinos impossibly ambitious targets or goals have always been imminently 
achievable with the help of the divine or of the spirit world (May, 1992).  If something 
needs to be changed or improved then God will find a way to do it, perhaps through the 
agency of a presidential candidate.  In this respect, election campaigns are akin to a 
lottery and it is not always possible to determine who has been chosen until their 
impending victory is obvious.  It is a factor which turns politics and politicians into 
phenomena (Casiple, 2016; pp. 86-87).  As a result, events and achievements can seem 
to defy all rational and earthly explanation.  Each Philippine election cycle also tends 
to produce at least one candidate who could legitimately lay claim to the mantle of the 
chosen.  In 1986 it was the widow of the most prominent victim of Marcos’ brutal 
rule (Fallows, 1987), in 2010 it was the turn of her son shortly after her own death 
(Gutierrez, 2012), while in 2016 it seemed to be Duterte – unless Senator Grace 
Poe’s calling proved to be stronger.  Poe’s narrative was always more compelling than 
Jejomar Binay and Manuel Roxas II’s.  This is not to disparage what they had achieved 
over their long political careers.  Binay the human rights lawyer had risked his life to 
defy Marcos and had personally defended Corazon Aquino’s presidency multiple 
times against coup attempts, often with an Uzi sub-machinegun in hand 
(Cepeda, 2016; Macabenta, 2015).  Whereas Mar Roxas was so respected as 
a minister under successive administrations that even former President Joseph 
Estrada, who allied himself with Duterte despite being forcibly removed from the 
presidential palace in 2001 due to corruption, could not bring himself to 
publicly criticise his most able technocrat (Cupin, 2016c). Yet it was Poe who 
as an orphan had been adopted by Philippine show business royalty.  Her Moses-
like story and her father’s fame meant her victory could have been as inevitable as 
________Duterte’s_______ (Ba____nyan_____, 2015).  __________________________________________________________________
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Under these circumstances the discourse present in Figure 57 is more 
understandable.  Although it proposed that because Duterte was willing to sacrifice his 
own life he was worthy of support this is an unusual form of utopian messaging.  All 
Duterte seemed to promise in Figure 57 was struggle and death even though this was not 
expressly mentioned.  This is more like the message of an avenging angel than a redeemer. 
When the post hailed the reader directly and asked if they were willing to support Duterte 
this provided DU30 for 2016 with a classic parasocial opportunity (Dibble et al., 2016).  
Quite simply, if the audience did not feel an affinity with Rodrigo Duterte then they risked 
being destroyed along with the rest of Sodom.  However, if they joined with him then not 
only would they be personally saved, they would also be contributing towards the 
country’s collective salvation.   
This macrodiscursive assumption ignores how tenuous Duterte’s position in the 
campaign race was on March 16 when Figure 57 was uploaded.  If the Mayor had been 
chosen then it seems like a fairly haphazard selection process.  This is because his 
opponents had no intention of gifting him the presidency and their behaviour in the second 
Presidential debate may have had more to do with the criticism they had been subjected to 
after their collegiality during the first (Avendaño, Cabacungan, & Uy, 2016).  All DU30 
for 2016 could achieve through the discourse of posts such as Figure 57 was to ensure that 
the Duterte campaign was able to take advantage of whatever opportunities Heaven sent 
their way.   
Figure 58 demonstrated how DU30 for 2016 also relied on this discursive theme 
when Duterte faced a serious crisis in the final weeks of the campaign.  The corruption 
allegations levelled against him were a last-ditch attempt to challenge the Filipino public’s 
relationship with Duterte.  Although the Liberal party would resort to even more extreme 
language the day before the election, when President Benigno Aquino III compared 
Duterte to Hitler and implied that he was the Antichrist, alleging Duterte was a fraud was 
almost as damning (ABS-CBN, 2016c; pp. 88).  By attacking his anti-corruption platform 
as a farce Duterte’s opponents were attacking Duterte the man rather than just Duterte the 
candidate.  It suggested to his supporters that they didn’t really know him at all, which also 
inferred that he was incapable of knowing them either.  This sense of mutual knowledge, 
of knowing each other, is the foundation of any parasocial relationship (Rubin & McHugh, 
1987).  Few studies have focused on the political impact of parasociality outside 
of WEIRD or Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich and Democratic environments 
(Henrich et al., 2010; Zenor, 2014).  As a result, despite the data showing its importance 
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in East Asian media ecologies such as Japan and South Korea, most Western researchers 
still assume that all audiences are aware that this feeling they have of knowing a celebrity 
through seeing them on TV or following them on Facebook is illusory (Zenor, 
2014).  However, the leading Philippine authority on parasociality David De 
Guzman Centeno has concluded that this is not always the way some Filipinos think 
about their idols. 
This is why Figure 58’s use of yet another endorsement of Duterte’s integrity by 
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago on April 16 may have had an impact at such an 
important juncture during the campaign.  In the court of Philippine public opinion Figure 
58 required DU30 for 2016’s followers – and whoever else its posts were capable of 
reaching – to decide if Duterte was really capable of running on an amorphous anti-
corruption slate while actually being corrupt himself.  The allegations against him were an 
attempt to induce a form of parasocial shock (Cohen, 2004) which might convince some 
of Duterte’s supporters that they had been duped by a charlatan.  Defensor-Santiago’s 
insistence that Duterte was humble and righteous maintained the Christ-like aura which 
DU30 for 2016’s macrodiscursive conclusions were meant to construct around him.  They 
also suggested that the allegations against him could not possibly be true despite Duterte’s 
lack of transparency around his family’s wealth (pp. 90-91).  Throughout his research De 
Guzman Centeno (2010, 2016) has noted that many Filipinos talk about celebrities as if 
they were members of their own families.  These individuals were also most often 
from rural backgrounds and predominantly female (De Guzman Centeno, 2010) – which 
could have made Defensor-Santiago’s second inadvertent endorsement even more 
effective.  This is because what this fading star of the Philippine political stage 
appeared to be saying was don’t worry Lola (Nana) Miriam has been to Kuya 
(your elder Brother) Rody’s house and it’s so modest there’s no way he’s a thief.  
Therefore, you can trust him the same way you trust me. 
By the time Defensor-Santiago began to publicly express her doubts about 
Duterte’s probity a few days later it was too late to have any impact on the Mayor’s 
momentum (p. 91; Pazzibugan, 2016).  If the worst that Duterte had been capable of, like 
Senator Grace Poe and his other rivals, was mismanaging the Philippine economy then 
concerns would still have been raised about how his campaign team leveraged Facebook 
during the election.  However, when the candidate who was positioned as the country’s 
saviour has also gone on to anathematise whole swathes of Filipino society it becomes 
even more critical to ask how complicit his supporters were in this endeavour.  How far 
were they willing to go by joining him?  Enough of the fickle Filipino public were 
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convinced that Rodrigo Duterte, unlike anyone else, could be trusted with the 
responsibility of sweeping away all the norms and traditions painstakingly established 
since 1986 and bringing back the selective violence of the Marcos era.  This fresh start has 
seen the dismantling of the Philippine democracy, its media freedoms and the death of at 
least 24,000 people in targeted killings linked to the Duterte regime (Buan, 2018; Cook, 
2018; HRW, 2018; Regencia, 2018; Talabong, 2018).  In this important regard, the new 
People Power in the Philippines is nothing like the original.  It is the imposition of 
dictatorship rather than its overthrow – and despite attempts to play down this aspect on 
his official Rody Duterte account during the 2016 presidential campaign other Facebook 
pages such as DU30 for 2016 made sure it was always obviously on display.  
   
 
Chapter 7.  Conclusions: Getting fooled again   
While exploring this research’s main research question and examining the role that 
Facebook played in Rodrigo Duterte’s 2016 presidential election victory and his 
acquisition of power in the Philippines, it was impossible to ignore the contrasts – as well 
as the similarities – between how Facebook was ostensibly used by the official Duterte 
campaign and how it was also used by his legions of passionate part-time Facebook 
warriors and their cyber mercenaries.  This is because this research’s first sub-question 
analyses how Duterte’s image as a candidate was constructed through his official Rody 
Duterte Facebook profile and DU30 for 2016.  Yet both accounts, and possibly the 400-
500 others like DU30 for 2016 employed during the campaign as well, were all under the 
direct or at least indirect control of Team Duterte.  It is this contradiction which makes 
separating the official from the ‘unofficial’ so difficult.  Furthermore, the methods utilised 
by this research also demonstrated several limitations when applied to a Philippine election 
campaign.     
This because at times Byron Mathews’ content analysis categories can seem unfit 
to accurately classify which Facebook posts from this research’s data collection period 
were more significant than the others.  However, this is unfair to Mathews as his original 
intent was to identify which newspapers in a newly mass literate early 20th Century New 
York were perpetuating what he considered to be a dangerous trend towards greater 
trivialisation.  These concerns reflected the mise en scène of Mathews’ original study.  The 
publications he derided were the ones which emphasised what Mathews’ considered to be 
trivial stories over everything else.  What he felt newspapers should be informing their 
overwhelmingly male readers about were the worthwhile political and economic issues of 
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the day, the information he believed was essential for an informed electorate (Mathews, 
2009). 
Mathews was not completely blind to the value of trivial human interest stories 
though.  He recognised that sometimes they could provide important context to worthwhile 
issues.  What Mathews actually abhorred was the salacious crime reporting of the tabloids.  
He felt that this coverage diverted lower-class readers away from the debates over the 
economic conditions which Mathews thought were the root cause of crime and misfortune 
(Mathews, 2009).  In this respect, the chaos of this media environment is similar to that of 
the early 21st Century Philippines.   
Mass media penetration of the rural Philippines is only a relatively recent 
development.  The role of regional radio networks has also been frequently underestimated 
in the media analysis of low-literacy environments and audiences.  This is because the 
market for newspapers in these provincial settings, even when they focus on the love lives 
of maganda (beautiful) young female entertainers, is always going to be modest. 
Philippine radio has traditionally filled this void by providing a mass communication 
equivalent to the oral gossip which would have otherwise dominated discourse in these 
communities (Lent, 1968; Woodier, 2008).  During the dictatorship of President Marcos 
broadcast and print media outlets were either disestablished or censored (Gavilan, 2018; 
Tuazon, 2015).  This legacy contributed to a free-wheeling media atmosphere after 1986 
when racy and sensational coverage was also a way of distinguishing the renewed 
democratic Philippines from the Marcos state (Woodier, 2008).  This increased 
trivialisation of the Philippine media was a development whose implications 
were routinely under-acknowledged by successive Philippine governments (Tuazon, 
2015; Woodier, 2008).  However, by 2015 radio was considered to be old-fashioned and 
had been abandoned by most Filipinos except the elderly.  Its replacement, television, 
was also competing with an even newer medium enabled by the proliferation of low-cost 
smartphones and free mobile Facebook data (“Fake news in the Philippines,” 2017; 
Williams, 2017).   
It is the analysis of two Facebook accounts which forms the core of this research 
and Mathews’ classification system has proved helpful in two main ways.  Although 
Mathews may have had difficulty understanding why his contemporaries were so 
interested in the most salacious and disturbing aspects of human affairs he would have 
instantly recognised the dangers inherent in de-emphasising detailed policy during 
an election campaign.  This is what was demonstrated by the trivial character of both the 
official Rody Duterte Facebook page and DU30 for 2016.  As a result, the content 
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produced by Rody Duterte and DU30 for 2016 reflected the political and media realities 
of the Philippines of late 2015 and early 2016.  They were symptoms of an uninformed 
electorate as well as part of the cause.  Each account also attempted to address the different 
needs of different audiences while simultaneously coping with the fluidity of the election 
campaign and its daily developments.  Yet Mathews would have noted that it was the 
content which depicted how many supporters and what kind Duterte was able to attract 
which seemed critical to his success during the most vital stages of the campaign. 
That the televised talent contest which determines the Philippines next political idol 
can be influenced by new communications channels such as Facebook is provable, even 
when exactly to what degree is always going to be contestable.  The role of Facebook in 
Duterte’s success during the 2016 presidential race must be first broken into its component 
parts to be understood.  Neither can it be decoupled from the context of the election 
campaign as a whole.  This is because comparative analysis is also instrumental in 
determining how this research’s second sub-question can be answered.  If influential 
figures within the Philippine political and media elite did abet Duterte’s rise then how was 
Duterte’s core political message reinforced, even inadvertently, by other political and 
media sources during the period under review?   
Although Mayor Rodrigo Duterte’s official Facebook presence only had a 
relatively modest audience by the time he officially entered the presidential race on 
December 17, 2015, he still managed to solidify himself as a national celebrity over the 
course of the campaign.  However, it is difficult to conclude that the Mayor’s official Rody 
Duterte Facebook account was the main cause of this development.  Instead, it appears to 
have played an important supporting role.  This is mainly because of its low-level of overall 
activity but also because of how infrequently it was used to inform its audience about 
detailed policies. 
The first major opportunity which the Rody Duterte page had to make a significant 
impact on the campaign was either prior to or just after the Mayor’s Tondo proclamation 
rally on February 9, 2016.  Duterte received relatively sympathetic coverage from some of 
the Philippine media.  If he could have articulated what kind of alternative government he 
was offering – and in what specific ways it was going to do more for the masa or people – 
then this would have been the ideal time to do it.  Any coherent political message he 
provided would have been amplified by the reportage it received.  However, this is not 
how populists and populism work.  Unlike many of her competitors, it was Rappler’s Pia 
Ranada who accurately reported the rage Duterte shared with his small band of supporters 
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on February 9.  He wasn’t interested in or capable of providing a set of detailed policy 
proposals.  What Duterte did offer was a form of rejectionism, a break with what had come 
before.  As a result, it was the Rody Duterte page’s role to maintain a veneer of normalcy 
leading up to the first Presidential debate.  Its purpose was to present Duterte as a dynamic, 
yet non-threatening, candidate.  This was a relatively modest goal – but one which also 
relied on the Duterte campaign’s ability to successfully manage the Mayor’s contradictory 
qualities.  In order to do this, his official Facebook account needed to be as contradictory 
as the Mayor himself. 
There seemed to be major differences between the private Duterte and his public 
persona.  Reporters such as Ranada appeared to believe they had a genuine chemistry with 
him – except when he was being Mayor Duterte.  The Rody Duterte account tried to 
address this issue by restricting itself to a series of uploads that barely hinted at Duterte’s 
platform.  It was sufficiently vague to be anything, everything, and nothing – all at the 
same time.  This confusion may also have been exacerbated by the external advice the 
Duterte campaign had received.  The SCL Group had suggested earlier in 2015 that 
candidates should test emotional anti-corruption and anti-drugs messages on Facebook 
along with other themes such as fighting poverty (Robles, 2018).  As a result, under 
Mathews’ categories there was no single topic or issue which characterised the Rody 
Duterte account’s worthwhile posts at this early stage of the campaign.  Only when 
individual categories are linked to each other does Duterte’s candidacy start to make sense.  
This is not just because eliminating corruption and illegal drugs mattered to Duterte.  They 
were also the issues which had helped define his takeover of Davao City and had come to 
define how he saw himself as well. 
Duterte came to power in Davao during one of the most chaotic periods in modern 
Philippine history and he could have easily been swept away by the disorder engulfing the 
Southern Philippines.  However, the pacification lesson which he appears to have learned 
from 1988-1998 is that it is impossible to improve the environment you wish to control 
without first eliminating the threats to your wellbeing and to those you are trying to protect.  
Even though this counterinsurgency doctrine can sometimes mean adopting the poverty 
reduction policies of the Communist Party of the Philippines it mostly emphasises the 
death squad mentality and tactics of the security forces as well as the violent Maoist social 
cleansing of ‘undisciplined elements’ – such as drug users – which was perpetrated by the 
New People’s Army cadres (May, 1992; Rabasa et al., 2011; Weiss, 2017).  As a successful 
rural boss and warlord, someone who had already brought better infrastructure and stability 
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to a sizeable slice of the Philippines’ largest southern city by killing anyone who stood in 
his way before they could kill him, Duterte must have felt he was capable of replicating 
this achievement on a national scale.  He also appeared convinced that it was possible to 
do this by using the same methods he had in Davao City.  Yet when his official social 
media team attempted to convey this prior to the first debate, just as Duterte attempted to 
do during the debate itself, his candidacy came close to self-destructing the way his 
opponents and many media pundits had predicted it would (Esguerra, 2015). 
Teun Van Dijk’s discourse analysis provides a critical lens through which Duterte’s 
campaign language can be broken down into its constituent components so that what he 
was actually proposing becomes clearer.  Duterte had almost advocated for extra-judicial 
killings on February 20, but when he was challenged the next day by one of the hosts of 
the first Presidential debate about his record in Davao he denied being the Death Squad 
Mayor.  The Rody Duterte Facebook account never mentioned the Mayor’s anti-narcotics 
plans again.  However, the first debate represented a major turning point in the campaign 
for another reason.  It marked Duterte’s acceptance by the country’s elite as a serious 
candidate, even when they didn’t seem to take all his talk about killing as literally as the 
hushed Mindanaoan crowd did.  In this respect, this research confirms the accidental 
findings of those who have already used Van Dijk to analyse the Philippine media (Flores, 
2016).  The way Senator Defensor-Santiago praised Duterte’s anti-corruption record and 
how this discourse was accepted by his other rivals merely reflected the wider social 
context in which it occurred.  How no one stopped to question whether it was really 
appropriate to tolerate Duterte at any level of Philippine politics is a disturbing aspect of 
the country’s fragile democracy (Quimpo, 2005).  The provincial violence he represented 
had become so normalised that no one bothered to raise how he had avoided censure or 
trial for so long.  This imperial complacency meant the country’s Manila-based lawmakers 
and media had spent three decades tolerating the kind of rural warlordism that had 
frequently cost their regional counterparts their lives.  Supporting these strongmen may 
have made sense when the New People’s Army had been on the brink of victory in the late 
1980s.  However, the success of the Philippines’ counterinsurgency efforts and its reliance 
on death squads to pacify places such as Davao City led to the creation of Rodrigo Duterte.  
It was these factors which makes Senator Defensor-Santiago’s inadvertent 
promotion of him as the country’s saviour during the first debate – even when he was still 
expected to lose with dignity on May 9 – seem like such a major error.  It is also a tribute 
to the quality of Duterte’s social media campaign team that they were able to capitalise on 
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this and other opportunities as effectively as they did.  As Mathews’ content 
analysis system demonstrated, after the debacle of the second presidential debate Team 
Duterte no longer needed to risk communicating what sort of revolutionary change the 
Mayor actually stood for.  They could instead focus on presenting him as a popular 
candidate who was attracting large-scale support throughout the country and among 
Filipinos of all socio-economic classes.  This is similar to how the original People 
Power movement propelled Cory Aquino to power in 1986 by presenting the 
Communist-dominated front organisations which supported her as less threatening 
then they had previously seemed during Marcos’ heyday (Mydans, 1986).  Despite 
the trivial nature of most campaign rally posts due to their lack of any policy 
announcements, their visible demonstration of his popular support was Duterte’s 
real official Facebook message.  Change was on its way and like other populists 
Duterte was chameleon enough to alter his colours when he needed to blend in more.  If 
he was in danger of appearing too red he could always shift towards the yellow of 
his centre-right running-mate Alan Peter Cayetano to avoid scaring the middle 
and upper-classes.  Facebook pages such as DU30 for 2016 played a key role in 
achieving this as well.  However, their main purpose was to maintain Duterte’s 
relationships with his diehard supporters while he courted others less comfortable 
with his plans to use selective violence after he was elected.  This is because 
the terror which Duterte unleashed after his victory was not spontaneous and 
required central planning and organisation.  The organisation required to achieve 
this, just like the training of his online activists, had to come from Davao. 
Like the official Rody Duterte Facebook account, DU30 for 2016 was also a 
predominantly trivial information source.  Mathews’ sub-categories have also shown that 
when DU30 for 2016 did post worthwhile content, its initial topic choices were less 
consistent than those of the Rody Duterte page.  There is evidence that most of this early 
material was being supplied by Duterte’s official campaign team even before his Social 
Media Co-ordinator gained the ability to upload content directly on March 11, 2016.  Yet 
the lack of posts addressing Duterte’s anti-drugs policies are telling.  This is because down-
playing the most controversial elements of Duterteism appeared to be a deliberate strategy 
during the campaign.  It was only at his final campaign rally on May 7 that the Mayor 
felt confident enough about his impending victory to say he would dump 100,000 corpses 
into Manila Bay after he took office (Reuters, 2016) – a statement which was ignored by 
every Philippine media outlet present that evening.  As a result, DU30 for 2016’s role 
was to maintain the morale of Duterte’s more enthusiastic supporters while the Rody 
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Duterte account tried to portray him as a semi-conventional candidate who only 
occasionally resorted to vulgarity. 
This was a task that DU30 for 2016 struggled to fulfil during the first half of the 
data collection period.  Despite the page’s tremendous number of posts between December 
17 and December 31, 2015 this was still no substitute for the automated support DU30 for 
2016 received during the second half of March, April and early May 2016.  The original 
administrator’s use of Visayan also suggests that this individual was probably from Davao 
City – although they could have been based anywhere in the Philippines or even outside 
of it during the collection period.  However, their early attempts to build an organic pro-
Duterte online community were constrained by their limited number of followers and those 
followers’ levels of engagement.  This raises the possibility that during the transition from 
DU30 for 2016’s early flesh and blood audience to the augmented one which Duterte’s 
Davao City-based social media staff helped to create, many of its centrally co-ordinated 
posts and comments might have been wasted on networks of fake Facebook accounts.  Yet 
this cyber investment still paid off after the second Presidential debate on March 20, 2016.  
DU30 for 2016’s early attempts to portray Duterte as a popular candidate with 
widespread support outside of Mindanao relied on a degree of subterfuge and 
manipulation.  The use of inaccurate online polls and the concealment of rally locations 
also hinted at a lack of confidence in Duterte’s prospects.  These tactics were also straight 
out of Cambridge Analytica’s playbook (Gutierrez, 2018b).  However, his television 
debate performances were so compelling that these machinations were discarded.  This is 
because the high interest in Duterte’s candidacy that pages such as DU30 for 2016 were 
trying to pretend he had already achieved was quickly supplanted by genuine political 
momentum during the latter stages of the campaign.  Although Duterte had begun 2016 
with fewer official Facebook followers than Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Jejomar Binay 
and Grace Poe, his team still ensured that he dominated the political discourse on Facebook 
during the election (Occenola, 2016a, 2016b).  Video clips from these debates played a 
prominent role in his worthwhile messaging on the official Rody Duterte page and after 
his strong second debate performance, which also exposed the weaknesses of his rivals, 
DU30 for 2016 finally became the online community it had always aspired to be.  
Fortunately for Duterte, this turning point in the campaign occurred just as DU30 for 2016 
and the other Facebook accounts created to promote his presidential bid began to receive 
significant amounts of automated support.  Many of the individual endorsements as well 
as the photos and videos of supporters which DU30 for 2016 shared appear to have been 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Page 126    
provided by Duterte’s main campaign team in Davao or his network of regional activists. 
Nonetheless, some of the activity on this Facebook page did seem spontaneous and 
organic.  Even when content may have been distributed to DU30 for 2016 or uploaded 
directly onto its timeline as part of a co-ordinated effort, the comments, shares and overall 
engagement which they attracted towards the end of the collection period were at least 
partially genuine.  Since December 2015, DU30 for 2016 had been campaigning on behalf 
of a candidate in whom the vast majority of Filipinos had no interest.  Yet as more and 
more of them gravitated towards Rodrigo Duterte they found a Facebook ecosystem which 
suggested that the Mayor had already attracted substantial levels of nationwide support – 
even when he hadn’t.  
The DU30 for 2016 page also provided an insider’s view of the discourse 
surrounding Duterte’s candidacy.  The language and tone it used could be mocking and 
dismissive at times.  This is because the account’s original administrator seemed to realise 
what lay ahead for the Philippines in the advent of a Duterte victory – another possible 
sign of his Davao origins.  The concept of Duterte as the country’s last card, its last hope, 
permeated the worldview of the Diehard Duterte Supporters – a group whose acronym 
intentionally replicated that of the Davao Death Squad’s (Nawal, 2015b).  The apocalyptic 
discourse DU30 for 2016 employed sits uneasily alongside Duterte’s standard utopian 
messaging.  If his presidency really could resolve every challenge the Philippines faced 
quickly and easily, then the implication of this discursive reality was that popular 
mobilisation was also going to be needed to free the Philippine people from their 
oppressors.  Although Duterte was supposedly ready to sacrifice his life for the good of 
the country what DU30 for 2016 expected Duterte’s supporters to risk in return was never 
fully explained.  The largest sacrifices seemed to be demanded from those who had 
allegedly been holding the country back, as these individuals were expected to acquiesce 
in their own destruction. 
Duterte’s rejection of Western norms and traditions required faith in his ability to 
implement a policy of selective killings.  This is difficult to explain by anything other than 
a form of parasociality.  Female supporters might have been reassured by the praise Duterte 
received from fellow political celebrities such as Senator Defensor-Santiago while males 
may have been more influenced by his association with former President Fidel Ramos. 
However, this trust in Duterte’s judgement is closer to the relationship Filipinos used to 
have with their community leaders during the pre-colonial period.  The hinterlands of the 
Philippines – and Mindanao and the Southern Philippines in particular – were always 
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shaped more by traditional Philippine values than they were by the limited European 
contact the country had experienced (Anderson, 1988; Sidel, 1999, 2005).  In this respect, 
Duterte represented continuity with this past as well as a rejection of the post-1986 
consensus.  His strong leadership was to be a familial one of in and out groups.  He offered 
protection to his supporters, impunity from prosecution and persecution, regardless of their 
actions, while also promising to violently attack those he claimed threatened and oppressed 
his people.  This is the language of a native chief or cacique who hasn’t been corrupted by 
Western values, a man willing to kill and die for his tribe and who knows what they really 
need.  Since this research is too limited to explore the parasocial relationship between 
Duterte and his supporters adequately it can only be hoped that leading Philippine scholars 
like David De Guzman Centeno might be able to do so in the future.  Yet this may not be 
possible while Rodrigo Duterte remains in power.  As a result, memories will fade and, 
out of necessity, are likely to be reconstructed and adjusted to fit the post-Duterte 
environment in which these future focus groups will be conducted.  This is because the 
bloodthirstiness of DU30 for 2016’s discourse and Duterte’s campaign as a whole makes 
a significant number of his supporters appear complicit in what occurred after his victory 
on May 9, 2016 (Boykoff & McKirdy, 2017).  It also suggests that democratic political 
and media ecologies, especially fragile and complacent ones, can struggle to cope with the 
nation-wide threats posed by successful rural coercive bosses.  Perhaps the main lesson of 
the 2016 Philippine presidential campaign is that if they are tolerated for so long that their 
power is allowed to expand outside their regional bastions, then these strongmen are more 
than capable of bringing the feudal killing fields of the Southeast Asian countryside 
to megacities such as Manila.  The cheerleading of the Philippine Star’s Carmen Pedrosa 
for Duterte and his Dutertistas also needs to be re-examined within this 
context.  Politicians, such as anti-Marcos legend and PDP-Laban president Senator 
Aquilino ‘Koko' Pimentel III also acted as enablers for Duterte but Pedrosa’s open 
support for the Mayor was an early indication of the loyalty that would be demanded 
by the new media environment his election would usher in.   
7.1     A farewell to kings? 
The fickleness of the Philippine voter seems like evidence of a damaged culture (Fallows, 
1987) because this survival tool isn’t usually needed in Western democracies.  Placating a 
dangerous leader who has already demonstrated their propensity for violence only appears 
like a moral failure when you are critiquing the actions of others from a safe distance.  The 
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Philippine political and media elite had to manage the challenge Duterte posed to the post-
Marcos era as best they could.  For Senator Grace Poe this extended to promising to make 
him a senior part of her government if she was elected president (Makabenta, 2016) while 
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago could not reconcile her positive views of Duterte as a 
private individual with the public persona he had adopted in order to become a 
revolutionary change agent.  Only Manuel ‘Mar’ Roxas II consistently tried to undermine 
Duterte despite their past friendship.  His ability to do this was constrained by the 
limitations of the Philippine political environment.  This meant he had to be careful not to 
provoke the violent confrontation that some Duterte supporters appeared to want (Saberon-
Abalayan, 2016).  Therefore, his use of proxies such as Senator Antony Trillanes IV was 
probably the best that could be managed under the circumstances.   
However, the dynamics of the campaign itself cannot be separated from Duterte’s 
innovative use of social media during the collection period.  Although some of his team 
had previously worked for Benigno Aquino III and perhaps hoped to benefit materially 
from a future Duterte presidency, most of his dedicated supporters could be reasonably 
proud of what they managed to achieve during the election campaign (ABS-CBN, 2018; 
Cantera, 2016; Etter, 2017; Mayol, Matus & Napallacan, 2016).  Nonetheless, it is still 
difficult to ascertain how seriously they took his war on drugs.  Research conducted after 
Duterte’s election has shown that while many of his supporters hoped to see a crackdown 
on criminality and corruption, the overwhelming majority also claimed they always 
wanted this to result in arrests rather than shootings (Curato, 2017).  This is borne out by 
the central role of specialised units of Davao City police in the killings which have 
occurred so far (Baldwin & Marshall, 2017a).  As a whole, the public has not participated 
in the slaughter of their neighbours and the Philippine National Police have also been 
reluctant to get too involved despite their promised pay rise, extra cash bounties and 
opportunities to loot from their victims (Amnesty International, 2017; Mogato & Baldwin, 
2017).  The ongoing weaponisation of Facebook by Duterte after his election and his 
attempts to use it as a replacement for all other media not only demonstrates how important 
this medium has become to him (Etter, 2017), they also suggest that support for his 
actions might be far more limited than it often appears.   
Media outlets suspected of pro-Liberal Party tendencies such as Rappler, the 
Philippine Daily Inquirer and ABS-CBN News have all come under increasing pressure 
since Duterte’s victory.  In this environment, their ability to report freely on his drug war 
has become impossible.  The multimedia graphics tracking its death toll and the interviews 
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with the victims’ families have all slowly faded and disappeared as it became apparent 
what kind of change Duterte really represented (Cook, 2018; Etter, 2017).  Yet it should 
be remembered that despite all the efforts on Facebook on his behalf throughout 2015, 
Duterte only announced his official bid for the presidency after he was certain that the pro-
government Liberal Party vote would be split three ways between Roxas II, Poe and Binay 
(Geronimo, 2015; Zamora, 2015).  It is offline factors such as this which also must be 
taken into account as opportunistic Facebook activity is only one strand in this political 
narrative.  As a result, it might never be possible to conclude exactly what kind of specific 
effect pro-Duterte Facebook content had during the 2016 Philippine presidential 
campaign.   
The shift in voter sentiments which handed Duterte victory after the second 
Presidential debate cannot be adequately pinned down without further examination either.  
All that can be said with some certainty is that thanks to the efforts of his social media 
team Rodrigo Duterte was well positioned to exploit it.  However, this claim can also 
detract from the strength of Duterte’s performances over the data collection period.  This 
is because he proved time and again how an absence of policy or planning can be turned 
to your advantage if you have instinctive charm and charisma.  It is a formula which may 
not have worked for any other candidate no matter how effectively they used Facebook 
and is further evidence that Duterte was a genuine phenomenon.  Yet the Philippine public 
could unexpectedly tire of him at any time just as they had suddenly gravitated towards 
him in late March 2016 when they sensed the vulnerability of his rivals.  This is the one 
saving grace of the fickleness which propelled Duterte to victory, but it could also cause 
him to become a victim of his own complacency.     
If Duterteism can be returned to its regional stronghold and confined there it may 
provide the Philippines with the opportunity to gradually erode the feudal grip that 
coercive bosses have on its provinces.  The period from 1986 to 2016 seems to have been 
a brief democratic interlude between dictatorships.  If a post-Duterte Philippines is going 
to be resilient enough to avoid this fate again then it will need to address the deficiencies 
which made Duterteism possible.  This will only occur in the country with the world’s 
heaviest Facebook users (“Fake news in the Philippines,” 2017) if a way can be found to 
limit social media’s potential to incite violence.  This development proved possible in 
the West after other communication mediums such as newspapers and radio had 
facilitated mass slaughter on an unprecedented scale during the first half of the 20th 
Century.  The current challenge is to convince Facebook (Gutierrez, 2018a, 2018b;  
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Robles, 2018) that the 21st Century requires a similar rejection of the extremism 
which is capable of hiding in plain sight beneath a thin shell of normalcy; 
particularly in fragile political contexts where members of out groups are still capable 
of being killed at any time. 
It is tempting to conclude that Duterte’s victory would have been impossible 
without manipulating Facebook and that his shifting and elastic candidacy was deliberately 
constructed in order to deceive different audiences.  However, these simplistic answers to 
this research’s main question and first sub-question ignore the complexities which arose 
while trying to answer the second.  If key political and media influencers really 
did intentionally assist Duterte then why were so many others of their ilk contemptuous 
and dismissive of his prospects?  This cannot be explained away by mere complacency 
and suggests that unlike the other main candidates Duterte had more detractors 
than cheerleaders throughout most of the campaign. This may have been because his 
blatant support for violence made it risky for members of the Manila elite to fully 
embrace him until his success appeared inevitable.  Nonetheless, the least attractive 
conclusion in Duterte’s case is also the most Filipino.  Although it is comforting to insist 
that he imposed himself on a vulnerable electorate through guile and subterfuge, the 
reality may be far more disturbing.  A significant number of Filipinos chose Duterte as 
their champion and expect him to wage a righteous war against the 
country’s traditional rulers, even while sacrificing large numbers of his own 
supporters in the process.  Yet even if some will eventually grow weary of the 
murder and mayhem he has unleashed, many might continue to reject the need for a 
pluralistic democracy which openly confronts its developmental challenges and 
history of failed quick fixes.  Instead, they may find an even more violent warrior 
king to lead them, and it is hard to imagine that the 
opportunistic use of social media of some kind would not play a part in their 
selection as well.        
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